International IDEA

THE GLOBAL STATE OF DEMOCRACY INDICES CODEBOOK

Version 8 (2024)

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About this document

The Global State of Democracy Indices Codebook, Version 8 presents information about all the variables included in the Global State of Democracy (GSoD) Indices data set: identifying variables, attributes of democracy, subattributes, subcomponents and indicators. The other two documents that describe the data and data-generation process are *The Global State of Democracy Indices Methodology: Conceptualization and Measurement Framework, Version 8* (Skaaning and Hudson 2024), which presents the theoretical framework that guided the construction of the Indices, and *The Global State of Democracy Indices: Technical Procedures Guide, Version 8* (Tufis and Hudson 2024), which outlines the technical aspects of constructing the Indices.

Version 8 of the GSoD Indices depicts democratic trends at the country, regional and global levels across a broad range of different attributes of democracy in the period 1975–2023 but does not provide a single index of democracy. The Indices produce data for 174 countries. The data underlying the Indices is based on a total of 165 indicators developed by various scholars and organizations using different types of sources, including expert surveys, standards-based coding by research groups and analysts, observational data and composite measures.

The Global State of Democracy is a report that aims to provide policymakers with an evidence-based analysis of the state of global democracy, supported by the GSoD Indices, in order to inform policy interventions and identify problem-solving approaches to trends affecting the quality of democracy around the world.[1] The first edition of the report (International IDEA 2017) explored the conditions under which democracy can be resilient and how to strengthen its capacity as a system to overcome challenges and threats.

Version 8 of the GSoD Indices can be accessed online:

<http://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>

SUGGESTED CITATION

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[1] In the Global State of Democracy Reports, we use different terms to refer to the three levels of aggregation in the data set. In this codebook (and other data set documentation) the three levels of aggregation are (from highest to lowest): attributes, subattributes and subcomponents. In the Report, we have made the language more accessible by referring instead to categories (attributes), factors (subattributes), and subfactors (subcomponents).

Abbreviations

The data sets that are used to build the Global State of Democracy Indices are referred to throughout this codebook using abbreviations or acronyms for the data set name as follows:

BRRD	Regime Types and Regime Changes: A New Data set (Bjørnskov and Rode 2024)
BFA	Bayesian factor analysis
BTI	Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2024)
CIRIGHTS	The CIRIGHTS Human Rights Data Project (Mark, Cingranelli and Filippov 2022)
CLD	Civil Liberty Dataset (Skaaning 2010)
CME	Child Mortality Estimates (UN Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation n.d.)
FITW	Freedom in the World (Freedom House 2024)
FOTN	Freedom on the Net (Freedom House 2023)
GGGR	Global Gender Gap Report (World Economic Forum 2023)
GMFD	Global Media Freedom Data set (Whitten-Woodring and Van Belle 2017)
ICRG	International Country Risk Guide (Howell 2011)
IHME	Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME 2020)
ILOSTAT	International Labour Organization (ILO), Department of Statistics (ILO n.d.)
IRT	Item response theory
LIED	Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy (Skaaning, Gerring and Bartusevičius 2015)
Polity	Polity V Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions (Marshall and Gurr 2020)

PTS	Political Terror Scale (Gibney et al. n.d.)
SWIID	Standardized World Income Inequality Database (Solt 2020)
V-Dem	Varieties of Democracy Project (Coppedge et al. 2024)
UN FAO	United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO n.d.)
UNEGS	United Nations e-Government Survey (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2022a)
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO 2020)
VTD	Voter Turnout Database (International IDEA n.d.)
WHO	World Health Organization, Global Health Observatory (WHO n.d.)
WPP	World Population Prospects (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2022b)

Contents

INTRODUCTION

The main objective of the GSoD Indices is to provide systematic data that captures trends at the global, regional and national levels for different aspects of International IDEA's comprehensive understanding of democracy. The Indices turn a broad range of empirical indicators from various data sets into measures of different aspects of democracy that can be used to evaluate the state of democracy at the global, regional and national levels. They can also assist stakeholders, such as policymakers, researchers and civil society actors, in their analyses of trends related to different aspects of democracy and identification of priority policy areas.

The GSoD Indices, which were constructed for the first time in 2017 and updated annually, now cover 174 countries in the period 1975 to 2024. They are composite measures based on 165 indicators from different kinds of extant data sources. These indicators are assigned to the different subattributes of the conceptual framework and combined in the GSoD Indices.

The GSoD Indices have been produced by a team of International IDEA staff and two external experts. The construction of the GSoD Indices was supervised by an expert advisory board consisting of five leading experts in the field of democracy measurement. Careful justification and documentation of the conceptual distinctions and methodological choices made as well as the use of state-of-the-art procedures were emphasized at all stages in the construction of the Indices. This was done to ensure consistency and transparency, as well as high levels of measurement validity and reliability.

The main section of the Codebook is devoted to presenting information about all the variables included in the data set. The identifying variables are presented first. The attributes, subattributes, subcomponents and indicators are then presented, grouped by attribute of democracy. Within each attribute, the variables are presented from the highest to the lowest level of aggregation, which means that the attributes are presented first, followed by the corresponding subattributes, the corresponding subcomponents (only in the case of the second attribute, Rights) and finally the corresponding indicators.

IDENTIFYING VARIABLES

Correlates of War numerical country code (COWcode)

Original variable	**Constructed variable**
Name in data set	**COWcode**
Definition	**This is an identification variable, which uniquely identifies each of the 174 countries in the data set. The values this variable takes are the Correlates of War numeric country code (COWcode).**

Year (year)

Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in data set	year
Definition	This is an identification variable, which uniquely identifies each of the 48 years included in the data set (from 1975 to 2023).

Country Year (country_year)

Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in data set	country_year
Definition	This is an identification variable, which uniquely identifies each combination of country and year (the country–year) in the data set. It has been constructed by concatenating the Correlates of War country code (COWcode) and the year, so that the last four digits of the variable always indicate the year, while the first one to three digits preceding the year represent the COWcode.

ISO 3166-1 alpha-3 (iso3c)

Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in data set	iso3c
Definition	This is an identification variable, which uniquely identifies each of the 174 countries included in the data set. The three-character codes are taken from the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) ISO 3166 standard. Where there is no ISO assigned three-character code, others in common use have been assigned: XKX (Kosovo), PSE (Palestine). The ISO-deprecated DDR code has been retained for the German Democratic Republic.

Country Name (country_name)

Original variable	**Constructed variable**
Name in data set	country_name
Definition	This is an identification variable, which uniquely identifies each of the 174 countries in the data set. The values this variable takes are the names of the countries included in the data set, following the European Union's standard short names for countries in English.
Countries	Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, East Germany, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kosovo, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North Korea, North Macedonia, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, South Korea, South Sudan, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, The Gambia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Türkiye, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Country Name (country_name_full)

Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in data set	country_name_full
Definition	This is an identification variable, which uniquely identifies each of the 174 countries in the data set. The values this variable takes are the names of the countries included in the data set, following the European Union's standard full names for countries in English.

Countries	Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Republic of Albania, People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, Republic of Angola, Argentine Republic, Republic of Armenia, Commonwealth of Australia, Republic of Austria, Republic of Azerbaijan, Kingdom of Bahrain, People's Republic of Bangladesh, Barbados, Republic of Belarus, Kingdom of Belgium, Republic of Benin, Kingdom of Bhutan, Plurinational State of Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of Botswana, Federative Republic of Brazil, Republic of Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Republic of Burundi, Republic of Cabo Verde, Kingdom of Cambodia, Republic of Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Republic of Chad, Republic of Chile, People's Republic of China, Republic of Colombia, Union of the Comoros, Republic of the Congo, Republic of Costa Rica, Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, Republic of Croatia, Republic of Cuba, Republic of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kingdom of Denmark, Republic of Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Republic of Ecuador, Arab Republic of Egypt, Republic of El Salvador, Republic of Equatorial Guinea, State of Eritrea, Republic of Estonia, Kingdom of Eswatini, Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Republic of Fiji, Republic of Finland, French Republic, Gabonese Republic, Georgia, Federal Republic of Germany, Republic of Ghana, Hellenic Republic, Republic of Guatemala, Republic of Guinea, Republic of Guinea-Bissau, Cooperative Republic of Guyana, Republic of Haiti, Republic of Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Republic of India, Republic of Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Republic of Iraq, Ireland, State of Israel, Italian Republic, Jamaica, Japan, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Republic of Kazakhstan, Republic of Kenya, Republic of Kosovo, State of Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Republic of Latvia, Lebanese Republic, Kingdom of Lesotho, Republic of Liberia, State of Libya, Republic of Lithuania, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Republic of Madagascar, Republic of Malawi, Malaysia, Republic of Maldives, Republic of Mali, Republic of Malta, Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Republic of Mauritius, United Mexican States, Republic of Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Kingdom of Morocco, Republic of Mozambique, Myanmar, Republic of Namibia, Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal, Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, Republic of Nicaragua, Republic of Niger, Federal Republic of Nigeria, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Republic of North Macedonia, Kingdom of Norway, Sultanate of Oman, Islamic Republic of Pakistan, State of Palestine, Republic of Panama, Independent State of Papua New Guinea, Republic of Paraguay, Republic of Peru, Republic of the Philippines, Republic of Poland, Portuguese Republic, State of Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Republic of Rwanda, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Republic of Senegal, Republic of Serbia, Republic of Sierra Leone, Republic of Singapore, Slovak Republic, Republic of Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Federal Republic of Somalia, Republic of South Africa, Republic of Korea, Republic of South Sudan, Kingdom of Spain, Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, Republic of the Sudan, Republic of Suriname, Kingdom of Sweden, Swiss Confederation, Syrian Arab Republic, Taiwan, Republic of Tajikistan, United Republic of Tanzania, Kingdom of Thailand, Republic of The Gambia, Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Togolese Republic, Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Republic of Tunisia, Republic of Türkiye, Turkmenistan, Republic of Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Eastern Republic of Uruguay, Republic of Uzbekistan, Republic of Vanuatu, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Republic of Yemen, Republic of Zambia, Republic of Zimbabwe

Region name (region_name)

Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in data set	region
Definition	This is an identification variable, which uniquely identifies each of the five regions in the data set. The values this variable takes are the names of the regions included in the data set. For more details see Tufis and Hudson (2024).
Regions	Africa, Americas, Asia and the Pacific, Western Asia, Europe

Region (region)

Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in data set	region
Definition	This is an identification variable, which uniquely identifies each of the five regions in the data set with a numerical value. The values this variable takes are the names of the regions included in the data set. For more details see Tufis and Hudson (2024).
Regions	Africa = 1 Americas = 2 Asia and the Pacific = 3 Western Asia = 5 Europe = 6

Subregion name (subregion_name)

Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in data set	subregion
Definition	This is an identification variable, which uniquely identifies each of the 18 subregions in the data set. The values this variable takes are the names of the subregions included in the data set. For more details see Tufis and Hudson (2024).
Subregions	East Africa, Central Africa, Southern Africa, West Africa, North Africa, Caribbean, Central America, South America, Northern America, Central Asia, East Asia, South Asia, South-East Asia, Oceania, Western Asia, Central Europe, Eastern Europe, North/ Western Europe, Southern Europe

Subregion (subregion)

Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in data set	subregion
Definition	This is an identification variable, which uniquely identifies each of the 18 subregions in the data set with a numerical value. For more details see Tufis and Hudson (2024).
Subregions	East Africa = 1 Central Africa = 2 Southern Africa = 3 West Africa = 4 North Africa = 5 Caribbean = 6 Central America = 7 South America = 8 Northern America = 9 Central Asia = 10 East Asia = 11 South Asia = 12 South-East Asia = 13 Oceania = 14 Western Asia = 15 Central Europe = 16 Eastern Europe = 17 North/Western Europe = 18 Southern Europe = 19

Chapter 1

REPRESENTATION

Representation is the first of the four attributes of democracy developed for International IDEA's Global State of Democracy Indices. This chapter of the Codebook provides details about the subattributes and indicators that comprise the index of Representation.

