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SUMMARY

Electoral officials serve as the guardians of democratic processes, ensuring that elections are conducted in a manner that is transparent, fair, accurate, and in compliance with the law. Their role is fundamental to the functioning of democratic systems and is as crucial as the role of the information environment in shaping the democratic landscape. 

Research by International IDEA (2023), confirmed by the electoral managers interviewed, found that, despite their pivotal function, or many times because of it, electoral officials all over the world face tremendous harassment, aggression, and (gender-based) disinformation in the information environment, online and offline. 

A prevalent tendency to trivialize these malicious practices was noticed, leading to a perception that such actions are inherent to the role of electoral manager. In reality, these actions have serious and multifaceted implications, ranging from loss of the electoral management bodies (EMBs) institutional capacity (Bicu, 2022), to individual and family trauma (The Carter Center, 2022) to democratic erosion, potentially escalating to violence.

The general public witnessing such behaviors often tends to accept them as legitimate expressions of dissatisfaction by citizens with state officials. While in some cases these attacks are the genuine manifestation of public discontent with the national situation, often the strategies behind these attacks are part of concerted efforts by various entities aiming to discredit leading electoral officials, and the institutions they manage and undermine trust in the electoral outcome. 

The strategies of attack, with an obvious gender dimension, often involve coordination between mainstream and online media, with digital platforms being central to these dynamics. The absence of physical and time constraints, perceived impunity stemming from insufficient oversight, the opportunities for anonymity, microtargeting, inauthentic behaviors, and amplification all empower malign actors to aggressively target electoral officials in the online information environment without fear of facing repercussions in the offline world.

The demarcation between actual initiators, whether national or foreign, is unclear, especially in light of revelations regarding covert political funding by foreign actors (CBC, 2023). Nonetheless, the overwhelming majority of documented cases of disinformation and other types of aggression and harassment against electoral officials have been initiated by national political figures, in opposition or holding different roles within state structures.

The strategies of attack often involve coordination of messaging on mainstream and online media, with digital platforms being central to these dynamics. The absence of physical and time constraints, perceived impunity stemming from insufficient oversight, the opportunities for anonymity, microtargeting, inauthentic behaviors, and amplification all empower malign actors to aggressively target electoral officials in the online information environment without fear of facing repercussions in the offline world.

These attacks target the pillars of trust in elections (Wolf and Pearce Laanela, 2022). The objectives, as they emerged from our research, tend to converge towards gaining or retaining political power over electoral processes to be able to influence the results of elections, voter suppression, or influencing the perception of the correctness of the results. The aim for the latter is usually to justify loss or generate unacceptance of electoral outcomes with all its societal and political implications. 

This global phenomenon with devastating consequences requires immediate action from the responsible entities, particularly online platforms, and strong commitments from political actors and mainstream media who are often listed amongst the perpetrators or initiators of these attacks. 

The risk of altering or rejecting electoral outcomes - stemming from the loss of functional independence and political subjugation of EMBs through the substitution of impartial and committed electoral officials with individuals serving less democratic agendas - can reverberate beyond national borders, impacting global stability. 

This underscores the urgency for comprehensive countermeasures, particularly in the wake of the rapid emergence of artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled technologies. AI can negatively impact electoral officials, institutions, processes, and the democratic landscape in a country by empowering malign actors with more effective tools for the creation and spread of disinformation, realistic deepfakes, and other types of harmful conduct and content, among other malign practices.

 

INTRODUCTION

Background 

As communication technologies evolve swiftly, the dynamics of democratic processes and electoral integrity are continually reshaped and challenged. The digital environment has amplified the reach and impact of information, generating both opportunities for enhanced democratic engagement and vulnerabilities exploited to undermine the foundations of democratic societies. The intersection of technology and democratic processes has revealed a pressing need to protect electoral integrity and the well-being of those entrusted with upholding it.

Electoral officials are pivotal in the democratic ecosystem, functioning as the guarantees of electoral processes. Their roles are complex, and they ultimately encompass the assurance of fairness, transparency, and accuracy of elections. 

The digital but also traditional media environment emerged as a breeding ground for disinformation, harassment, and aggression targeting electoral officials. These attacks are meticulously orchestrated to discredit individuals and institutions, affecting the overall integrity and reliability of electoral processes and outcomes.

A survey conducted by International IDEA reveals (Figure 1) that the majority of the 229 electoral officials who answered it, spanning 73 countries, have been targeted by disinformation and/or online aggression while serving in their official capacities. Further confirmation of the prevalence of these malicious practices comes from qualitative interviews with 30 electoral officials in high-visibility roles, globally (International IDEA 2023). 

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_{Figure 1: Global survey on disinformation and/or online aggression and harassment against electoral officials
Source: Answers by 229 electoral officials to the question “Were you targeted by disinformation and/or online aggression and harassment while in your position within the electoral management body?”, conducted by International IDEA between February 2022 – February 2023 and firstly mentioned in International IDEA 2023 report on The Information environment around elections.}

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Moreover, during a confidential event hosted by International IDEA in November 2022, 23 top-ranking EMB officials from around the world elaborated on the varied strategies used against them (Bicu & Park 2023).

 In recent years, this global phenomenon escalated, with a huge number of online attacks of extreme violence highlighting a worrying trend globally. These attacks range from disinformation campaigns and online harassment to direct intimidation and threats, impacting not only the targeted officials and their inner circle but also the democratic system and potentially the world order.

Objective

Given the profound implications of such attacks, there is an imperative need to identify the perpetrators, delve into the reasons behind these malign practices, and understand the broader context in which they occur. This research is anchored in the necessity to elucidate the motivations, strategies, and impacts of online attacks against electoral officials. It aims to contribute to the development of comprehensive, evidence-based strategies and recommendations to build resilience against such threats, hold the perpetrators accountable, and to preserve the integrity of democratic processes.

Through addressing overarching questions such as

Who are the primary actors involved?

What objectives are they pursuing?

How do they operate? What means and tools are employed in their operations?

What are the consequences on an individual, institutional, and societal level?

Which countermeasures have been implemented? Which were effective, and which were not?, 

the report seeks to provide actionable, evidence-based recommendations for the various stakeholders responsible for ensuring a safe information environment around elections and protecting electoral officials in the exercise of their duties and beyond. 

