Ukraine
Ukraine exhibits mid-range performance in three categories of the Global State of Democracy framework (Representation, Rights and Participation), but it performs in the low range in Rule of Law. It is among the world’s top 25 per cent of countries in Gender Equality but is among the bottom 25 per cent in Freedom of Movement and Civic Engagement. Over the last five years, Ukraine has experienced notable advances in Gender Equality and Absence of Corruption while suffering declines in Freedom of Movement, Freedom of the Press, Free Political Parties and Civil Liberties. A lower-middle-income country, Ukraine is a major producer of metals and agricultural goods. However, outmigration is a serious issue, and between 15 and 25 per cent of the country’s pre-war labour force was estimated to be employed abroad.
Ukraine’s current political landscape is dominated by the ongoing Russian war of aggression, which began in February 2022. The war has prompted a surge of refugee outflows and internal displacement.
Since gaining independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine has commonly been characterized as having a “pro-Russian” versus “pro-Western” cleavage, but these terms are reductive. Although ethnicity, language, social class, and geography are strong drivers of the country’s political cleavages, they have not cleanly or consistently divided Ukraine into a Russophone, Slavicizing east and a Ukrainian-speaking, Europhile west. Together, ethnic Russians and Ukrainians make up over 90 percent of the population, with Belarusians, Moldovans, and Crimean Tatars making up the largest remaining minorities. Persistent gender inequality has been exacerbated by the Russian invasion, with women experiencing greater economic, physical, and psychosocial inequality than men.
In practice, ethnic and linguistic boundaries in Ukraine are blurred, bilingualism is near-universal, and large swathes of rural and suburban Ukraine rely on a Ukrainian-Russian creole known as surzhyk. Arguments over the relative status of the Russian and Ukrainian languages has been a frequent rallying point in national politics, but this discourse is often a proxy for other concerns about unemployment, inequality, the distribution of national resources, and corruption. The 2014 Euromaidan Revolution and the 2022 invasion triggered an ongoing renegotiation of Ukraine’s sense of national identity, the outcome of which remains uncertain.
In pre-war Ukraine, the controversial handling of reforms of judicial, electoral, and anti-corruption institutions were a driving political force. Broad-based efforts to improve the everyday functioning of government and fight corruption had been hampered by the often-countervailing force of strong patrimonial structures centred around powerful oligarchs or local power brokers. These oligarchs dominated the state and economy for nearly all of Ukraine’s independent history, only losing ground following the full-scale Russian invasion. Indeed, domestic dissatisfaction with corruption and state capture has driven two mass democratic revolutions in 2004 and 2014 in response to, respectively, electoral fraud and autocratization of the presidency. Behind the scenes struggles between oligarchs have resulted in constitutional instability and recurring public conflicts between the office of the president, the parliament, and government ministries loyal to various power brokers.
Civil Liberties and Free Political Parties have declined in recent years, reflecting bans on pro-Russian political parties and restrictions on movement that are part of the government’s wartime defence efforts. They may or may not be indicative of the country’s future post-war development. The short- and long-term democratic trajectory of Ukraine will be heavily influenced by the outcome of the ongoing war and the nature of its final settlement.
Updated: September 2024
https://www.idea.int/democracytracker/
August 2024
Parliament bans religious entities with connections to Russia
The Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) passed a bill on 20 August banning religious entities with connections to Russia from operating in Ukraine. The long-anticipated law primarily targets the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (OUCMP), a self-governing church which is under the authority of the Patriarchate of Moscow. OUCMP priests and bishops have been accused of directly collaborating or providing moral and public support for the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The OUCMP asserts the law is an unconstitutional overreach, and stresses that it separated administratively from the Moscow Patriarchate at the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion. Ukrainian officials dispute the OUCMP’s characterization of a break with Moscow. The law gives individual OUCMP parishes nine months to integrate with the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) or face dissolution. Many parishes are reportedly planning legal opposition to the new law and the OUCMP maintains significant international support. Seventy-two per cent of Ukrainians are Orthodox Christians.
Sources: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Kyiv Independent, Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, Public Orthodoxy
May 2024
Journalists return to Parliament
A limited number of Ukrainian journalists were accredited and allowed access to the Verkhovna Rada, the country’s parliament, on 5 May, marking the first time press has been allowed to cover parliamentary sessions since February 2022. Access to Parliament on the basis of security was restricted in the wake of the full-scale Russian invasion. Numerous restrictions remain in place: only 20 to 30 journalists will be accredited, down from 4,000 before the war; direct broadcasts and photographs are still prohibited, and journalistic access will be limited to a press centre. Media freedom watchdog Reporters without Borders welcomed the move as a step in the right direction.
Sources: Ukrainska Pravda, Reporters without Borders
Study finds ‘profound devastation’ of healthcare systems
Research published in the journal JAMA Health Forum in May assessing the impact of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on the country’s health infrastructure has found ‘profound devastation’ and a decline in the provision of all non-emergency healthcare services. The decline in routine and preventative services, such as gynaecological treatments and cancer screenings, is likely to have significant downstream effects on public health in the country. The situation in the country has been especially exacerbated by the Russian military’s deliberate targeting of healthcare facilities throughout the conflict, in violation of the laws of war.
Sources: JAMA Health Forum
April 2024
New mobilization law comes into effect
Ukraine’s long-debated new law on mobilization was signed into law on 16 April after a lengthy political and legislative process. The law intends to address the Ukrainian military’s struggle to recruit sufficient troops to continue to resist the Russian invasion, properly train and deploy new recruits, identify and punish draft evaders, and close loopholes that allow some Ukrainian men to otherwise avoid conscription. The new law overhauls the recruitment process, lowers the age for draft eligibility from 27 to 25, reduces the grounds for deferment, and introduces more penalties for evading conscription. The law has received criticism for not addressing the issue of demobilization.
Sources: Kyiv Independent (1), Centre of United Actions, Kyiv Independent (2), The Village Ukraine
Mobilization-aged men to lose consular services
The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry announced on 23 April it would cease consular support for Ukrainian men aged 18-60 residing abroad – meaning men would have to return to Ukraine to renew a passport, for example - with foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba suggesting these men should return to Ukraine and enlist in the armed forces. As with Ukraine’s conscription law, the policy does not apply to women.
Sources: Kyiv Independent, The Village Ukraine
March 2024
Parliament registers draft law that blocks banned party members from office
Ukraine’s parliament registered several draft laws that would indefinitely restrict the ability of members of the now-banned Party of Regions, Opposition Bloc, the Opposition Platform — For Life, Shariy Party and more from holding any political office at any level in the country. The parties were banned following Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022 for having links to Russia. The Venice Commission and ODIHR criticized the draft bills last year as indiscriminate and often unclear, and Ukrainian legal expert organization OPORA argued that members of the banned parties should only be prevented from holding office on the basis of a court decision. The draft laws will be considered by parliament and require presidential approval before becoming law.
Sources: OPORA, Evropeiska Pravda
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