1 attribute

- Representation

6 subattributes

- Credible Elections
- Inclusive Suffrage
- Free Political Parties
- Elected Government
- Effective Parliament
- Local Democracy

36 indicators

ATTRIBUTE

Representation (representation_est)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in data set	representation_est
Definition	The Representation attribute emphasizes contested and inclusive popular elections for legislative and executive offices. This attribute distinguishes among six subattributes. Five of them (Credible Elections, Free Political Parties, Elected Government, Effective Parliament, and Local Democracy) have been aggregated into a contestation index using an item response theory (IRT) measurement model. The Representation index is obtained by multiplying the contestation index by the sixth subattribute, Inclusive Suffrage.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning and Hudson (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	—
Indicator of	—
Aggregation	—
Indicators included	cred_elect_est, inclu_suff_est, free_parties_est, elected_gov_est, effect_parl_est, local_dem_est
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	representation_l = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval representation_lu = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval

SUBATTRIBUTES

Credible Elections (cred_elect_est)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in data set	cred_elect_est
Definition	The Credible Elections subattribute denotes the extent to which elections for national, representative political office are free from irregularities. All the selected indicators tap into the quality of elections. One of the V-Dem indicators and the LIED indicator reflect the presence of free elections more generally, whereas the other V-Dem indicators and those from BTI and Freedom House capture more specific aspects of elections, including the fairness of the electoral laws, electoral management body (EMB) autonomy and capacity, government intimidation and other irregularities. The 10 indicators have been aggregated into the Credible Elections subattribute using IRT.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning and Hudson (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	1. Representation
Aggregation	Bayesian factor analysis (BFA) of 1.1. Credible Elections, 1.3. Free Political Parties, 1.4. Elected Government, 1.5. Effective Parliament, and 1.6. Local Democracy to create a contestation index. Thereafter multiplication of contestation index and 1.2. Inclusive Suffrage.
Indicators included	v_11_01, v_11_02, v_11_03, v_11_04, v_11_05, v_11_06, v_11_07, v_11_08, v_11_09, v_11_10
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	cred_elect_l = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval cred_elect_u = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval

Inclusive Suffrage (inclu_suff_est)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in data set	inclu_suff_est
Definition	The inclusive suffrage subattribute denotes the extent to which adult citizens have equal and universal passive and active voting rights.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning and Hudson (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	1. Representation
Aggregation	Weighted average of the two variables, with suffrage counting twice as much as voter registration. Thereafter multiplication with the contestation index.
Indicators included	v_12_01, v_12_02
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Free Political Parties (free_parties_est)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in data set	free_parties_est
Definition	The Free Political Parties subattribute denotes the extent to which political parties are free to form and campaign for political office. Six indicators, partly based on expert surveys and partly in-house coded, are used to measure how free political parties are. All of them reflect whether political parties generally, and opposition parties in particular, are allowed to organize freely and run in elections. The six indicators have been aggregated into the Free Political Parties subattribute using IRT.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning and Hudson (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	1. Representation
Aggregation	BFA of 1.1. Credible Elections, 1.3. Free Political Parties, 1.4. Elected Government, 1.5. Effective Parliament, and 1.6. Local Democracy to create a contestation index. Thereafter multiplication of contestation index and 1.2. Inclusive Suffrage.
Indicators included	v_13_01, v_13_02, v_13_03, v_13_04, v_13_05, v_13_06
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	free_parties_l = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval free_parties_u = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval

Elected Government (elected_gov_est)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in data set	elected_gov_est
Definition	The Elected Government subattribute denotes the extent to which national, governing offices are filled through elections. It is operationalized using nine indicators from BRRD, Freedom House, LIED, Polity and V-Dem. All the indicators have a rather formal focus, which means that they do not assess the quality of elections or fully capture the extent to which reserved domains and undue influence from non-elected groups might in practice restrict elected officials' effective power to govern. The eight indicators were aggregated into the Elected Government subattribute using IRT.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning and Hudson (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	1. Representation
Aggregation	BFA of 1.1. Credible Elections, 1.3. Free Political Parties, 1.4. Elected Government, 1.5. Effective Parliament, and 1.6. Local Democracy to create a contestation index. Thereafter multiplication of contestation index and 1.2. Inclusive Suffrage.
Indicators included	v_14_01, v_14_02, v_14_03, v_14_04, v_14_05, v_14_06, v_14_07, v_14_09
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	elected_gov_l = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval elected_gov_u = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval

Effective Parliament (effect_parl_est)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in data set	effect_parl_est
Definition	The Effective Parliament subattribute denotes the extent to which the legislature is capable of overseeing the executive. It includes three indicators from the V-Dem experts survey that tap fairly directly into the effectiveness of parliament. Another V-Dem indicator on executive oversight and the executive constraints indicator from Polity are included as they capture relevant aspects of institutional representation not covered by other subattributes. The five indicators were aggregated into the Effective Parliament subattribute using IRT.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning and Hudson (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	1. Representation
Aggregation	BFA of 1.1. Credible Elections, 1.3. Free Political Parties, 1.4. Elected Government, 1.5. Effective Parliament, and 1.6. Local Democracy to create a contestation index. Thereafter multiplication of contestation index and 1.2. Inclusive Suffrage.
Indicators included	v_15_01, v_15_02, v_15_03, v_15_04, v_15_05
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	effect_parl_l = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval effect_parl_u = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval

Local Democracy (local_dem_est)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in data set	local_dem_est
Definition	V-Dem is also the only provider of a comprehensive, cross-national data set on subnational elections. The local government index indicates whether the local government is elected and whether it is empowered in relation to the central government, while another indicator assesses the freedom and fairness of subnational elections.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning and Hudson (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	—
Indicator of	1. Representation
Aggregation	—
Indicators included	v_16_01, v_16_02
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	—

INDICATORS

EMB autonomy (v_11_01)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2elembaut
Name in data set	v_11_01
Definition	Question: Does the election management body (EMB) have autonomy from government to apply election laws and administrative rules impartially in national elections? Responses: 0. No. The EMB is controlled by the incumbent government, the military or another de facto ruling body. 1. Somewhat. The EMB has some autonomy on some issues but on critical issues that influence the outcome of elections, the EMB is partial towards the de facto ruling body. 2. Ambiguous. The EMB has some autonomy but is also partial and it is unclear to what extent this influences the outcome of the election. 3. Almost. The EMB has autonomy and acts impartially almost all the time. It may be influenced by the de facto ruling body in some minor ways that do not influence the outcome of elections. 4. Yes. The EMB is autonomous and impartially applies elections law and administrative rules. Clarification: The EMB refers to whatever body (or bodies) is charged with administering national elections.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). Coded as zero if there are no elections or if the electoral process has been suspended or nullified (e.g. through dismissal or dissolution of the relevant elected bodies or offices), as indicated by values of zero for both Executive_elections and Legislative_ elections from the LIED data set.
Indicator of	1. Representation 1.1. Credible Elections
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.1. Credible Elections.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

EMB capacity (v_11_02)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2elembcap
Name in data set	v_11_02
Definition	Question: Does the election management body (EMB) have sufficient staff and resources to administer a well-run national election? Responses: 0. No. There are glaring deficits in staff, financial, or other resources affecting the organization across the territory. 1. Not really. Deficits are not glaring but they nonetheless seriously compromised the organization of administratively well-run elections in many parts of the country. 2. Ambiguous. There might be serious deficiencies compromising the organization of the election but it could also be a product of human errors and co-incidence or other factors outside the control of the EMB. 3. Mostly. There are partial deficits in resources but these are neither serious nor widespread. 4. Yes. The EMB has adequate staff and other resources to administer a well-run election. Clarification: The EMB refers to whatever body (or bodies) is charged with administering national elections.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). Coded as zero if there are no elections or if the electoral process has been suspended or nullified (e.g. through dismissal or dissolution of the relevant elected bodies or offices), as indicated by values of zero for both Executive_elections and Legislative_ elections from the LIED data set.
Indicator of	1. Representation 1.1. Credible Elections
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.1. Credible Elections.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Election other voting irregularities (v_11_03)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2elirreg
Name in data set	v_11_03
Definition	Question: In this national election, was there evidence of other intentional irregularities by incumbent and/or opposition parties and/or vote fraud? Responses: 0. Yes. There were systematic and almost nationwide other irregularities. 1. Yes, some. There were non-systematic, but fairly common other irregularities, even if only in some parts of the country. 2. Sporadic. There were a limited number of sporadic other irregularities and it is not clear whether they were intentional or disadvantaged particular groups. 3. Almost none. There were only a limited number of irregularities and many were probably unintentional or did not disadvantage particular groups' access to participation. 4. None. There was no evidence of intentional other irregularities. Unintentional irregularities resulting from human error and/or natural conditions may still have occurred. Clarification: Examples include use of double IDs, intentional lack of voting materials, ballot-stuffing, misreporting of votes and false collation of votes. This question does not refer to lack of access to registration, harassment of opposition parties, manipulations of the voter registry or vote-buying (dealt with in previous questions).
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). Coded as zero if there are no elections or if the electoral process has been suspended or nullified (e.g. through dismissal or dissolution of the relevant elected bodies or offices), as indicated by values of zero for both Executive_elections and Legislative_ elections from the LIED data set.
Indicator of	1. Representation 1.1. Credible Elections
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.1. Credible Elections.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Election government intimidation (v_11_04)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2elintim
Name in data set	v_11_04
Definition	Question: In this national election, were opposition candidates/ parties/campaign workers subjected to repression, intimidation, violence or harassment by the government, the ruling party or their agents? Responses: 0. Yes. The repression and intimidation by the government or its agents was so strong that the entire period was quiet. 1. Yes, frequent. There was systematic, frequent and violent harassment and intimidation of the opposition by the government or its agents during the election period. 2. Yes, some. There was periodic, not systematic but possibly centrally coordinated harassment and intimidation of the opposition by the government or its agents. 3. Restrained. There were sporadic instances of violent harassment and intimidation by the government or its agents, in at least one part of the country and directed at only one or two local branches of opposition groups. 4. None. There was no harassment or intimidation of opposition by the government or its agents throughout the election campaign period and polling day. Clarification: Other types of clearly distinguishable civil violence, even if politically motivated, during the election period should not be factored in when scoring this indicator (it is dealt with separately).
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). Coded as zero if there are no elections or if the electoral process has been suspended or nullified (e.g. through dismissal or dissolution of the relevant elected bodies or offices), as indicated by values of zero for both Executive_elections and Legislative_ elections from the LIED data set.
Indicator of	1. Representation 1.1. Credible Elections
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.1. Credible Elections.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Election free and fair (v_11_05)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2elfrfair
Name in data set	v_11_05
Definition	Question: Taking all aspects of the pre-election period, election day and the post-election process into account, would you consider this national election to be free and fair? Responses: 0. No, not at all. The elections were fundamentally flawed and the official results had little if anything to do with the 'will of the people' (i.e. who became president or who won the legislative majority). 1. Not really. While the elections allowed for some competition, the irregularities in the end affected the outcome of the election (as defined above). 2. Ambiguous. There was substantial competition and freedom of participation but there were also significant irregularities. It is hard to determine whether the irregularities affected the outcome or not (as defined above). 3. Yes, somewhat. There were deficiencies and some degree of fraud and irregularity but these did not in the end affect the outcome (as defined above). 4. Yes. There was some amount of human error and some logistical restrictions but these were largely unintentional and without significant consequences. Clarification: The only thing that should not be considered in coding this is the extent of suffrage (by law). Thus, a free and fair election may occur even if the law excludes significant groups (an issue measured separately).
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). Coded as zero if there are no elections or if the electoral process has been suspended or nullified (e.g. through dismissal or dissolution of the relevant elected bodies or offices), as indicated by values of zero for both Executive_elections and Legislative_ elections from the LIED data set.
Indicator of	1. Representation 1.1. Credible Elections
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.1. Credible Elections.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Competition (v_11_06)