The objective is to enable electoral officials to manage and conduct trustworthy elections with accepted outcomes while maintaining their mental well-being and fostering professional growth. This is particularly pertinent for women and other typically marginalized groups in electoral management who, according to our research (Bicu, 2023), face additional layers or harassment and aggression.

Methodology

The background, definitions, methodology overview and context in the introductory section of the Information Environment around Elections page are relevant for properly framing this report.

The methodology to gather information for this report, on attacks in the form of disinformation, aggression, and harassment towards electoral officials, with an important gender angle, involved a mixed-methods approach, combining both quantitative and qualitative data collection techniques.

Firstly, an online survey was conducted, which received responses from 229 electoral officials in 73 countries between February 2022 and February 2023. The survey aimed at identifying the electoral officials targeted by malign practices in the information space, as well as establishing the incidence of such attacks against individuals.

Secondly, interviews were conducted with 30 current and former electoral officials from all regions of the world, selected based on the confirmation of their negative experiences and availability for being interviewed. Through conducting in-depth interviews with a sub-sample of survey respondents, more detailed and nuanced qualitative data was gathered. These interviews explored the motivations and strategies of those perpetrating the attacks, the specific tactics used, and the personal and institutional impacts of the attacks. 

Thirdly, a closed-door in-person roundtable discussion was organized, where 23 current and former chairs and members of EMBs, a balanced representation of men and women, shared their experiences with disinformation, aggression, and harassment. Among others, issues such as the effectiveness of current strategies to combat disinformation, the role of social media in spreading disinformation and facilitating harmful conduct, and potential solutions to reduce the impact of attacks on electoral officials and institutions were explored.

The interviews and roundtable discussions were held under Chatham House Rule to protect the identity of participants, considering the sensitivity of the topic.

The role of electoral officials in the democratic landscape 

The integrity of electoral processes is pivotal for maintaining the legitimacy of democratic societies, with electoral officials playing an indispensable role in preserving this integrity and ensuring the public trust in democratic systems (James & Clark, 2020). These officials hold the responsibility for the implementation of electoral procedures, monitoring the conduct of elections, and certifying the results, hence becoming a foundation stone for the establishment of confidence in electoral outcomes (James, 2019).

Officials holding prominent positions, such as those chairing EMBs, assume overarching responsibilities, providing strategic direction, ensuring adherence to electoral laws and regulations, and coordinating the multifaceted work of their colleagues (Garnett, 2019). 

These officials, working across various functions within the EMB and throughout the electoral cycle, are the custodians of democratic principles of free and fair elections, elements indispensable for the legitimacy of governments and the smooth operation of democratic frameworks (James et al., 2019). Their impartiality, professionalism, competence, and unwavering commitment to preserving electoral integrity are essential to conducting elections in a manner that is transparent, inclusive, and accountable.

Considering their vital role in the democratic landscape described above, electoral officials easily become the target of malign actors with different agendas but overlapping strategies. Particularly exposed appear to be the electoral officials in high visibility roles from EMBs overseeing the regulation of political parties and electoral campaigns.

 

ACTORS, OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIES OF ATTACK

 

Perpetrators

The research revealed a wide range of actors involved in online aggression and disinformation campaigns aimed at electoral officials (Figure 2). 

The 30 electoral officials in high-visibility roles across various world regions interviewed unanimously indicated political figures among the main perpetrators. 

Mainstream media and journalists, particularly those who are biased and politicized due to being owned or financed by political actors, have been identified by 93% of the interviewees as playing a crucial role in initiating and disseminating disinformation and attacks against electoral officials.

A great majority (77%) also referred to the incumbent government and state entities, sometimes including specialized governmental structures or agencies as initiators of attacks against electoral officials.

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_{Figure 2: Perpetrators of attacks against electoral officials in the information environment. Source: The answers to the interviews conducted by the author with the 30 electoral officials in high-visibility roles from across the globe}

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Additionally, influencers, advocacy groups, and private individuals acting as political party supporters or with certain ideological convictions, along with civil society organizations with political agendas were noted as playing prominent roles in the malign strategies targeting electoral officials in the information environment.

A particularly concerning category of perpetrators, although not very frequently mentioned, are the members of the EMB’s staff, attacking usually the chair of the electoral management body through different means, ranging from contradicting their official statements to attacks on their personal life.

Other domestic actors include prominent religious clergy, syndicate leaders, and vendors aiming at providing services to EMBs. 

The influence industry, both domestic and foreign, emerged as an important player in the attack strategies against electoral officials in the informational ecosystem, although difficult to isolate its interventions. This industry encompasses a diverse range of actors, including political consultants, public relations firms, data analytics companies, and other entities specializing in shaping public opinion and behavior. Their role is multifaceted, and as proved by this and previous research, often extends to the orchestration of comprehensive influence campaigns. 

Several external state and non-state entities have been identified by the participants in the research project as originators of disinformation and harassment against electoral officials. These include foreign actors with connections in the country, foreign non-state actors, external entities exhibiting inauthentic behavior to amplify domestic actors, and foreign state actors. Additionally, individuals or groups within the diaspora and certain “criminal elements” have also been listed as sources of such disruptive activities.

Reasons and objectives

Individuals or entities might be interested in discrediting electoral officials for various reasons (Figure 3), primarily related to undermining democratic processes and institutions for their gains. 

Disinformation, aggression and harassment against electoral officials in high visibility roles are often a strategic endeavor to manipulate perceptions and outcomes, subvert democratic processes, and gain advantages in the political landscape.

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_{Figure 3: Objectives of the attacks against electoral officials in the information environment around elections.
Source: International IDEA research on the information environment around elections and the challenges for electoral officials.}

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Retain or gain political control

When political actors are involved, these attacks can be expected from both incumbents and opposition. Objectives behind these attacks included influencing the independence of the EMBs and gaining or retaining political control over both the institution and its staff, ultimately leading to control over the results of future elections.  Autocratic regimes or those with autocratic tendencies may attack electoral officials to suppress democratic processes and maintain or extend their hold on power. 

Officials noted that attacks on the chair of the electoral authority could result in their removal and replacement with a more influenceable individual, potentially benefiting those in power. The harassment and disinformation campaigns against electoral officials were used as a tactic to coerce or manipulate them into making decisions favorable to the perpetrators or to discredit them should they make unfavorable decisions.

Undermine trust in the electoral results

The targeted and sustained efforts to discredit electoral officials can substantively contribute to shaping public opinion and manipulating voter behaviors. Distrust in the officials and the electoral process as a whole, can result in lower voter turnout, to the benefit of certain parties or political actors, or lead to questioning of the electoral outcomes.

