Out of mind, out of sight - Freedom of the press and speech in South Caucasus and Türkiye

On the night of 21 August, Bahruz Samadov, an Azerbaijani doctoral candidate at Charles University in Prague, disappeared from the streets of Baku. He was not located until the following morning, when his family was able to confirm he had been arrested and charged with treason for having online contact with Armenians. Friends, including a journalist and a commentator best known for his study of the medieval Caucasian Albanian language, were also detained for hours, interrogated, and prevented from leaving the country as alleged “key witnesses”. The arrests mark the latest iteration in a steady degradation of freedom of expression and association that has accompanied an overall decline in democracy not just in Azerbaijan, but in the region more broadly. Although it has happened at different speeds, similar processes have played out in neighboring Georgia and Türkiye. 

Repressing speech 

Azerbaijan has steadily restricted freedom of expression over the years, culminating in the adoption of a controversial Law on Media in 2022 which created a compulsory and restrictive media registry. Since 2023, there has also been a renewed crackdown in which over 20 journalists have been arrested on bogus charges of smuggling. Scores of civic activists have been detained as well, and more have been placed on indefinite travel bans as retribution for their statements and activism.  

In Azerbaijan’s close partner Türkiye, independent and investigative reporters also regularly face censorship at the hands of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). Another common method of media and speech censorship takes place online, where thousands of websites have been blocked and court orders have banned access to news sites reporting on a wide range of current events. 

Such measures have been possible thanks to the duration of leaderships in power - the longer they remain in office, the tougher restrictions have become.  

Popular support? 

It is true that to some degree it is popular support that helps keep these leaders and governments in power; in Türkiye the AKP has been winning elections for 20 years and, in Georgia, the ruling Georgian Dream has been in power and won relatively free and fair elections for over a decade. But it is important to understand that even where elections are somewhat competitive, these leaders have relied on increasing levels of repression to maintain their stays in office.  

The AKP in Türkiye came to power in 2002 on the promise of economic stability. The party did deliver – when the world was hit with the global financial crisis in 2008 and 2009, the country’s economy continued growing. But economic stability is not enough when other institutions – both governmental and civic – are being gradually compromised and weakened. Democratic contraction has been on full display under the AKP, with ongoing arrests of critics and deteriorations reported in all basic rights and freedoms.  

In Georgia, where not so long ago there were high hopes for the country becoming part of the European Union, the ruling Georgian Dream has been pulling the country further away from the country’s partners. Despite what observers say was already a promising electoral outlook and a fractured opposition, the contested adoption of the “foreign agents” law illustrates how far the ruling party is willing to go to consolidate its power ahead of the parliamentary vote in October. Popular protests in response to the bill were met with truncheons, rubber bullets and water cannons. In August 2024, Georgian Dream leadership even began promising to outlaw all existing opposition parties should it win the upcoming election. 

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev recently marked 20 years in power and secured yet another victory in a snap presidential election in February 2024. Under his rule, Azerbaijan has made an international name for itself as a country rich in fossil fuels – but also one more interested in spending that wealth on “caviar diplomacy”, hosting lavish international events, and strengthening nepotism instead of improving the livelihoods of its 10 million citizens. Nevertheless, the ruling New Azerbaijan Party and President Ilham Aliyev are not widely or actively disliked and have benefited from victories in the second Karabakh war and the September 2023 military offensive into Nagorno-Karabakh.  

However, this increase in popularity has accelerated, not slowed, the silencing of civic groups, journalists, and activists who expose the scale of abuses and violations in the country. Azerbaijan has now over 300 political prisoners, and the scope of who can be considered a threat to the regime has widened from those who touch the affairs of the ruling family to critical journalists and scholars more broadly. A snap parliamentary election will take place in September 2024, but few hope this election will be any more free or fair than those that came before it.  

Democratic cooperation is key 

These developments illustrate that the textbook practices of autocratic backsliding are applicable, alive, and kicking. But so are democratic activists and engaged citizens in every one of these countries. And that matters, as it always takes an ally or a group of allies better yet to stand against the tides that go against the values that we so deeply cherish.  Perhaps these recent changes should serve as a lesson learned – consistency in partnership and engagement should be the way of moving forward in the region. The fate of democracy in the region may rest on democratizers in these countries learning to work together.