Data source	LIED
Original variable	competitive elections
Name in data set	v_11_06
Definition	The chief executive offices and seats in the effective legislative body are filled using elections that are characterized by uncertainty, meaning that the elections are, in principle, sufficiently free to enable the opposition to gain power if they were to attract sufficient support from the electorate. This presumes that control over key executive and legislative offices is determined by elections, the executive and members of the legislature have not been unconstitutionally removed and the legislature has not been dissolved. With respect to the electoral process, this presumes that the constitutional timing of elections has not been violated (in more than a marginal fashion), non-extremist parties are not banned, opposition candidates are generally free to participate, voters experience little systematic coercion in exercising their electoral choice and electoral fraud does not determine who wins. With respect to the outcome, this presumes that the declared winner of executive and legislative elections reflects the votes cast by the electorate, as near as can be determined from extant sources. Incumbent turnover (as a result of multiparty elections) is regarded as a strong indicator of competition but is neither necessary nor sufficient. In addition, reports from outside observers (as reported in books, articles and country reports) are used to determine whether the above-mentioned conditions have been met in a given election. Coding for this variable does not take into account whether there is a level playing field, all contestants gain access to funding and the media, media coverage is unbiased, civil liberties are respected or other features associated with fully free and fair elections are present. Competition therefore sets a modest threshold.
Original scale	Nominal
Citation	Skaaning, Gerring and Bartusevičius (2015)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Coded as zero if there are no elections or if the electoral process has been suspended or nullified (e.g. through dismissal or dissolution of the relevant elected bodies or offices), as indicated by values of zero for both Executive_elections and Legislative_ elections from the LIED data set.
Indicator of	1. Representation 1.1. Credible Elections
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.1. Credible Elections.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

A3 Electoral process (v_11_07)

Data source	FITW
Original variable	A3
Name in data set	v_11_07
Definition	Question: Are the electoral laws and framework fair, and are they implemented impartially by the relevant election management bodies? Country scores vary between 0 (worst) and 4 (best).
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Freedom House (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Coded as zero if there are no elections or if the electoral process has been suspended or nullified (e.g. through dismissal or dissolution of the relevant elected bodies or offices), as indicated by values of zero for both Executive_elections and Legislative_ elections from the LIED data set.
Indicator of	1. Representation 1.1. Credible Elections
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.1. Credible Elections.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

B2 Political pluralism and participation (v_11_08)

Data source	FITW
Original variable	B2
Name in data set	v_11_08
Definition	Question: Is there a realistic opportunity for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections? Country scores vary between 0 (worst) and 4 (best).
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Freedom House (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Coded as zero if there are no elections or if the electoral process has been suspended or nullified (e.g. through dismissal or dissolution of the relevant elected bodies or offices), as indicated by values of zero for both Executive_elections and Legislative_ elections from the LIED data set.
Indicator of	1. Representation 1.1. Credible Elections
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.1. Credible Elections.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

B3 Political pluralism and participation (v_11_09)

Data source	FITW
Original variable	B3
Name in data set	v_11_09
Definition	Question: Are the people's political choices free from domination by forces that are external to the political sphere, or by political forces that employ extrapolitical means? Country scores vary between 0 (worst) and 4 (best).
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Freedom House (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Coded as zero if there are no elections or if the electoral process has been suspended or nullified (e.g. through dismissal or dissolution of the relevant elected bodies or offices), as indicated by values of zero for both Executive_elections and Legislative_ elections from the LIED data set.
Indicator of	1. Representation 1.1. Credible Elections
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.1. Credible Elections.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Free and fair elections (v_11_10)

Data source	BTI
Original variable	elect
Name in data set	v_11_10
Definition	Countries scored from 1 to 10, following the statements listed below: 1. National elections, if held at all, are entirely unfree and unfair. 2. 3. 4. General elections are held, but serious irregularities during voting process and ballot count occur. The rights to vote, campaign and run for office are restricted, and elections have de facto only limited influence over who governs. 5. 6. 7. General, multiparty elections are held, conducted properly and accepted as the means of filling political posts. However, there are some constraints on the fairness of the elections with regard to registration, campaigning or media access. 8. 9. 10. There are no constraints on free and fair elections.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Bertelsmann Stiftung (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Coded as zero if there are no elections or if the electoral process has been suspended or nullified (e.g. through dismissal or dissolution of the relevant elected bodies or offices), as indicated by values of zero for both Executive_elections and Legislative_ elections from the LIED data set.
Indicator of	1. Representation 1.1. Credible Elections
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.1. Credible Elections.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Inclusive suffrage (v_12_01)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2elsuffrage
Name in data set	v_12_01
Definition	Question: What percentage (%) of adult citizens (as defined by statute) has the legal right to vote in national elections? Responses: Percentage Clarification: This question does not take into consideration restrictions based on age, residence, having been convicted for crime, or being legally incompetent. It covers legal (de jure) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (de facto). The adult population (as defined by statute) is defined by citizens in the case of independent countries or the people living in the territorial entity in the case of colonies. Universal suffrage is coded as 100. The scores reflect de jure provisions of suffrage extension in percentage of the adult population. If the suffrage law is revised in a way that affects the extension, the scores reflect this change as of the calendar year the law was enacted.
Original scale	0% to 100%
Citation	Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Re-scaled to vary between 0 and 1. Coded as zero if there are no elections or if the electoral process has been suspended or nullified (e.g. through dismissal or dissolution of the relevant elected bodies or offices), as indicated by values of zero for both Executive_elections and Legislative_ elections from the LIED data set.
Indicator of	1. Representation 1.2. Inclusive Suffrage
Aggregation	Weighted average to construct subattribute 1.2. Inclusive Suffrage.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Election voter registry (v_12_02)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2elrgstry
Name in data set	v_12_02
Definition	Question: In this national election, was there a reasonably accurate voter registry in place and was it used? Responses: 0. No. There was no registry or the registry was not used. 1. No. There was a registry but it was fundamentally flawed (meaning 20% or more of eligible voters could have been disenfranchised or the outcome could have been affected significantly by double voting and impersonation). 2. Uncertain. There was a registry but it is unclear whether potential flaws in the registry had much impact on electoral outcomes. 3. Yes, somewhat. The registry was imperfect but less than 10% of eligible voters may have been disenfranchised, and double-voting and impersonation could not have affected the results significantly. 4. Yes. The voter registry was reasonably accurate (less than 1% of voters were affected by any flaws) and it was applied in a reasonable fashion.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Re-scaled to vary between 0 and 1. Coded as zero if there are no elections or if the electoral process has been suspended or nullified (e.g. through dismissal or dissolution of the relevant elected bodies or offices), as indicated by values of zero for both Executive_elections and Legislative_ elections from the LIED data set.
Indicator of	1. Representation 1.2. Inclusive Suffrage
Aggregation	Weighted average to construct subattribute 1.2. Inclusive Suffrage.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Party ban (v_13_01)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2psparban_ord
Name in data set	v_13_01
Definition	Question: Are any political parties banned? Responses: 0. Yes. All parties except the state-sponsored party (and closely allied parties) are banned. 1. Yes. Elections are non-partisan or there are no officially recognized parties. 2. Yes. Many parties are banned. 3. Yes. But only a few parties are banned. 4. No. No parties are officially banned. Clarification: This does not apply to parties that are barred from competing for failing to meet registration requirements or support thresholds.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	—
Indicator of	1. Representation 1.3. Free Political Parties
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.3. Free Political Parties.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Barriers to parties (v_13_02)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2psbars_ord
Name in data set	v_13_02
Definition	Question: How restrictive are the barriers to forming a political party? Responses: 0. Parties are not allowed. 1. It is impossible, or virtually impossible, for parties not affiliated with the government to form (legally). 2. There are significant obstacles (e.g. party leaders face high levels of regular political harassment by authorities). 3. There are modest barriers (e.g. party leaders face occasional political harassment by authorities). 4. There are no substantial barriers. Clarification: Barriers include legal requirements such as requirements for membership or financial deposits, as well as harassment.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	1. Representation 1.3. Free Political Parties
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.3. Free Political Parties.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Opposition parties' autonomy (v_13_03)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2psoppaut_ord
Name in data set	v_13_03
Definition	Question: Are opposition parties independent and autonomous of the ruling regime? Responses: 0. Opposition parties are not allowed. 1. There are no autonomous, independent opposition parties. Opposition parties are either selected or co-opted by the ruling regime. 2. At least some opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime. 3. Most significant opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime. 4. All opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime. Clarification: An opposition party is any party that is not part of the government—that is, it has no control over the executive.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	—
Indicator of	1. Representation 1.3. Free Political Parties
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.3. Free Political Parties.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Elections multiparty (v_13_04)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2elmulpar_ord
Name in data set	v_13_04
Definition	Question: Was this national election multiparty? Responses: 0. No. No-party or single-party and there is no meaningful competition (includes situations where a few political parties are legal but they are all de facto controlled by the dominant party). 1. Not really. No-party or single-party (defined as above) but multiple candidates from the same party and/or independents contest legislative seats or the presidency. 2. Constrained. At least one real opposition party is allowed to contest but competition is highly constrained, either legally or informally. 3. Almost. Elections are multiparty in principle but either one main opposition party is prevented (de jure or de facto) from contesting, or conditions such as civil unrest (excluding natural disasters) prevent competition in a portion of the territory. 4. Yes. Elections are multiparty, even though a few marginal parties may not be permitted to contest (e.g. far-right/left extremist parties, or anti-democratic religious or ethnic parties).
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Coded as zero if there are no elections or if the electoral process has been suspended or nullified (e.g. through dismissal or dissolution of the relevant elected bodies or offices), as indicated by values of zero for both Executive_elections and Legislative_ elections from the LIED data set.
Indicator of	1. Representation 1.3. Free Political Parties
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.3. Free Political Parties.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Competitiveness of participation (v_13_05)