Change ineffective government 

The attacks on electoral officials in the information environment were also linked to widespread disappointment and disillusionment among citizens due to negative events in the respective countries and perceived as government failures. This societal discontent, although not necessarily generated by the performance of the EMB, directly impacts the credibility of electoral management bodies and the officials affiliated with them, as they become symbolic representations of broader governmental and societal dysfunctions. 

Some individuals or groups may aim to discredit electoral officials to generate social or political change, particularly if they perceive the existing system or officials as corrupt, unfair, or ineffective. In highly polarized environments, electoral officials were perceived as being affiliated with or favoring one political group over another, making them a target for attacks from opposing factions.

Neutralize individual targets

Some respondents noted that the attacks were more personal and aimed to undermine the individual leading the EMB rather than the institution. 

Disinformation initiated or disseminated by fellow electoral officials was documented in some countries and represents a deeply concerning instance of attacks in the information environments due to its profoundly damaging potential. Such acts can hide professional aspirations, such as replacing the incumbent chair in the top management position within the EMB, or are a modality to advance the interests of political entities or actors.

Obtain financial benefits

For certain actors, financial incentives were listed as triggers for spreading false information and harmful content against electoral officials. In the case of bloggers, influencers, and media outlets, for example, those types of content may have a higher chance of becoming viral, leading to higher engagement and increased profits. 

Providers of services to the EMBs were also listed amongst the attackers driven by financial interest. They are using the attacks against electoral officials as a means to influence policies, regulations, and governmental decisions in their favor.

In the same category can be included political and electoral competitors aspiring to higher finances and less oversight from the state. These attacks are strategic, intending to discredit electoral officials and thus pave the way for changes that could benefit them financially and politically.

Fulfil ideological convictions

Various participants agreed that malign actors, by excluding and silencing women in electoral management through gender-based attacks in the information environment, act in accordance with their stereotypical convictions about women's roles in society and their perceived incapacity to fulfill such roles effectively.

Generate societal disruptions

Disinformation and harassment aimed at electoral officials can destabilize the electoral process, increase political polarization and social discord, creating chaos, confusion, and diminishing the legitimacy of elections. It can lead to conflict and weaken societal cohesion. 

Influence the geopolitical landscape

External actors may seek to discredit electoral officials to interfere in a country’s electoral processes, promoting their geopolitical interests and affecting international relations.

Attacks coming from foreign state actors may be also motivated by a desire to influence the newly elected government and its policies, particularly if the party or individual in power aligns with the foreign actor's interests.

Means and tactics 

In most instances, attacks against electoral officials are not isolated or sporadic. Instead, they are part of well-crafted, complex, and systematic strategies, adhering to clearly delineated objectives. 

The figure below indicates the frequency of use of various forms of digital aggression and harassment, many times gender-based, as reported by the interviewed electoral officials. 

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_{Figure 4: Forms of digital aggression and harassment used against electoral officials in the information environment and their frequency.
Source: The answers to the interviews conducted by the author with the 30 electoral officials in high-visibility roles from across the globe.}

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Coordinated inauthentic behavior

“Digital warriors”, “troll farms”, “digital armies”, and “digital lynching” were repeatedly mentioned by interviewees as being involved in the execution of digital attacks. While difficult to establish the real initiators, such campaigns many times appear to benefit the government and political actors and were implemented either by specialized governmental structures or were intermediated by the influence industry (Hamada, Bicu, and Wolf, 2023). They were described as persistent, sophisticated, and multifaceted, aiming to influence the information environment around elections, manipulate public perception, and also contribute to the polarization of audiences. 

Instances of external inauthentic behavior to amplify domestic actors were also described. This involves foreign entities artificially boosting the reach and impact of certain domestic actors’ attacks against electoral officials and influencing the domestic discourse.

Disguise techniques

Harmful content aimed at individuals in electoral management often goes unnoticed due to being disguised through methods like malign euphemistic content or ephemeral posts[i], making it challenging to detect and report and frequently evading content moderation and fact-checking efforts on social media platforms. Additionally, entertainment media was cited as a vehicle for disseminating malign narratives under the guise of "satire" or "pamphlet".

High-profile national figures as superspreaders 

The initiation or dissemination of attacks directly by domestic high-profile influencers, such as heads of state and other prominent governmental and political figures, further amplify the credibility and reach of these acts of disinformation and aggression against electoral officials, leading to their escalation in terms of volume and aggressiveness, and consequently generate a higher impact. 

Attacks against the inner circle

Intimidation tactics against family and friends were also utilized in an attempt to control electoral officials, along with tactics aimed at humiliating and degrading their competencies. 

Coordination between online and traditional media

A tactic frequently highlighted was the one where mainstream media acted as a platform for public dialogue and discussion, strategically initiating topics that polarize or propagate untruths and that end up being used in social media for attacks against electoral officials. 

Discord seeded internally and between electoral actors

Additionally, creating polarization between EMB’s staff members, between different government agencies and the representatives of the electoral authority, and even between the electoral institution and political competitors was identified as a tactic to destabilize the electoral authority and create distrust.

Threats and instigation of violence in real life

Online actions meant to instigate violence and convey intimidating messages to electoral officials in high visibility positions which resulted in manifestation in real life were documented in several cases. Some participants also noted that their staff experienced violence or even death threats in real life. 

Pressure through legal actions

Furthermore, civil society organizations, potentially affiliated with specific political parties, issued threats or commenced legal proceedings and trials in courts to exert pressure on the leadership of the EMBs.

Discrediting narratives

Disinformation narratives targeting electoral officials primarily center around alleged political affiliations, favoritism towards a specific electoral competitor, and accusations of electoral fraud. Additionally, there's scrutiny of the expenditures of the EMBs and the incomes of the electoral officials. Narratives also exploit often the officials' professional and personal backgrounds to paint them as politically biased or lacking in integrity.

While these narratives generally apply to both male and female electoral officials participating in this research, as developed across the report, women disproportionately face attacks centered on their personal lives and, in addition, that exploit gender societal stereotypes.

Gender-based attacks

Male and female electoral officials answering International IDEA’s survey on disinformation declared in relatively equal proportions having been targeted with such malign content while in their official positions. 