Data source	Polity
Original variable	parcomp
Name in data set	v_13_05
Definition	The competitiveness of participation refers to the extent to which alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena. Political competition implies a significant degree of civil interaction, so polities that are coded unregulated (1) on regulation of participation (PARREG, variable 2.5) are not coded for competitiveness. Polities in transition between unregulated and any of the regulated forms on variable 2.5 also are not coded on variable 2.6. Competitiveness is coded on a five-category scale: 0. Not applicable. 1. Repressed. 2. Suppressed. 3. Factional. 4. Transitional. 5. Competitive.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Marshall and Gurr (2020)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Codes -99 to -66 treated as missing values. Values for 2019 and following were coded by International IDEA's expert consultants following the original code book by Marshall and Gurr (2020).
Indicator of	1. Representation 1.3. Free Political Parties
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.3. Free Political Parties.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Multiparty elections (v_13_06)

Data source	LIED
Original variable	multiparty legislative elections
Name in data set	v_13_06
Definition	Multiparty legislative elections are defined by the existence of two conditions: legislative elections (LEGSELEC) and opposition (OPPOSITION). LEGSELEC: A legislative body issues at least some laws and does not perform executive functions. The lower house (or unicameral chamber) of the legislature is at least partly elected. The legislature has not been closed. OPPOSITION: The lower house (or unicameral chamber) of the legislature is (at least in part) elected by voters facing more than one choice. Specifically, parties are not banned and either more than one party is allowed to compete or elections are nonpartisan (i.e. all the candidates run without party labels).
Original scale	Nominal
Citation	Skaaning, Gerring and Bartusevičius (2015)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Coded as zero if there are no elections or if the electoral process has been suspended or nullified (e.g. through dismissal or dissolution of the relevant elected bodies or offices), as indicated by values of zero for both Executive_elections and Legislative_ elections from the LIED data set.
Indicator of	1. Representation 1.3. Free Political Parties
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.3. Free Political Parties.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

B1 Political pluralism and participation (v_13_07)

Data source	FITW
Original variable	B1
Name in data set	v_13_07
Definition	Question: Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system free of undue obstacles to the rise and fall of these competing parties or groupings? Country scores vary between 0 (worst) and 4 (best).
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Freedom House (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	1. Representation 1.3. Free Political Parties
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.3. Free Political Parties.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Party system (v_13_08)

Data source	BTI
Original variable	party_sys
Name in data set	v_13_08
Definition	Countries scored from 1 to 10, following the statements listed below: 1. There is no party system to articulate and aggregate societal interest. 2. 3. 4. The party system is unstable with shallow roots in society: high fragmentation, high voter volatility and high polarization. 5. 6. 7. The party system is fairly stable and socially rooted: moderate fragmentation, moderate voter volatility and moderate polarization. 8. 9. 10. The party system is stable and socially rooted: it is able to articulate and aggregate societal interest with low fragmentation, low voter volatility and low polarization.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Bertelsmann Stiftung (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	–
Indicator of	1. Representation 1.3. Free Political Parties
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.3. Free Political Parties.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Elected executive index (v_14_01)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2x_elecoff
Name in data set	v_14_01
Definition	Question: Are the chief executive and legislature appointed through popular elections? Clarifications: This index attempts to measure whether the chief executive is elected, either directly by popular elections or indirectly by a popularly elected legislature that then appoints the chief executive; and whether, in presidential systems with a directly elected president who is also the chief executive, the legislature is directly elected. Note that a popular election is only minimally defined and also includes sham elections with limited suffrage and no competition. Similarly, 'appointment' by legislature only implies selection and/or approval, not the power to dismiss. This index is useful primarily for aggregating higher-order Indices and should not necessarily be interpreted as an important element of democracy in its own right.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 0, 0.5, 0.95 and 1. Coded as zero if there are no elections or if the electoral process has been suspended or nullified (e.g. through dismissal or dissolution of the relevant elected bodies or offices), as indicated by values of zero for both Executive_elections and Legislative_ elections from the LIED data set.
Indicator of	1. Representation 1.4. Elected Government
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.4. Elected Government.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Competitiveness of executive recruitment (v_14_02)

Data source	Polity
Original variable	xrcomp
Name in data set	v_14_02
Definition	Competitiveness refers to the extent that prevailing modes of advancement give subordinates equal opportunities to become superordinates. If power transfers are coded unregulated ('1') in the Regulation of Executive Recruitment (variable 3.1), or involve a transition to/from unregulated, competitiveness is coded '0'. Three categories are used to measure this concept: 1. Selection. Chief executives are determined by hereditary succession, designation or by a combination of both, as in monarchies where the chief minister is chosen by the king or court. Examples of pure designative selection are: rigged, unopposed elections; repeated replacement of presidents before their terms end; recurrent military selection of civilian executives; selection within an institutionalized single party; recurrent incumbent selection of successors; and repeated election boycotts by the major opposition parties. 2. Dual/Transitional. Dual executives occur where one is chosen by hereditary succession, the other by competitive election. Term also used for transitional arrangements between selection (ascription and/or designation) and competitive election. 3. Election. Chief executives are typically chosen in or through competitive elections involving two or more major parties or candidates.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Marshall and Gurr (2020)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Codes -99 to -66 treated as missing values. Recoded 0 and 1 as 0, 2 as 0.5, and 3 as 1. Values for 2019 and following were coded by International IDEA's expert consultants following the original code book by Marshall and Gurr (2020). Coded as zero if there are no elections or if the electoral process has been suspended or nullified (e.g. through dismissal or dissolution of the relevant elected bodies or offices), as indicated by values of zero for both Executive_elections and Legislative_ elections from the LIED data set.
Indicator of	1. Representation 1.4. Elected Government
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.4. Elected Government.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Openness of executive recruitment (v_14_03)

Data source	Polity
Original variable	xropen
Name in data set	v_14_03
Definition	Recruitment of the chief executive is 'open' to the extent that all the politically active population has an opportunity, in principle, to attain the position through a regularized process. If power transfers are coded unregulated (1) in Regulation of Executive Recruitment (variable 3.1) or involve a transition to/from unregulated, openness is coded 0. Four categories are used: 1. Closed. Chief executives are determined by hereditary succession, e.g. kings, emperors, emirs, who assume executive power by right of descent. An executive selected by other means may proclaim himself a monarch but the polity he governs is not coded 'closed' unless a relative succeeds him as ruler. 2. Dual Executive–Designation. Hereditary succession plus executive or court selection of an effective chief minister. 3. Dual Executive–Election. Hereditary succession plus electoral selection of an effective chief minister. 4. Open. Chief executives are chosen by elite designation, competitive election or transitional arrangements between designation and election.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Marshall and Gurr (2020)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Codes -99 to -66 treated as missing values. Recoded 0, 1 and 2 as 0; 3 as 0.5; and 4 as 1. Values for 2019 and following were coded by International IDEA's expert consultants following the original code book by Marshall and Gurr (2020). Coded as zero if there are no elections or if the electoral process has been suspended or nullified (e.g. through dismissal or dissolution of the relevant elected bodies or offices), as indicated by values of zero for both Executive_elections and Legislative_ elections from the LIED data set.
Indicator of	1. Representation 1.4. Elected Government
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.4. Elected Government.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Electoral (v_14_04)

Data source	BRRD
Original variable	electoral
Name in data set	v_14_04
Definition	Does a country have no regular elections, elections in an effectively one-party state, elections with opposition parties but without an actual chance of government change, or full democracy? Alternative democracy indicator capturing degree of multiparty competition (no elections = 0, single-party elections = 1, non-democratic multiparty elections = 2, democratic elections = 3).
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Bjørnskov and Rode (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Coded as zero if there are no elections or if the electoral process has been suspended or nullified (e.g. through dismissal or dissolution of the relevant elected bodies or offices), as indicated by values of zero for both Executive_elections and Legislative_ elections from the LIED data set.
Indicator of	1. Representation 1.4. Elected Government
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.4. Elected Government.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

A1 Electoral process (v_14_05)

Data source	FITW
Original variable	A1
Name in data set	v_14_05
Definition	Question: Was the current head of government or other chief national authority elected through free and fair elections? Country scores vary between 0 (worst) and 4 (best).
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Freedom House (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Coded as zero if there are no elections or if the electoral process has been suspended or nullified (e.g. through dismissal or dissolution of the relevant elected bodies or offices), as indicated by values of zero for both Executive_elections and Legislative_ elections from the LIED data set.
Indicator of	1. Representation 1.4. Elected Government
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.4. Elected Government.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

A2 Electoral process (v_14_06)

Data source	FITW
Original variable	A2
Name in data set	v_14_06
Definition	Question: Were the current national legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections? Country scores vary between 0 (worst) and 4 (best).
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Freedom House (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Coded as zero if there are no elections or if the electoral process has been suspended or nullified (e.g. through dismissal or dissolution of the relevant elected bodies or offices), as indicated by values of zero for both Executive_elections and Legislative_ elections from the LIED data set.
Indicator of	1. Representation 1.4. Elected Government
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.4. Elected Government.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

C1 Functioning of government (v_14_07)

Data source	FITW
Original variable	C1
Name in data set	v_14_07
Definition	Question: Do the freely elected head of government and national legislative representatives determine the policies of the government? Country scores vary between 0 (worst) and 4 (best).
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Freedom House (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Coded as zero if there are no elections or if the electoral process has been suspended or nullified (e.g. through dismissal or dissolution of the relevant elected bodies or offices), as indicated by values of zero for both Executive_elections and Legislative_ elections from the LIED data set.
Indicator of	1. Representation 1.4. Elected Government
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.4. Elected Government.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Lexical index of electoral democracy (v_14_09)

Data source	LIED
Original variable	lexical_index_plus
Name in data set	v_14_09
Definition	An index built by combining the values of several other variables measured in the LIED data set: 0. legislative_election=0 & executive_elections=0 (regime type: non-electoral autocracies). 1. legislative_elections=1 or executive_elections=1 & multi-party_legislative_elections=0 (regime type: one-party autocracies, few cases where executive elections are on track but there is no functioning elected parliament). 2. legislative_elections=1 & multi-party_legislative_elections=1 & executive_elections=0 (regime type: multiparty autocracies without elected executive—generally because a monarch influences government appointment and removal or foreign powers dominate political decision making or has significant veto powers). 3. legislative_elections=1 & multi-party_legislative_elections=1 & executive_elections=1 & competitive_elections=0 (regime type: multiparty autocracies). 4. legislative_elections=1 & multi-party_legislative_elections=1 & executive_elections=1 & competitive_elections=1 & male_ suffrage=0 (regime type: exclusive democracies). 5. legislative_elections=1 & multi-party_legislative_elections=1 & executive_elections=1 & competitive_elections=1 & male_ suffrage=1 & female_suffrage=0 (regime type: male democracies). 6. legislative_elections=1 & multi-party_legislative_elections=1 & executive_elections=1 & competitive_elections=1 & male_ suffrage=1 & female_suffrage=1 & political_liberties=0 (regime type: electoral democracies). 7. legislative_elections=1 & multi-party_legislative_elections=1 & executive_elections=1 & competitive_elections=1 & male_ suffrage=1 & female_suffrage=1 & political_liberties=1 (regime type: polyarchies).
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Skaaning, Gerring and Bartusevičius (2015)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Coded as zero if there are no elections or if the electoral process has been suspended or nullified (e.g. through dismissal or dissolution of the relevant elected bodies or offices), as indicated by values of zero for both Executive_elections and Legislative_ elections from the LIED data set.
Indicator of	1. Representation 1.4. Elected Government
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.4. Elected Government.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Legislature questions officials in practice (v_15_01)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2lgqstexp
Name in data set	v_15_01
Definition	Question: In practice, does the legislature routinely question executive branch officials? Responses: 0. No, never or very rarely. 1. Yes, routinely. Clarification: 'Question' means, for example, the power of summons through which the head of state or head of government could be forced to explain policies or testify.
Original scale	Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). Coded as zero if there are no elections or if the electoral process has been suspended or nullified (e.g. through dismissal or dissolution of the relevant elected bodies or offices), as indicated by values of zero for both Executive_elections and Legislative_ elections from the LIED data set.
Indicator of	1. Representation 1.5. Effective Parliament
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.5. Effective Parliament.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Executive oversight (v_15_02)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2lgotovst
Name in data set	v_15_02
Definition	Question: If executive branch officials were engaged in unconstitutional, illegal or unethical activity, how likely is it that a body other than the legislature, such as a comptroller general, general prosecutor or ombudsman, would question or investigate them and issue an unfavourable decision or report? Responses: 0. Extremely unlikely. 1. Unlikely. 2. Very uncertain. 3. Likely. 4. Certain or nearly certain.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). Coded as zero if there are no elections or if the electoral process has been suspended or nullified (e.g. through dismissal or dissolution of the relevant elected bodies or offices), as indicated by values of zero for both Executive_elections and Legislative_ elections from the LIED data set.
Indicator of	1. Representation 1.5. Effective Parliament
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.5. Effective Parliament.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Legislature investigates in practice (v_15_03)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2lginvstp
Name in data set	v_15_03
Definition	Question: If the executive were engaged in unconstitutional, illegal or unethical activity, how likely is it that a legislative body (perhaps a whole chamber, perhaps a committee, whether aligned with government or opposition) would conduct an investigation that would result in a decision or report that is unfavourable to the executive? Responses: 0. Extremely unlikely. 1. Unlikely. 2. As likely as not. 3. Likely. 4. Certain or nearly certain.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). Coded as zero if there are no elections or if the electoral process has been suspended or nullified (e.g. through dismissal or dissolution of the relevant elected bodies or offices), as indicated by values of zero for both Executive_elections and Legislative_ elections from the LIED data set.
Indicator of	1. Representation 1.5. Effective Parliament
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.5. Effective Parliament.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Legislature opposition parties (v_15_04)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2lgoppart
Name in data set	v_15_04
Definition	Question: Are opposition parties (those not in the ruling party or coalition) able to exercise oversight and investigatory functions against the wishes of the governing party or coalition? Responses: 0. No, not at all. 1. Occasionally. 2. Yes, for the most part.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). Coded as zero if there are no elections or if the electoral process has been suspended or nullified (e.g. through dismissal or dissolution of the relevant elected bodies or offices), as indicated by values of zero for both Executive_elections and Legislative_ elections from the LIED data set.
Indicator of	1. Representation 1.5. Effective Parliament
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.5. Effective Parliament.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Executive constraints (v_15_05)

Data source	Polity
Original variable	xconst
Name in data set	v_15_05
Definition	Operationally, this variable refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities. Such limitations may be imposed by any 'accountability groups'. In Western democracies these are usually legislatures. Other kinds of accountability groups are the ruling party in a one-party state; councils of nobles or powerful advisers in monarchies; the military in coup-prone polities; and, in many states, a strong, independent judiciary. The concern is therefore with the checks and balances between the various parts of the decision-making process. A seven-category scale is used: 1. Unlimited authority. 2. Intermediate category. 3. Slight to moderate limitation on executive authority. 4. Intermediate category. 5. Substantial limitations on executive authority. 6. Intermediate category. 7. Executive party or subordination.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Marshall and Gurr (2020)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Codes -99 to -66 treated as missing values. Values for 2019 and following were coded by International IDEA's expert consultants following the original code book by Marshall and Gurr (2020). Coded as zero if there are no elections or if the electoral process has been suspended or nullified (e.g. through dismissal or dissolution of the relevant elected bodies or offices), as indicated by values of zero for both Executive_elections and Legislative_ elections from the LIED data set.
Indicator of	1. Representation 1.5. Effective Parliament
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 1.5. Effective Parliament.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Local government index (v_16_01)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2xel_locelec
Name in data set	v_16_01
Definition	Question: Are there elected local governments, and—if so—to what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the local level? Clarification: The lowest score would be reserved for a country that has no elected local governments. A medium score would be accorded a country that has elected local governments but where those governments are subordinate to unelected officials at the local level perhaps appointed by a higher-level body. A high score would be accorded to a country in which local governments are elected and able to operate without restrictions from unelected actors at the local level with the exception of judicial bodies. Naturally, local governments remain subordinate to the regional and national governments.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Re-scaled to vary between 0 and 1.
Indicator of	1. Representation 1.6. Local Democracy
Aggregation	Multiplication with v_16_02
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Subnational elections free and fair (v_16_02)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2elffelr
Name in data set	v_16_02
Definition	Question: Taking all aspects of the pre-election period, election day and the post-election process into account, would you consider subnational elections (regional and local, as previously identified) to be free and fair on average? Responses: 0. No, not at all. The elections were fundamentally flawed and the official results had little if anything to do with the 'will of the people' (who won office). 1. Not really. While the elections allowed for some competition, the irregularities in the end affected the outcome of the elections (who won office). 2. Ambiguous. There was substantial competition and freedom of participation but there were also significant irregularities. It is hard to determine whether the irregularities affected the outcome (who won office). 3. Yes, somewhat. There were deficiencies and some degree of fraud and irregularity but these did not in the end affect the outcome (who won office). 4. Yes. There were a certain amount of human error and logistical restrictions but these were largely unintentional and without significant consequences. Clarification: This question refers to subnational levels that have elected offices and elections. It does not refer to subnational levels without elected offices and elections. 'Free and fair' refers to all aspects of the election process except the extent of suffrage (by law). Thus, a free and fair election may occur even if the law excludes significant groups (which is measured separately).
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Re-scaled to vary between 0 and 1.
Indicator of	1. Representation 1.6. Local Democracy
Aggregation	Multiplication with v_16_01
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Chapter 2

RIGHTS

Rights is the second of the four attributes of democracy developed for International IDEA's Global State of Democracy Indices. This section of the Codebook provides details about the subattributes, subcomponents and indicators that compose the index of Rights:

1 attribute

- Rights

4 subattributes

- Access to Justice
- Civil Liberties
- Basic Welfare
- Political Equality

8 subcomponents

- Freedom of Expression
- Freedom of the Press
- Freedom of Association and Assembly
- Freedom of Religion
- Freedom of Movement
- Social Group Equality
- Economic Equality
- Gender Equality

84 indicators

ATTRIBUTE

Rights (rights_est)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in data set	rights_est
Definition	Rights in the form of liberal and social rights support both fair representation and the vertical mechanism of accountability that the second attribute seeks to achieve. This attribute is composed of four subattributes: Access to Justice, Civil Liberties, Basic Welfare, and Political Equality. The four subattributes were aggregated into the Rights index using BFA.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning and Hudson (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	—
Indicator of	—
Aggregation	—
Indicators included	access_just_est, civil_lib_est, basic_welf_est, pol_equal_est
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	rights_l = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval rights_u = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval

SUBATTRIBUTES

Access to Justice (access_just_est)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in data set	access_just_est
Definition	The Access to Justice subattribute denotes the extent to which the legal system is fair (i.e. citizens are not subject to arbitrary arrest or detention and have the right to be under the jurisdiction of, and to seek redress from, competent, independent and impartial tribunals without undue delay). It comprises four expert coded variables (V-Dem) that go beyond the independence of courts. The V-Dem indicators are supplemented with an in-house coded CLD measure of the right to a fair trial, a measure of the effective protection of civil rights from BTI, and a measure of due process rights from FITW. The seven indicators were aggregated into the Access to Justice subattribute using IRT.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning and Hudson (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	—
Indicator of	2. Rights
Aggregation	BFA of 2.1. Access to Justice, 2.2. Civil Liberties, 2.3. Basic Welfare, and 2.4. Political Equality.
Indicators included	v_21_01, v_21_02, v_21_03, v_21_04, v_21_05, v_21_06, v_21_07.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	access_just_l = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval access_just_u = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval

Civil Liberties (civil_lib_est)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in data set	civil_lib_est
Definition	The Civil Liberties subattribute denotes the extent to which civil rights and liberties are respected. The five civil liberties subcomponents are Freedom of Expression, Freedom of the Press, Freedom of Association and Assembly, Freedom of Religion, and Freedom of Movement, each of which reflects core concepts in the human rights literature. The five subcomponents were aggregated into the Civil Liberties subattribute using BFA.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning and Hudson (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	2. Rights
Aggregation	BFA of 2.1. Access to Justice, 2.2. Civil Liberties, 2.3. Basic Welfare, and 2.4. Political Equality.
Indicators included	free_express_est, free_press_est, free_assoc_assem_est, free_relig_est, free_move_est
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	civil_lib_l = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval civil_lib_u = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval

Basic Welfare (basic_welf_est)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in data set	basic_welf_est
Definition	Basic Welfare denotes the extent to which the material and social supports of democracy (e.g. nutrition, healthcare and education) are available. The provision of basic welfare is measured using a number of standard observable human development indicators: infant mortality rate (CME), life expectancy at birth (WPP), healthy life expectancy at age 60 (WHO), supply of kilocalories per person per day (FAO), literacy rate (UNESCO) and average years of schooling (IHME). In addition, two expert-based indicators from V-Dem were included to assess whether everyone in a given society has access to basic education and healthcare. All of these reflect the extent to which the basic needs of the population are being met. The indicators are aggregated into the Basic Welfare index using IRT.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning and Hudson (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	—
Indicator of	2. Rights
Aggregation	BFA of 2.1. Access to Justice, 2.2. Civil Liberties, 2.3. Basic Welfare, and 2.4. Political Equality.
Indicators included	v_23_01, v_23_02, v_23_03, v_23_04, v_23_05, v_23_06, v_23_07, v_23_08, v_23_09
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	basic_welf_l = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval basic_welf_u = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval

Political Equality (pol_equal_est)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in data set	pol_equal_est
Definition	The Political Equality subattribute denotes the extent to which political and social equality between social and economic groups, and genders is realized. The three Political Equality subcomponents are Social Group Equality, Economic Equality, and Gender Equality, all of which reflect core concepts in the human rights literature. The three subcomponents were aggregated into the Political Equality subattribute using BFA.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning and Hudson (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	2. Rights
Aggregation	BFA of 2.1. Access to Justice, 2.2. Civil Liberties, 2.3. Basic Welfare, and 2.4. Political Equality.
Indicators included	soc_grp_equal_est, econ_equal_est, gender_equal_est
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	pol_equal_l = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval pol_equal_u = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval