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_{Figure 5 (left): Disinformation against electoral officials: gender distribution of answers (men)}

_{Figure 6 (right): Disinformation against electoral officials: gender distribution of answers (women)}

Source: Answers by electoral officials who identify as men and as women to the question “Were you targeted by disinformation and/or online aggression and harassment while in your position within the electoral management body?”, conducted by International IDEA between February 2022 – February 2023 and firstly mentioned in International IDEA 2023 report on The Information environment around elections.

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However, more women than men answered the survey (Figure 7). The great majority of the female participants reported attacks that included a gender dimension, involving sexualization, objectification, and name-calling to humiliate and undermine their credibility and professional capacity. Various female participants also reported facing threats of sexual violence.

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_{Figure 7: Disinformation against electoral officials.}

Source: Answers by electoral officials who identify as men and as women to the question “Were you targeted by disinformation and/or online aggression and harassment while in your position within the electoral management body?”, conducted by International IDEA between February 2022 – February 2023 and firstly mentioned in International IDEA 2023 report on The Information environment around elections.

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These gender-based attacks did not target male predecessors and successors with the same frequency or type of content and conduct, illustrating a clear disparity in the experience of male and female officials regarding the impact of their gender. The majority of male electoral officials participating in the study did not perceive their gender as an additional vulnerability in the face of attacks in the information environment. Additionally, most male officials in leadership positions did not consider resignation, contrasting with their female counterparts. Several female chairs of EMBs not only considered renouncing their leading roles within the electoral administration, but several quit their positions or chose not to pursue new mandates, highlighting the tangible impact of gender-based discrepancies in experiences and responses to such attacks.

The presence of a woman as the chair or representative of the EMB tends to draw attacks that are more personalized and sexualized. This indicates a focus on the individual rather than the institution, with women particularly subjected to gender-specific forms of harassment, disinformation, and defamation.

 

 

Women in prominent roles within electoral management bodies are often depicted as untrustworthy, incompetent, and biased. The critiques often extend to personal attacks with a gender dimension, such as insinuations about their marital status, including derogatory comments about being single or unmarried and even negative comments about their belonging to a specific ethnic group. Other stereotypical characterizations, sometimes voiced in public meetings with political parties and government officials suggest that women are overly emotional and, therefore, ineffective in their roles. 

 

 

Many interviewed women electoral officials emphasized that harassment, insults, and comments including threats and sexist remarks, often appear in private messages and on the EMB’s wall, targeting the women chair of the EMB and other female members of the EMB in high visibility roles. In some cases, while initially there was no moderation of comments, due to the prevalence of sexual content, harassment, and graphic pictures, moderation became necessary. In some instances, a surge of spam containing graphic images was noticed.

These attacks and baseless stereotypical assertions illustrate the intersectional nature of the challenges faced by women in electoral management (Bicu, 2022) in the information environment and serve to undermine the credibility and authority of women in elections.

Media of unfolding

Online platforms were identified as playing a significant role in facilitating the spread of disinformation. These platforms, driven by algorithms designed to maximize user engagement and profits, have become breeding grounds for disinformation and inflammatory content. Such content tends to spread more easily and rapidly, contributing to the erosion of trust in electoral institutions and officials. 

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_{Figure 8: Level of manifestation of harmful conduct and content on each indicated platform
Source: The answers to the interviews conducted by the author with 30 electoral officials in high-visibility roles from across the globe}

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Social media like Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, and YouTube were identified as the primary platforms for spreading disinformation and enabling other types of harmful conduct and content against electoral officials (Figure 8). Participants in the research also reported that their private accounts on social media were hacked, and fake accounts were created in their name to spread false information and intimidate voters and themselves. They criticized social media platforms for the difficulty of monitoring and stopping the spread of disinformation and their lack of action to prevent and retain the harmful conduct in this space.

Various electoral officials declared that they received threatening and abusive direct calls and messages on their private communication devices, inclusively at late night hours, as a means of intimidation.

Concerns were voiced more recently about the employment of surveillance software tools and the imminence of AI-enabled tools as part of the strategies designed to attack electoral officials in the information environment. 

Traditional media outlets, such as news outlets, print, and radio, were also identified as platforms for spreading false information and attacks against electoral officials. Some journalists or media houses with links to political actors used their platforms to spread disinformation or question the integrity of the electoral officials, but due to regulation and oversight of traditional media, the attacks were more subtle and less violent. 

In many countries, there was no real division between social and traditional media, with messages or information for instance sent through private messaging apps being published on social media platforms, before being quickly picked up by mainstream media. Such strategies leave little time to comprehend or respond to false information or accusations for the targeted electoral officials and institutions.

There were reports of harassment strategies involving mainstream and online media, perpetrated by governments to gains some level of control over the electoral authorities and impact public perception of the electoral institution and electoral officials through the news cycle. 

Timing of attacks

According to the participants, disinformation and attacks against electoral officials were spread at different levels throughout the electoral cycle. 

The immediate catalyst for attacks often stems from a decision made by the EMB, and being a woman who leads it, the attack tends to escalate to include sexist elements.

Most of the responders reported that the intensity of disruptions did exhibit variations throughout the electoral cycle, peaking notably as elections approached, during major announcements related to elections, and immediately after elections. The periods of heightened intensity were particularly observed during the electoral campaign and before elections and extended to some post-election phases. They were generally correlated significantly with the country’s political context and major political events. 

During and after the election, the highest levels of disinformation were noted by some participants, especially from the losing parties and their supporters. Such situations often included accusations of electoral fraud and questioning of the integrity of the electoral management body and its staff.

 

IMPACT: THE IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCES AND THEIR REVERBERATIONS

 

Digital platforms and online media, alongside mainstream media, are exploited by malign actors to manipulate public perception of various aspects of democratic processes, including the fairness of electoral management and the integrity of electoral officials. 

Women in electoral management face an additional layer of disinformation and attacks, based on gender. Stereotypes and misogyny fuel campaigns that portray them as incapable, further perpetuating inequality.

The profoundly damaging effect of these attacks in the information environment can be observed on multiple levels. 

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_{Figure 8: The progressive impact of attacks against electoral officials in the information space on democracy
Source: International IDEA video on the challenges for electoral officials in the information space}

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On individuals

At a personal level, electoral officials face reputational damage, restraints or violations of their fundamental rights, psychological trauma, and even physical violence. Electoral officials overwhelmingly reported feeling unsafe, particularly as elections approached. 