SUBCOMPONENTS

Freedom of Expression (free_express_est)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in data set	free_express_est
Definition	The Freedom of Expression subcomponent is measured using 11 indicators based on expert surveys from V-Dem and 2 in-house coded indicators from BTI, CLD, CIRIGHTS and Freedom House. The questions underlying the BTI, CLD, CIRIGHTS and some of the Freedom House variables are rather broad, whereas the V-Dem indicators are more specific and refer to the right to openly discuss political issues and express political opinions outside the mass media. Two of them distinguish between freedom of expression for men and for women. Three of the questions from Freedom House (Freedom on the Net) add considerations of the broader information environment to this subcomponent, with particular attention to access to information online. The indicators are aggregated into the Freedom of Expression subcomponent using IRT.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning and Hudson (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties
Aggregation	BFA of 2.2.A. Freedom of Expression, 2.2.B. Freedom of the Press, 2.2.C. Freedom of Association and Assembly, 2.2.D. Freedom of Religion, and 2.2.E. Freedom of Movement.
Indicators included	v_22_01, v_22_02, v_22_03, v_22_04, v_22_05, v_22_06, v_22_07, v_22_08, v_22_09, v_22_10, v_22_11
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	free_express_l = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval free_express_u = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval

Freedom of the Press (free_press_est)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in data set	free_press_est
Definition	The Freedom of the Press subcomponent is built from nine indicators. Seven of these measures come from V-Dem and measure the extent to which the news media are diverse, honest, critical of the government, and free from censorship (from the government or self-imposed). We add to this a broader measure of media freedom from GMFD, and a measure of the freedom and independence of the media from FITW. The indicators are aggregated into the Freedom of the Press subcomponent using IRT.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning and Hudson (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties
Aggregation	BFA of 2.2.A. Freedom of Expression, 2.2.B. Freedom of the Press, 2.2.C. Freedom of Association and Assembly, 2.2.D. Freedom of Religion, and 2.2.E. Freedom of Movement.
Indicators included	v_22_12, v_22_13, v_22_14, v_22_15, v_22_16, v_22_17, v_22_18, v_22_19, v_22_20
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	free_press_l = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval free_press_u = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval

Freedom of Association and Assembly (free_assoc_assem)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in data set	free_assoc_assem
Definition	Eleven indicators from five sources are used to measure Freedom of Association and Assembly. Two of them refer directly to freedom of association. One indicator each from V-Dem and FITW focuses on the freedom of peaceful assembly. Two indicators from FITW deal with associational rights for non-governmental organizations and trade unions. The indicators offered by BTI, CLD and CIRIGHTS cover freedom of assembly as well as freedom of association, where association refers to both civil society organizations and political parties. Specific CIRIGHTS indicators capture the extent to which workers are entitled to organize and bargain collectively. The indicators are aggregated into the Freedom of Association and Assembly subcomponent using IRT.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning and Hudson (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	—
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties
Aggregation	BFA of 2.2.A. Freedom of Expression, 2.2.B. Freedom of the Press, 2.2.C. Freedom of Association and Assembly, 2.2.D. Freedom of Religion, and 2.2.E. Freedom of Movement.
Indicators included	v_22_21, v_22_22, v_22_23, v_22_24, v_22_25, v_22_26, v_22_27, v_22_28, v_22_29, v_22_30, v_22_31
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	free_assoc_assem_l = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval free_assoc_assem_u = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval

Freedom of Religion (free_relig_est)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in data set	free_relig_est
Definition	A separate subcomponent index comprised of two V-Dem general indicators on religious freedom based on expert surveys and two similarly broad in-house coded variables from CLD, CIRIGHTS and FITW. The five indicators were aggregated into the Freedom of Religion subcomponent using IRT.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning and Hudson (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties
Aggregation	BFA of 2.2.A. Freedom of Expression, 2.2.B. Freedom of the Press, 2.2.C. Freedom of Association and Assembly, 2.2.D. Freedom of Religion, and 2.2.E. Freedom of Movement.
Indicators included	v_22_32, v_22_33, v_22_34, v_22_35, v_22_36
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	free_relig_l = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval free_relig_u = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval

Freedom of Movement (free_move_est)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in data set	free_move_est
Definition	Freedom of Movement was captured by a general, in-house coded indicator from CLD, two specific in-house coded indicators from CIRIGHTS, and one in-house coded indicator from FITW, and three, more specific, expert coded indicators from V-Dem that distinguish between foreign and domestic movement and provide assessments of the latter feature for men and women. The seven indicators were aggregated into the Freedom of Movement subcomponent using IRT.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning and Hudson (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties
Aggregation	BFA of 2.2.A. Freedom of Expression, 2.2.B. Freedom of the Press, 2.2.C. Freedom of Association and Assembly, 2.2.D. Freedom of Religion, and 2.2.E. Freedom of Movement.
Indicators included	v_22_41, v_22_42, v_22_43, v_22_44, v_22_45, v_22_46, v_22_47
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	L_SD22D = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval U_SD22D = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval

Social Group Equality (soc_grp_equal_est)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in data set	soc_grp_equal_est
Definition	Five V-Dem expert-coded indicators that reflect social equality are used to measure social group equality with regard to civil liberties and political power distribution. These are supplemented by indicators of equality treatment and political equality from BTI and Freedom House. The eight indicators were aggregated into the Social Group Equality subcomponent using IRT.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning and Hudson (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.4. Political Equality
Aggregation	BFA of 2.4.A. Social Group Equality, 2.4.B. Economic Equality, and 2.4.C. Gender Equality.
Indicators included	v_24_01, v_24_02, v_24_03, v_24_04, v_24_05, v_24_06, v_24_07, v_24_08
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	soc_grp_equal _l = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval soc_grp_equal_u = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval

Economic Equality (econ_equal_est)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in data set	econ_equal_est
Definition	The Economic Equality subcomponent aggregates four V-Dem indicators that specify dimensions of political exclusion based on economic and geographical characteristics. The index also includes a measure of socio-economic barriers (from BTI) and the Gini coefficient (from SWIID). The six indicators were aggregated into the Economic Equality subcomponent using IRT.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning and Hudson (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.4. Political Equality
Aggregation	BFA of 2.4.A. Social Group Equality, 2.4.B. Economic Equality, and 2.4.C. Gender Equality.
Indicators included	v_24_09, v_24_10, v_24_11, v_24_12, v_24_13, v_24_14
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	soc_grp_equal _l = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval soc_grp_equal_u = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval

Gender Equality (gender_equal_est)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in data set	gender_equal_est
Definition	The Gender Equality subcomponent is measured through two expert-coded indicators from V-Dem, on power distribution by gender and female participation in civil society organizations, and five observational indicators, on the ratio of female to male mean years of schooling (IHME), the proportion of lower chamber legislators who are female (V-Dem), the gender disaggregated labour force participation rate (women-men, ILO), the share of managerial positions held by women (ILO), and gender disaggregated control of financial accounts (women-men, World Bank). To this we added an index of exclusion by gender (V-Dem), and in-house coded measures of women's empowerment (GGGR), and women's political and economic rights (both from CIRIGHTS). The 11 indicators were aggregated into the Gender Equality subcomponent using IRT.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning and Hudson (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.4. Political Equality
Aggregation	BFA of 2.4.A. Social Group Equality, 2.4.B. Economic Equality, and 2.4.C. Gender Equality.
Indicators included	v_24_15, v_24_16, v_24_17, v_24_18, v_24_19, v_24_20, v_24_21, v_24_22, v_24_23, v_24_24, v_24_25
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	gender_equal_l = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval gender_equal_u = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval

INDICATORS

Access to justice for men (v_21_01)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2clacjstm
Name in data set	v_21_01
Definition	Question: Do men enjoy secure and effective access to justice? Responses: 0. Secure and effective access to justice for men is non-existent. 1. Secure and effective access to justice for men is usually not established or widely respected. 2. Secure and effective access to justice for men is inconsistently observed. Minor problems in most cases or occur rather unevenly across different parts of the country. 3. Secure and effective access to justice for men is usually observed. 4. Secure and effective access to justice for men is almost always observed. Clarification: This question specifies the extent to which men can bring cases before the courts without risk to their personal safety, trials are fair and men have effective ability to seek redress if the public authorities violate their rights, including the rights to counsel, defence and appeal. This question does not ask you to assess the relative access to justice for men and women. Thus, it is correct to assign the lowest possible score to a country if men and women enjoy equal but extremely limited access to justice.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.1. Access to Justice
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 2.1. Access to Justice.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Access to justice for women (v_21_02)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2clacjstw
Name in data set	v_21_02
Definition	Question: Do women enjoy equal, secure and effective access to justice? Responses: 0. Secure and effective access to justice for women is non-existent. 1. Secure and effective access to justice for women is usually not established or widely respected. 2. Secure and effective access to justice for women is inconsistently observed. Minor problems occur in most cases or rather unevenly across different parts of the country. 3. Secure and effective access to justice for women is usually observed. 4. Secure and effective access to justice for women is almost always observed. Clarification: This question specifies the extent to which women can bring cases before the courts without risk to their personal safety, trials are fair and women have effective ability to seek redress if the public authorities violate their rights, including the rights to counsel, defence and appeal. This question does not ask you to assess the relative access to justice for men and women. Thus, it is correct to assign the lowest possible score to a country if men and women enjoy equal but extremely limited access to justice.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.1. Access to Justice
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 2.1. Access to Justice.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Judicial corruption decision (v_21_03)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2jucorrdc
Name in data set	v_21_03
Definition	Question: How often do individuals or businesses make undocumented extra payments or bribes in order to speed up or delay a process or to obtain a favourable judicial decision? Responses: 0. Always. 1. Usually. 2. About half of the time. 3. Not usually. 4. Never.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.1. Access to Justice
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 2.1. Access to Justice.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Judicial accountability (v_21_04)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2juaccnt
Name in data set	v_21_04
Definition	Question: When judges are found responsible for serious misconduct, how often are they removed from their posts or otherwise disciplined? Responses: 0. Never. 1. Seldom. 2. About half of the time. 3. Usually. 4. Always.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.1. Access to Justice
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 2.1. Access to Justice.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Fair trial (v_21_05)

Data source	CLD
Original variable	fairtrial
Name in data set	v_21_05
Definition	The indicator specifies the extent to which citizens have the right to a fair trial in practice: they are not subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile; and they have the right to recognition as a person before the law; the right to be under the jurisdiction of and seek redress from competent, independent and impartial tribunals; and the right to be heard and to be tried without undue delay if arrested, detained or charged with a criminal offence. Indicator scale: 1. Severely restricted. Fair trials are very unlikely. The courts are totally subordinated to the will of government or the justice system is profoundly undermined by arbitrary arrests, incompetence, corruption and intimidation. 2. Substantially restricted. Some elements of fair trials exist but the courts are not fully independent of the government and/or the justice system is characterized by widespread corruption, intimidation and inefficiency. 3. Moderately restricted. The courts are generally independent of the government, but the justice system is characterized by moderate degrees of corruption or inefficiency. 4. Unrestricted. All elements of fair trials are respected. No arbitrary arrests take place; the courts are competent, independent and impartial; and hearings and trials generally follow arrest and charge within a reasonable time.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Skaaning (2010)
Data manipulation for aggregation	—
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.1. Access to Justice
Aggregation	BFA to construct subattribute 2.1. Access to Justice.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

F2 Rule of law (v_21_06)

Data source	FITW
Original variable	F2
Name in data set	v_21_06
Definition	Question: Does due process prevail in civil and criminal matters? Country scores vary between 0 (worst) and 4 (best).
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Freedom House (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.1. Access to Justice
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 2.1. Access to Justice.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Civil rights (v_21_07)