 

 

This feeling of unsafety was not exclusive to the officials but extended to their families and inner circle, who were distressed by the ongoing attacks in the information environment and concerned about potential physical harm. 

Various noted negative impacts on their children, such as harassment in their physical life, leading to some being forced to leave the country. One participant even noted that their neighbour’s family was sent death threats, which led to the family being separated for their own safety.

 

 

 

The devastating consequences extend to their close ones. Many participants reported that they tried to limit their visibility in public with their close ones and shield their families from being associated with their work. 

 

 

Moreover, electoral officials have recounted instances where individuals within their close circles chose to distance themselves due to fear of repercussions. In some cases, participants noted that their friends or relatives had decided to distance themselves from them because they believed the false, discrediting narratives.

The participants unanimously shared the negative impact that attacks had on their personal and social lives. The sense of danger generated by the intensity and extreme violence of the attacks in the online space was so profound that many refrained from appearing in public places for extended periods, leading to discussion on the detrimental impact of these attacks on their rights and freedoms. 

 

 

The majority of the electoral officials interviewed, particularly women, significantly reduced their online presence as well or have completely deleted their social media accounts due to the extremely harmful content and conduct targeted at them through these platforms.

 

 

The attacks had also a significant impact on the mental health (The Washington Post, 2023) of the targeted electoral officials, their families, friends, and social groups. They also described feeling lost and unsure of how to defend themselves, their families, and the institutions they were leading against false allegations and attacks. Some participants noted losing their enthusiasm for working in elections due to the humiliation and harassment they faced.

 

 

Constant and aggressive campaigns of disinformation and harassment deterred electoral officials from performing their duties to the highest standards, as they diverted attention and energy away from the actual priority: elections. These campaigns also discouraged competent and eligible individuals from retaining or assuming various roles throughout the electoral cycle, ultimately leading to their replacement by actors serving specific political agendas. Due to these attacks, several electoral officials have either resigned or chosen not to pursue another mandate as chairs of EMBs. 

 

 

The reputational damage incurred affects electoral officials sometimes even beyond their tenure in electoral management roles.

 

 

On EMBs

Institutionally, these attacks had a detrimental impact in several areas. 

In some cases, persistent malign attacks against individuals in electoral management undermined confidence in the institution’s ability to conduct free and fair elections and led to a partial loss of public trust in the integrity of the electoral process and the reliability of election outcomes.

Disinformation and other malign conduct and content targeting electoral officials, particularly from within the organization is especially concerning because it has a serious and multifaceted impact: it affects the trust internally, creates a hostile work environment, impacting cooperation and organizational cohesion and diminishing the overall efficacy of the electoral body. The EMB also becomes more vulnerable to external threats and manipulations, further jeopardizing the electoral process. 

Several electoral officials noted that these malign behaviors affected staff morale, with many electoral officials leaving their roles due to fear of facing similar attacks. Additionally, they indicated that the public attacks they experienced in the information environment acted as a deterrent for potential future electoral officials, leading to recruitment challenges for the EMB and subsequently impacting the quality of electoral management.

For the EMBs implementing measures that include monitoring the information environment, this process involved allocating and training staff specifically for this endeavor.

Disinformation campaigns against electoral officials had repercussions also on the allocation of financial resources to EMBs. These campaigns lead decision-makers to allocate fewer financial resources for electoral management, either based on the perceived inefficiency or corruption within these bodies, fueled by the disseminated disinformation or under this pretext.

Additionally, electoral managers pointed out the need for substantial investments to enhance human, technological, and institutional capacity to effectively address the evolving challenges in the information environment.

At societal level

The behaviors described, including disinformation, aggression, and harassment campaigns against electoral officials and the perpetuation of gender-based stereotypes and biases, have extensive and multifaceted impacts at the societal level. 

The disinformation, aggression, and harassment against electoral officials, particularly the ones in high visibility roles, act as intimidating, discouraging examples for colleagues, but also unrelated individuals. This fosters a climate of fear, deterring individuals from participating in or associating with, electoral processes or any activities that may expose them to similar risks or threats. 

The hostile information environment inhibits freedom of expression and open dialogue, with individuals self-censoring or withdrawing from public discourse out of fear of becoming a victim of online aggression. 

 

 

Moreover, polarizing strategies and narratives that incite aggression and violence against electoral officials, create societal divisions, heighten tensions, and lead to conflicts, thereby destabilizing communities. This also leads to decreased voter turnout. 

Women, facing heightened levels of gender-based aggression, harassment, and disinformation, are deterred from participating fully in political and electoral life, hampering efforts towards achieving gender equality and inclusiveness in democratic processes. Additionally, the organic adoption of malicious narratives by audiences with less critical thinking skills fortify and perpetuate harmful stereotypes and biases at the societal level, affecting interpersonal relations, social cohesion, and equality.

The exposure to constant aggression and harassment behaviors in the information space has detrimental effects on individuals' mental well-being, affecting not only the targeted electoral officials but also fellow colleagues and it extends to the audiences exposed to such conduct and content. 

 

 

The continuous and concerted aggression and disinformation against individuals in electoral management ultimately result in undermining democratic systems. 

Lessons learned

Many interviewed EMBs officials acknowledged the critical linkage between operational excellence in conducting elections and the deployment of strategic communication. They emphasized that trust is built fundamentally on the seamless execution of elections, which sets the stage for the electoral body to establish and consolidate its credibility. Subsequent effective communication further reinforces this trust, enabling the public to recognize and appreciate the EMB's and it’s staff genuine competence and dedication to its mandate. 

In light of the complexities faced in the information environment, interviewed officials highlighted a marked effort to enhance transparency and open up their activities to diverse audiences, rather than just specialized ones. This shift towards open dialogue and strategic messaging is vital to counter any misconceptions and ensure that accurate information is effectively disseminated and reaches a wider audience.

Another aspect listed by the participants has been the increased resilience of EMBs against cyber-enabled threats (van der Staak, Peter Wolf, 2019). Their workflows have seen optimization, and there’s been a concentrated effort to develop crisis communication strategies tailored to today’s challenges.

The EMBs’ efforts in either enhancing existing collaboration mechanisms or creating new ones to engage with relevant stakeholders and contribute to a safer, cleaner information environment were also noted as a positive outcome of the otherwise profoundly negative context.

 

MEASURES AND THEIR EFFECTIVENESS 

To mitigate the adverse impacts of disinformation, participants mentioned the establishment of mechanisms aimed at monitoring and countering disinformation, including collaboration with civil society organizations, mainstream media outlets, and social media platforms. Additionally, there has been a recalibration of resource allocation in some cases, with an emphasis on training staff to counteract disinformation.

New routines aimed at safeguarding staff members in their physical lives included the implementation of enhanced security measures and the allocation of additional resources dedicated to staff protection. 

However, most of the measures focused on protecting EMBs and elections (Asplund and Casentini, 2024) against disinformation attacks in the information environment and less on protecting the individuals managing electoral processes.

In response to personal attacks, most of the electoral officials limited their countermeasures to media appearances and statements, aiming not to further empower the perpetrators by directly reacting to them. Many electoral officials claimed they felt lonely in front of those campaigns targeting them personally and their close ones and didn’t know how best to address those attacks to avoid exacerbating their intensity, violence, and the implicit negative impact on all levels.

Their primary strategy was to disseminate accurate information to counter the accusations. This approach involved in some cases a significant presence in traditional media, where possible, which subsequently echoed on social media. They maintained a stance of not counterattacking any individual, even those launching severe attacks, to avoid escalating conflict and amplifying the reach. 

A positive reputation and political neutrality of the electoral officials in high visibility roles played an important role in rallying people’s support and protection against attempts of attack in the information environment. In such instances, the public's trust and respect for the officials, based on their past performance and reputation, served to counterbalance the negative narratives and allow for a more resilient and robust defense against attempts to discredit them and the institutions and processes they were managing.

Communication 

The EMBs developed and implemented communication and outreach plans through different media to enhance transparency and trust throughout electoral processes. Information on different electoral processes was disseminated using diverse traditional and online platforms. A combination of regular social media posts and videos, press releases, and press conferences was aimed to clarify and provide transparency on institutional decisions. 

Some participants noted that structures were created within the EMBs to monitor and combat disinformation. However, this involved substantial resources allocation and most of the time did not include identifying and addressing attacks against electoral officials. Some EMBs maintain public repositories for debunked disinformation on their websites. By providing a trustworthy source of information and context to the public, these repositories help debunk false narratives and sustain the credibility and integrity of both the electoral processes and the institutions responsible. They are easily accessible and have proven effective in providing a transparent and reliable source of information to counteract falsehoods. 

Some EMBs maintain public repositories for debunked disinformation on their websites. By providing a trustworthy source of information and context to the public, these repositories help debunk false narratives and sustain the credibility and integrity of both the electoral processes and the institutions responsible. They are easily accessible and have proven effective in providing a transparent and reliable source of information to counteract falsehoods. 

Some EMBs maintain public repositories for debunked disinformation on their websites. By providing a trustworthy source of information and context to the public, these repositories help debunk false narratives and sustain the credibility and integrity of both the electoral processes and the institutions responsible. They are easily accessible and have proven effective in providing a transparent and reliable source of information to counteract falsehoods. 

Some EMBs maintain public repositories for debunked disinformation on their websites. By providing a trustworthy source of information and context to the public, these repositories help debunk false narratives and sustain the credibility and integrity of both the electoral processes and the institutions responsible. They are easily accessible and have proven effective in providing a transparent and reliable source of information to counteract falsehoods. 

In terms of personal exposure, the approach by EMB chairs worldwide in addressing disinformation targeting elections was diverse: while some electoral officials decided to keep as low profile as possible, to avoid fuelling additional attacks, many decided to follow a strategy where they would be the main figure for conveying the messages on behalf of the EMB, to help increase trust in the electoral body. The level of exposure appeared to be proportional to the subsequent level of intensity of attacks against the individuals.

Collaboration

Some participants mentioned the existence of national collaboration networks. Where established, these networks involved cooperation between different stakeholders, including in some cases security and intelligence agencies, political parties, ministries, and civil society, aiming to create robust solutions and enhance the collective ability to respond to and overcome such challenges. 

Several participants highlighted the importance of early collaboration, development, and implementation of preemptive, collaborative measures, and increasing transparency of their work, and emphasized that protecting individuals managing elections is fundamental to the protection of the democratic processes.  

Collaboration with fact-checkers was established in some cases and had proved effective in debunking disinformation targeting elections.

Some participants confirmed their EMBs signed memorandums of understanding with the main social media platforms activating in their countries, while others mentioned that the institutions they were leading occasionally reached out to platforms to request the deactivation of impersonating accounts, the ones replicating the official EMBs page and the ones spreading false and misleading information related to electoral processes. This resulted, according to officials, in the removal of several government-affiliated social media accounts, among others. 

However, as noted by the electoral officials, the efficacy of these interventions by social media platforms was limited, as new accounts were swiftly created to continue the attacks. 

Various participants have found it beneficial to exchange experiences and identify good practices, as well as to raise awareness through discussions with other countries. 

However, these approaches didn’t focus on the types of attacks individuals in electoral management usually face in the information environment, but rather on combating disinformation targeting electoral processes.

Many female participants reported receiving minimal or no support from the public or other institutions for their protection.

Training and education

Some EMBs have trained their staff against disinformation, aggression, and harassment both online and in real life. This endeavor aimed at equipping their staff with the necessary skills and knowledge to identify and respond effectively to such challenges and cover various aspects, including digital literacy, security protocols, and strategies to handle different forms of harassment and aggressive behavior.

Education for citizens, political competitors, media, and other relevant stakeholders was also mentioned as a beneficial measure adopted by some EMBs. 

Physical security measures

As a result of extremely aggressive attacks in the online information environment, and in some cases also following direct threats or based on information collected by national security services, new routines have been put in place by some EMBs to protect staff members, by ensuring physical security. 

The interviewed electoral officials didn’t report successful physical attacks against themselves or their families but referred to notorious cases of murdered electoral officials.

Legal measures

Few electoral officials have reported their cases to the justice system, and those who did mention receiving no positive actions or any kind of responses in return. Some attribute this to a lack of a supportive legal framework or enforcement capabilities, while others believe the existence of a politically affiliated justice system hinders action against the perpetrators of such attacks, in many cases the same political actors. Additionally, the level of harassment was reported to increase during the legal procedures, further discouraging the electoral officials from using such measures.

Codes of conduct for electoral officials in the information environment

Some electoral officials have noted the implementation of codes of conduct within the EMBs they oversee, governing staff engagement on social media. Generally, these codes mandate that staff abstain from public manifestations of political views and refrain from participating in political activities altogether. 