Data source	BTI
Original variable	civ_rights
Name in data set	v_21_07
Definition	Countries scored from 1 to 10, following the statements listed below. 1. Civil rights are systematically violated. There are no mechanisms and institutions to protect residents against violations of their rights. 2. 3. 4. Civil rights are codified by law, but even the most rights (i.e. to life, liberty and physical integrity) are violated in practice. Mechanisms and institutions to prosecute, punish and redress violations of civil rights are largely ineffective. 5. 6. 7. Civil rights are codified by law, but are not properly respected and protected. Mechanisms and institutions to prosecute, punish and redress violations of civil rights are in place, but are not consistently effective. 8. 9. 10. Civil rights are codified by law and respected by all state institutions, which actively prevent discrimination. Residents are effectively protected by mechanisms and institutions established to prosecute, punish and redress violations of their rights.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Bertelsmann Stiftung (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	–
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.1. Access to Justice
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 2.1. Access to Justice.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Freedom of discussion for women (v_22_01)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2cldiscw
Name in data set	v_22_01
Definition	Question: Are women able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces? Responses: 0. Not respected. Hardly any freedom of expression exists for women. Women are subject to immediate and harsh intervention and harassment for expressing political opinions. 1. Weakly respected. Expressions of political opinions by women are frequently exposed to intervention and harassment. 2. Somewhat respected. Expressions of political opinions by women are occasionally exposed to intervention and harassment. 3. Mostly respected. There are minor restraints on freedom of expression in the private sphere, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases or only linked to soft sanctions. As a rule, however, there is no intervention or harassment if women make political statements. 4. Fully respected. Freedom of speech by women in their homes and in public spaces is unrestricted. Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which women are able to engage in private discussions, particularly on political issues, in private homes and public spaces, such as restaurants, public transport, sports events or at work, without fear of harassment by other members of the polity or the public authorities. Of interest are restrictions by the government and its agents but also cultural restrictions or customary laws that are enforced by other members of the polity, sometimes in informal ways. This question does not ask you to assess the relative freedom of men and women. Thus, it is correct to assign the lowest possible score to a country where men and women enjoy equal but extremely few rights to freedom of discussion.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties 2.2.A. Freedom of Expression
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.A. Freedom of Expression.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Freedom of discussion for men (v_22_02)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2cldiscm
Name in data set	v_22_02
Definition	Question: Are men able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces? Responses: 0. Not respected. Hardly any freedom of expression exists for men. Men are subject to immediate and harsh intervention and harassment for expression of political opinions. 1. Weakly respected. Expressions of political opinions by men are frequently exposed to intervention and harassment. 2. Somewhat respected. Expressions of political opinions by men are occasionally exposed to intervention and harassment. 3. Mostly respected. There are minor restraints on freedom of expression in the private sphere, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases or only linked to soft sanctions. As a rule, however, there is no intervention or harassment if men make political statements. 4. Fully respected. Freedom of speech for men in their homes and in public spaces is unrestricted. Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which men are able to engage in private discussions, particularly on political issues, in private homes and public spaces, such as restaurants, public transport, sports events or at work, without fear of harassment by other members of the polity or the public authorities. Of interest are restrictions by the government and its agents but also cultural restrictions or customary laws that are enforced by other members of the polity, sometimes in informal ways. This question does not ask you to assess the relative freedom of men and women. Thus, it is correct to assign the lowest possible score to a country where men and women enjoy equal but extremely few rights to freedom of discussion.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties 2.2.A. Freedom of Expression
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.A. Freedom of Expression.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Freedom of academic and cultural expression (v_22_03)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2clacfree
Name in data set	v_22_03
Definition	Question: Are there academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression related to political issues? Responses: 0. Not respected by the public authorities. Censorship and intimidation are frequent. Academic activities and cultural expression are severely restricted or controlled by the government. 1. Weakly respected by the public authorities. Academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression are practised occasionally, but direct criticism of the government is mostly met with repression. 2. Somewhat respected by the public authorities. Academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression are practised routinely, but strong criticism of the government is sometimes met with repression. 3. Mostly respected by the public authorities. There are few limitations on academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression and resulting sanctions tend to be infrequent and soft. 4. Fully respected by the public authorities. There are no restrictions on academic freedom or cultural expression.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties 2.2.A. Freedom of Expression
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.A. Freedom of Expression.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Freedom of opinion and expression (v_22_04)

Data source	CLD
Original variable	freexp
Name in data set	v_22_04
Definition	The extent to which individual citizens, groups and the media have freedom of opinion and expression, that is, the right of citizens, groups and the press to hold views freely and to seek, obtain and pass on information on political issues as broadly understood without being subject to limitations or restrictions. Component scale: 1. Severely restricted. Hardly any freedom of opinion or expression exists. As a rule, political statements and press coverage independent and/or critical of the government do not exist or are harshly suppressed. 2. Fairly restricted. Some elements of expression of political opinions and press coverage independent and critical of the government exist but are exposed to numerous interventions and prohibitions. 3. Modestly restricted. There are minor restraints on the freedom of opinion and expression, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases, but as a rule there are no interventions and prohibitions on political statements and/or press coverage. 4. Unrestricted. Unhampered freedom of opinion and expression exists.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Skaaning (2010)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties 2.2.A. Freedom of Expression
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.A. Freedom of Expression.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Freedom of speech and press (v_22_05)

Data source	CIRIGHTS
Original variable	speech
Name in data set	v_22_05
Definition	The extent to which freedoms of speech and press are affected by government censorship, including ownership of media outlets. Censorship is any form of restriction that is placed on freedom of the press, speech or expression. Expression may also be in the form of art or music. There are different degrees of censorship. Censorship denies citizens freedom of speech and limits or prevents the media (print, online or broadcast) to express views challenging the policies of the existing government. In many instances, the government owns and operates all forms of press and media. Component scale: 0. Complete. If the government, in practice, owns all of any one aspect of the media, such as all radio stations or all television stations. 1. Some. The government places some restrictions yet does allow limited rights to freedom of speech and the press. 2. None. 'No' censorship means the freedom to speak freely and to print opposing opinions without the fear of prosecution. 'None' in no way implies absolute freedom, as there exists in all countries some restrictions on information and/or communication. Even in democracies there are restrictions placed on freedoms of speech and the press if these rights infringe on the rights of others or in any way endanger the welfare of others.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Mark, Cingranelli and Filippov (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Values for 2021 and following were coded by International IDEA following the original code book by Mark, Cingranelli and Filippov (2022).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties 2.2.A. Freedom of Expression
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.A. Freedom of Expression.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Obstacles to access (v_22_06)

Data source	FOTN
Original variable	A
Name in data set	v_22_06
Definition	This composite measure 'details infrastructural, economic, and political barriers to access; government decisions to shut off connectivity or block specific applications or technologies; legal, regulatory, and ownership control over internet service providers; and the independence of regulatory bodies'. Scores vary between 0 and 25.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Freedom House (2023)
Data manipulation for aggregation	–
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties 2.2.A. Freedom of Expression
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.A. Freedom of Expression.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Limits on content (v_22_07)

Data source	FOTN
Original variable	B
Name in data set	v_22_07
Definition	This composite measure 'analyzes legal regulations on content; technical filtering and blocking of websites; other forms of censorship and self-censorship; the vibrancy and diversity of online information space; and the use of digital tools for civic mobilization'. Scores vary between 0 and 35.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Freedom House (2023)
Data manipulation for aggregation	—
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties 2.2.A. Freedom of Expression
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.A. Freedom of Expression.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Violations of user rights (v_22_08)

Data source	FOTN
Original variable	C
Name in data set	v_22_08
Definition	This composite measure 'tackles legal protections and restrictions on free expression; surveillance and privacy; and legal and extralegal repercussions for online speech and activities, such as imprisonment, cyberattacks, or extralegal harassment and physical violence'. Scores vary between 0 and 40.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Freedom House (2023)
Data manipulation for aggregation	–
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties 2.2.A. Freedom of Expression
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.A. Freedom of Expression.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

D3 Freedom of expression and belief (v_22_09)

Data source	FITW
Original variable	D3
Name in data set	v_22_09
Definition	Question: Is there academic freedom, and is the educational system free from extensive political indoctrination? Country scores vary between 0 (worst) and 4 (best).
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Freedom House (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties 2.2.A. Freedom of Expression
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.A. Freedom of Expression.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

D4 Freedom of expression and belief (v_22_10)

Data source	FITW
Original variable	D4
Name in data set	v_22_10
Definition	Question: Are individuals free to express their personal views on political or other sensitive topics without fear of surveillance or retribution? Country scores vary between 0 (worst) and 4 (best).
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Freedom House (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	–
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties 2.2.A. Freedom of Expression
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.A. Freedom of Expression.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Freedom of expression (v_22_11)