Previous positive reputation

Some participants emphasized the significance of the selection process of individuals in managing roles in an electoral body, as it can substantially impact the general perception of the EMB’s integrity and its capability to conduct fair elections. Several participants noted concerns regarding the impartiality of members of the electoral authority, as they are often appointed by entities with political affiliations or motivations. Furthermore, the background of electoral officials in high-visibility roles was underscored as being crucial to mitigating, to some extent, attacks in the information environment.

In some cases, the reputation and past record of the EMB members as experts and democracy activists with integrity provided a protective shield against discrediting attacks and made the institution less vulnerable to malicious campaigns. The trustworthiness they had demonstrated played a significant role in countering distrust and misinformation. It was agreed that in the case of electoral managers without this established track record, the damage to the institution is much more severe. 

 

EMERGING CHALLENGES IN THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT AROUND ELECTIONS

 

AI-enabled technologies 

AI-enabled technologies can significantly impact the information environment around elections and electoral officials, exacerbating existing dangers and introducing new ones.

Enhanced social listening and microtargeting capabilities

AI empowers malign actors with diverse methods to manipulate public opinion, using techniques like observing the information environment to identify trending and polarizing topics as well as profiling audiences to develop and implement highly effective microtargeting campaigns. 

Increasingly realistic deepfakes

AI-enabled technologies facilitate the accelerated creation and microtargeted dissemination of harmful content, allowing the development of realistic deepfake videos, audio, and images. 

Moreover, recently unveiled features enable the instant generation of videos based on text, providing a glimpse of the damaging potential of such technological advancements on the individuals serving the democratic cause, and the whole democratic landscape.

Increasingly human-like chatbots

The methods described above are complemented by chatbots designed to engage in conversations with users in a manner that simulates human communication, further contributing to the effective implementation of comprehensive discrediting campaigns against electoral officials in the online information environment. With the imminent emergence of these technologies, and in the absence of legal and technological safeguards, the already blurry line between true and false will be totally erased, with potentially irrecuperable impact on the global democratic landscape. 

Spyware and targeted surveillance technology

Additionally, with the increased use of digital tools and devices, in parallel to the development of the increasingly efficient AI-enabled technologies facilitating tracking and facial recognition technologies, there is a growing potential for malign actors to collect personal data, monitor and track electoral officials’ activities and movements and design more complex and effective attack strategies. 

Moreover, as highlighted during some of the interviews, spyware and targeted surveillance technology pose a significant threat to electoral officials, who are already at high risk of online harassment and violence. 

Cyber-attacks

Cyber-attacks can complement the cyber-enabled malign influence activities or can be launched independently. They can aim at penetrating the systems used for voting or other electoral processes only to compromise the trust in the capacity of the electoral officials in leading positions to manage the processes properly, undermine trust in the electoral outcome, and delegitimize democratic processes. The spread of false claims about the success of such attacks can be equally damaging for elections managers and the overall perception of the correctness of electoral results as the attacks themselves.

Gender-specific challenges

Many of the emerging challenges in the digital realm around elections described above are particularly concerning for women in electoral management. As outlined throughout this report, they experience different types of attacks compared to their male colleagues, mainly exploiting and perpetuating stereotypes rather than building on professional aspects, as it is generally the case with men. 

Due to the intersection of gender and other social identities that already predispose them to discrimination and attacks in the information environment, with the vulnerabilities presented by AI-enabled technologies, women in electoral management may face unique challenges. 

They may be subject to gender-specific disinformation AI-empowered campaigns that exploit existing biases and stereotypes, aiming to discredit them based on gender. AI tools can be used to automate and amplify online harassment, discrimination, and gender-based disinformation, impacting women disproportionately. They could experience intensified psychological violence through AI-driven personalized attacks, intending to cause mental distress and discourage them from continuing their roles in electoral management. Moreover, women chairing EMBs or managing different processes across the electoral cycle could be more likely to be targeted with deepfakes, intended to damage their reputation or to force them out of public spaces. Microtargeting capabilities of AI can be used to design and disseminate content that exploits societal gender biases and attempts to manipulate public opinion against women in leading position roles within EMBs.

Additionally, it is important to note that existing AI technologies have been shown to reinforce preexisting biases (O’Connor and Liu, 2023) related to women. Moreover, due to the lack of meaningful inclusion of women in the development of AI technologies (World Economic Forum, 2023), there is a substantial risk of perpetuating and intensifying the related challenges for women in elections.

Surveillance tools and spyware are of high concern. The information gathered through these means can be weaponized to fuel smear campaigns, blackmail, and doxing against women, leading to devastating effects on the personal and professional lives of female electoral officials, particularly those in high visibility roles. 

Beyond compromising the personal safety and mental well-being of women in electoral management and many times their inner circle and fellow colleagues, the credibility of the electoral processes and outcome is at stake, with the expanded implications for the social and democratic environment.

 

RECOMMENDATIONS

The integrity and trustworthiness of electoral processes are paramount to the functioning of democracies. When electoral officials are targeted, not only individuals at are risk, but the entire democratic process can be undermined. At every stage of the electoral cycle, harmful conduct and content cast a shadow over the processes, institutions, and, increasingly frequently, individuals involved in electoral management. The situation becomes even more concerning with the rapid emergence of generative AI technology, which enables increased effectiveness of this kind of manipulation and attacks in the information environment.

However, most of the measures described by electoral officials and documented during this research are focused on addressing disinformation against the electoral processes and institutions. 

Urgent, coordinated action, with intersectional consideration, is needed to protect electoral officials in the information space and beyond. Measures need to be tailored to address the specific challenges electoral officials with different responsibilities in electoral processes face in the online and offline information space, in their specific national contexts. 

Firm commitments through codes of conduct

Considering their established roles in the information environment surrounding elections, and the responsibilities highlighted in this research, states, political stakeholders (including parties, candidates, and their supporters), technology companies, media, and civil society must firmly commit to respecting the independence and neutrality of electoral management bodies and to upholding human rights and democratic values.

Developing codes of conduct tailored to the roles and responsibilities of various stakeholders in elections can be a first step in achieving this goal.

Strategic communication

Strategic communication was listed among the measures proven most efficient in mitigating the impact of malign conduct and content against electoral officials in the information environment and in consolidating trust in elections. A coordinated approach is needed, that entails, among other elements, reputation management mechanisms for electoral management bodies and high visibility of officials. 

A mechanism to quickly respond to disinformation or attacks against electoral officials should be put in place within the EMB. This might involve a dedicated team monitoring media channels for false narratives targeting elections and addressing them with celerity before they gain traction.

A strong online presence of the EMB has proven beneficial in many countries, to engage with the audiences and consolidate the electoral institution as a primary, reliable source of information on electoral matters, while avoiding information voids and their filling with rumors and false narratives.

Since a crisis is fairly inevitable in the current informational landscape surrounding elections, it is important to prepare in advance a crisis management plan  (Bicu, 2020).

Partnering with independent fact-checking organizations has proven highly effective based on our research, as these third-party entities can validate the information or complement the EMB in addressing disinformation.

In addition, as our research findings suggest, in certain instances, limiting the visibility of EMB management officials led to a decrease in targeted attacks. Such an approach could serve as a protective mechanism for electoral officials, where circumstances permit it.

Transparency and accountability

In the context of the current and emerging challenges in the information environment around elections, increased transparency is primarily needed from the EMBs themselves. A crucial aspect, based on the excellent operational implementation of electoral procedures, involves opening up the electoral processes. 

Transparent funding of both online and mainstream media can shed light on potential agendas driving targeted campaigns against electoral officials.

Greater transparency regarding the financial activities of political parties can aid in uncovering and discouraging potential smear campaigns against electoral officials.

Moreover, by establishing financial caps on digital and traditional media advertising expenditures for state entities and political actors, their influence over public discourse can be limited.

Enhanced transparency regarding online platforms’ algorithms, policies, oversight, and moderation, especially on political advertisements is also essential to protect electoral officials from targeted campaigns of defamation and intimidation by political actors.

Ad libraries (Meta) continue to be a good resource for identifying the initiators of malign campaigns, although many times, such “services” are being externalized to the influence industry companies (The Guardian, 2023).

Companies that offer communication services could be required to publicly disclose their sources of funding, especially when tied to political campaigns or entities, and the nature of the services provided. 

Enhanced interagency cooperation

In addition, much closer and coordinated collaboration between the EMBs, ministries and state agencies, political parties, civil society, mainstream media, online platforms, and other relevant actors is recommended as an efficient way of tackling disinformation. Where existent  partnerships between governments, civil society, academia, and the private sector were proven to foster resilience and facilitate a hands-on approach to addressing the issues related to problematic conduct and content in the information environment around elections.

This multi-stakeholder cooperation can serve as an example of good practice, leading to comprehensive strategies that could address, at an early stage, the multifaceted challenges posed by generative AI technologies.

Situational awareness

Increasing the awareness and ensuring a contextualized understanding of the challenges electoral officials at the national and local level are facing in the online space, with a particular focus on women, youth, and other typically marginalized groups and the impact on a personal, professional, as well as institutional level are an important initial part of the resilience building process. 

Furthermore, it's crucial to bolster the anticipatory capacity of EMBs concerning emerging challenges in elections that could impact electoral officials. This is especially pertinent given the rapid advancement of AI and other technologies influencing the communication landscape. 

Training and education of the different stakeholders

Developing media literacy and critical thinking skills is essential for safely navigating the complex information environment around elections. 

An important component of this education should be online safety, enabling individuals to identify and navigate online threats, such as disinformation, digital aggression, and harassment. Furthermore, shedding light on the profound detrimental impacts of malign narratives and conduct against individuals in the online space, electoral officials in particular, help audiences better perceive their repercussions, thus potentially preventing them from adhering to such malicious tactics.

Open-source investigation and digital forensic skills might be a useful addition for entities with oversight mandates.

Platforms policies

Online platforms must reconsider their recent shift away (The Washington Post, 2023) from the aim of establishing a safe, inclusive digital environment. This research consistently highlighted the urgent need for robust policies to protect individuals in electoral management from abuse in the online information space. Reforms are urgently needed to increase moderation and oversight, streamline the reporting process, and expedite responses to incidents of abuse, harassment, and disinformation involving electoral officials, considering the sensitivity of the context and its implications.

Legal and regulatory measures

Comprehensive regulation on political advertising, coupled with data protection, platform accountability, and hate speech regulatory frameworks, could curb disinformation, ensure advertiser accountability, and protect electoral officials from targeted smear campaigns.

Introducing regulations that curb harmful online content and behaviors targeting electoral officials, including through using generative AI, is essential but very challenging due to enforceability difficulties and because it needs to be flexible enough to keep up with the changes in the dynamic digital space. It is also vital that these regulations are designed in a manner that respects the right to freedom of expression.

Furthermore, given their unique and centralized control over their content, online platforms could proactively search for and address malign campaigns against electoral officials. Utilizing AI technologies could enhance the effectiveness of these efforts. 

Networks of support

Building support networks is crucial for electoral officials who face online aggression and disinformation. These networks should offer specialized assistance in areas such as security, psychological counseling, and legal advice. Given that women and other vulnerable groups may face unique challenges and threats online, these support systems must be tailored to meet their specific needs.

Electoral officials could also organize themselves and connect on both global and regional scales. Fostering collaborative relationships and sharing best practices with counterparts from other regions is a practice encouraged by many electoral officials during the discussions. Such connections can lead to unified standards, shared threat awareness, and common initiatives that amplify efforts to protect officials and the overall electoral process.

Gender-specific measures

The mechanisms available to women for protecting themselves from online harassment and abuse are often inadequate or non-existent. The responsibility for ensuring their safety in the information space, particularly online, remains unclear. This not only undermines women's ability to fully engage in public life and participate in decision-making processes, but it also perpetuates a culture of impunity for those who engage in harmful online behaviors. 

The lack of legal and social protections against gender-based violence and existing power asymmetries in electoral management and more broadly in the political landscape make it even more challenging for women to fight back against such malign behaviors. Addressing these gender-specific challenges requires a multi-faceted approach, including promoting gender-sensitive digital literacy, enforcing laws against gender-based online violence, implementing robust online safety measures, and fostering an inclusive and equitable environment in electoral management bodies and in the broader political landscape for women and other typically marginalized populations. 

It's also important to promote inclusivity and diversity in the field of artificial intelligence to ensure a broader range of perspectives and address already existing biases.

By adopting a combination of these protective measures, it is possible to mitigate the potentially irrecoverable impact of disinformation, aggression, and harassment targeting electoral officials in the information environment on the global democratic landscape and to safeguard individuals serving democratic processes.