Data source	BTI
Original variable	express
Name in data set	v_22_11
Definition	Countries scored from 1 to 10, following the statements listed below. 1. Freedom of expression is denied. Independent media do not exist or are prohibited. 2. 3. 4. Freedom of expression is often subject to interference or government restrictions. Distortion and manipulation shape matters of public debate. 5. 6. 7. Freedom of expression is occasionally subject to interference or government restrictions, but there are generally no incidents of blatant intrusions like outright state censorship or media shutdowns. 8. 9. 10. Freedom of expression is guaranteed against interference or government restrictions. Individuals, groups and the press can fully exercise these rights.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Bertelsmann Stiftung (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties 2.2.A. Freedom of Expression
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.A. Freedom of Expression.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Print/broadcast censorship effort (v_22_12)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2mecenefm
Name in data set	v_22_12
Definition	Question: Does the government directly or indirectly attempt to censor the print or broadcast media? Responses: 0. Attempts to censor are direct and routine. 1. Attempts to censor are indirect but nonetheless routine. 2. Attempts to censor are direct but limited to especially sensitive issues. 3. Attempts to censor are indirect and limited to especially sensitive issues. 4. The government rarely attempts to censor major media in any way and when such exceptional attempts are discovered, the responsible officials are usually punished. Clarification: Indirect forms of censorship might include politically motivated awarding of broadcast frequencies, withdrawal of financial support, influence over printing facilities and distribution networks, selected distribution of advertising, onerous registration requirements, prohibitive tariffs and bribery. Censorship of non-political topics such as child pornography, statements offensive to a particular religion or defamatory speech are not relevant unless used as a pretext for censoring political speech.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties 2.2.B. Freedom of the Press
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.B. Freedom of the Press.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Harassment of journalists (v_22_13)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2meharjrn
Name in data set	v_22_13
Definition	Question: Are individual journalists harassed; that is, threatened with libel, arrested, imprisoned, beaten or killed, by governmental or powerful non-governmental actors while engaged in legitimate journalistic activities? Responses: 0. Journalists do not dare to engage in journalistic activities that would offend powerful actors because harassment or worse would be certain to occur. 1. Some journalists occasionally offend powerful actors but they are almost always harassed or worse and eventually forced to stop. 2. Some journalists who offend powerful actors are forced to stop but others manage to continue practising journalism freely for long periods of time. 3. It is rare for any journalist to be harassed for offending powerful actors and if this were to happen, those responsible for the harassment would be identified and punished. 4. Journalists are never harassed by governmental or powerful non-governmental actors while engaged in legitimate journalistic activities.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties 2.2.B. Freedom of the Press
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.B. Freedom of the Press.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Media self-censorship (v_22_14)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2meslfcen
Name in data set	v_22_14
Definition	Question: Is there self-censorship among journalists when reporting on issues that the government considers politically sensitive? Responses: 0. Self-censorship is complete and thorough. 1. Self-censorship is common but incomplete. 2. There is self-censorship on a few highly sensitive political issues but not on moderately sensitive issues. 3. There is little or no self-censorship among journalists.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties 2.2.B. Freedom of the Press
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.B. Freedom of the Press.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Critical print/broadcast media (v_22_15)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2mecrit
Name in data set	v_22_15
Definition	Question: Of the major print and broadcast outlets, how many routinely criticize the government? Responses: 0. None. 1. Only a few marginal outlets. 2. Some important outlets routinely criticize the government but there are other important outlets that never do. 3. All major media outlets criticize the government, at least occasionally.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties 2.2.B. Freedom of the Press
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.B. Freedom of the Press.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Print/broadcast media perspectives (v_22_16)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2merange
Name in data set	v_22_16
Definition	Question: Do the major print and broadcast media represent a wide range of political perspectives? Responses: 0. The major media represent only the government's perspective. 1. The major media represent only the perspectives of the government and a government-approved, semi-official opposition party. 2. The major media represent a variety of political perspectives but they systematically ignore at least one political perspective that is important in this society. 3. All perspectives that are important in this society are represented in at least one of the major media.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties 2.2.B. Freedom of the Press
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.B. Freedom of the Press.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Media bias (v_22_17)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2mebias
Name in data set	v_22_17
Definition	Question: Is there media bias against opposition parties or candidates? Responses: 0. The print and broadcast media cover only the official party or candidates, or have no political coverage; or there are no opposition parties or candidates to cover. 1. The print and broadcast media cover more than just the official party or candidates but all the opposition parties or candidates receive only negative coverage. 2. The print and broadcast media cover some opposition parties or candidates more or less impartially, but they give only negative or no coverage to at least one newsworthy party or candidate. 3. The print and broadcast media cover opposition parties or candidates more or less impartially, but they give an exaggerated amount of coverage to the governing party or candidates. 4. The print and broadcast media cover all newsworthy parties and candidates more or less impartially and in proportion to their newsworthiness. Clarification: Take particular care in rating the year-to-year variation on this question if media bias tends to increase or decrease in election years. Coverage can be considered 'more or less impartial' when the media as a whole presents a mix of positive and negative coverage of each party or candidate.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties 2.2.B. Freedom of the Press
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.B. Freedom of the Press.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Media corrupt (v_22_18)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2mecorrpt
Name in data set	v_33_04
Definition	Question: Do journalists, publishers or broadcasters accept payments in exchange for altering news coverage? Responses: 0. The media are so closely directed by the government that any such payments would be either unnecessary to ensure pro-government coverage or ineffective in producing anti-government coverage. 1. Journalists, publishers and broadcasters routinely alter news coverage in exchange for payments. 2. It is common, but not routine, for journalists, publishers and broadcasters to alter news coverage in exchange for payments. 3. It is not normal for journalists, publishers and broadcasters to alter news coverage in exchange for payments, but it happens occasionally without anyone being punished. 4. Journalists, publishers and broadcasters rarely alter news coverage in exchange for payments and if it becomes known, someone is punished for it.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties 2.2.B. Freedom of the Press
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.B. Freedom of the Press.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Media freedom (v_22_19)

Data source	GMFD
Original variable	Media freedom
Name in data set	v_22_19
Definition	The media environments around the world are sorted into three basic categories: 1. Free. Countries where criticism of the government and government officials is a common and normal part of the political dialogue in the mediated public sphere. 2. Imperfectly free. Countries where the social, legal or economic costs related to criticism of the government or government officials limit public criticism, but investigative journalism and criticism of major policy failings can and do occur. 3. Not free. Countries where it is not possible to safely criticize government or government officials. Clarification: In the original data set (Van Belle 2000), there were four categories. Category 4 meant that the government directly controlled all news media, whereas category 3 meant that the government exerted indirect control. Since the end of the Cold War and with the massive growth in information technology, distinguishing between state-operated news media and media controlled by other means became something of a pointless exercise.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Whitten-Woodring and Van Belle (2017)
Data manipulation for aggregation	The scale is inverted so that higher values denote better performance.
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties 2.2.B. Freedom of the Press
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.B. Freedom of the Press.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

D1 Freedom of expression and belief (v_22_20)

Data source	FITW
Original variable	D1
Name in data set	v_22_20
Definition	Question: Are there free and independent media? Country scores vary between 0 (worst) and 4 (best).
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Freedom House (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	—
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties 2.2.B. Freedom of the Press
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.B. Freedom of the Press.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

CSO entry and exit (v_22_21)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2cseeorgs
Name in data set	v_22_21
Definition	Question: To what extent does the government achieve control over entry and exit by civil society organizations (CSOs) into public life? Responses: 0. Monopolistic control. The government exercises an explicit monopoly over CSOs. The only organizations allowed to engage in political activity, such as endorsing parties or politicians, sponsoring public issue forums, organizing rallies or demonstrations, engaging in strikes or publicly commenting on public officials and policies, are government-sponsored organizations. The government actively represses those who attempt to defy its monopoly on political activity. 1. Substantial control. The government licenses all CSOs and uses political criteria to bar organizations that are likely to oppose the government. There are at least some citizen-based organizations that play a limited role in politics independent of the government. The government actively represses those who attempt to flout its political criteria and bars them from any political activity. 2. Moderate control. Whether the government ban on independent CSOs is partial or full, some prohibited organizations manage to play an active political role. Despite its ban on organizations of this sort, the government does not or cannot repress them, due to either its weakness or political expediency. 3. Minimal control. Regardless of whether the government licenses CSOs, constitutional provisions exist that allow the government to ban organizations or movements that have a history of anti-democratic action (e.g. the banning of neo-fascist or communist organizations in the Federal Republic of Germany). Such bans take place within the rule of law and conditions of judicial independence. 4. Unconstrained. Regardless of whether the government licenses CSOs, the government does not impede their formation and operation unless they are engaged in activities that seek to violently overthrow the government.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties 2.2.C. Freedom of Association and Assembly
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.C. Freedom of Association and Assembly.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

CSO repression (v_22_22)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2csreprss
Name in data set	v_22_22
Definition	Question: Does the government attempt to repress civil society organizations? Responses: 0. Severely. The government violently and actively pursues all real and some imagined members of CSOs, seeking not just to deter the activity of such groups but effectively to liquidate them. Examples include Stalinist Russia, Nazi Germany and Maoist China. 1. Substantially. In addition to the kinds of harassment outlined in responses 2 and 3 below, the government also arrests, tries and imprisons leaders of and participants in opposition CSOs that are not acting unlawfully. Other sanctions include disruption of public gatherings and violent sanctions of activists such as beatings, threats to family members and destruction of valuable property. Examples include Mugabe's Zimbabwe, Poland under Martial Law and Serbia under Milosevic. 2. Moderately. In addition to the material sanctions outlined in response 3, the government also engages in minor legal harassment such as detentions or short-term incarceration to dissuade CSOs from acting or expressing themselves. The government may also restrict the scope of CSOs' actions through measures that restrict the association of such organizations with each other or political parties, bar CSOs from taking certain actions or block international contacts. Examples include post-Martial Law Poland, Brazil in the early 1980s and the late Franco period in Spain. 3. Weakly. The government uses material sanctions such as fines, firings and denial of social services, to deter oppositional CSOs from acting or expressing themselves. They may also use burdensome registration or incorporation procedures to slow the formation of new CSOs and sidetrack them from engagement. The government may also organize government organized movements or NGOs (GONGOs) to crowd out independent organizations. Examples include Singapore in the post-Yew phase or Putin's Russia. 4. No. Civil society organizations are free to organize, associate, strike, express themselves and criticize the government without fear of government sanction or harassment.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).

Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties 2.2.C. Freedom of Association and Assembly
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.C. Freedom of Association and Assembly.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Freedom of peaceful assembly (v_22_23)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2caassemb
Name in data set	v_22_23
Definition	Question: To what extent do state authorities respect and protect the right of peaceful assembly? Responses: 0. Never. State authorities do not allow peaceful assemblies and are willing to use lethal force to prevent them. 1. Rarely. State authorities rarely allow peaceful assemblies, but generally avoid using lethal force to prevent them. 2. Sometimes. State authorities sometimes allow peaceful assemblies, but often arbitrarily deny citizens the right to assemble peacefully. 3. Mostly. State authorities generally allow peaceful assemblies, but in rare cases arbitrarily deny citizens the right to assemble peacefully. 4. Almost always. State authorities almost always allow and actively protect peaceful assemblies except in rare cases of lawful, necessary, and proportionate limitations. Clarification: This question focuses on the ability to assemble publicly in practice. An assembly is 'an intentional and temporary presence of a number of individuals in a public place, for a common expressive purpose' (Belyaeva et al. 2010). Authorities may limit the right to assembly only if limitations are necessary in the interests of national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, and are lawful, necessary and proportionate to the aim pursued. Such reasonable and legal restrictions should not be considered when answering. However, if there is evidence that restrictions are used as a pretext for political reasons, this evidence should be considered.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties 2.2.C. Freedom of Association and Assembly
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.C. Freedom of Association and Assembly.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Freedom of assembly and association (v_22_24)

Data source	CLD
Original variable	freass
Name in data set	v_22_24
Definition	The extent to which individuals and groups have freedom of assembly and association, that is, the right of citizens to gather freely and carry out peaceful demonstrations as well as to join, form and participate with other persons in political parties, cultural organizations, trade unions or the like of their own volition without being subject to limitations or restrictions. Component scale: 1. Severely restricted. Hardly any freedom of association and assembly exists. As a rule, politically relevant civic organizations and attempts at assembly do not exist or are harshly suppressed. 2. Fairly restricted. Some elements of civic organizations exist, but oppositional organizations of relevance to governance are prohibited, disabled or systematically repressed, and demonstrations critical of the government exposed to numerous interventions and prohibitions. 3. Modestly restricted. There are minor restraints on the freedom of association and/or assembly, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases, but as a rule there are no interventions or prohibitions on parties, social organizations or public meetings. 4. Unrestricted. There is unrestricted freedom of association and assembly.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Skaaning (2010)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties 2.2.C. Freedom of Association and Assembly
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.C. Freedom of Association and Assembly.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Freedom of assembly and association (v_22_25)

Data source	CIRIGHTS
Original variable	assn
Name in data set	v_22_25
Definition	It is an internationally recognized right of citizens to assemble freely and to associate with other persons in political parties, trade unions, cultural organizations, or other groups. This variable evaluates the extent to which the freedoms of assembly and association are subject to actual governmental limitations or restrictions (as opposed to strictly legal protections). Component scale: 0. Severely restricted or denied completely to all citizens. 1. Limited for all citizens or severely restricted or denied for select groups. 2. Virtually unrestricted and freely enjoyed by practically all citizens.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Mark, Cingranelli and Filippov (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Values for 2021 and following were coded by International IDEA following the original code book by Mark, Cingranelli and Filippov (2022).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties 2.2.C. Freedom of Association and Assembly
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.C. Freedom of Association and Assembly.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Union practices (v_22_26)

Data source	CIRIGHTS
Original variable	union_p
Name in data set	v_22_26
Definition	The right to form worker unions includes the right of workers and employers to establish and join organizations of their choosing without previous authorization; to draw up their own constitutions and rules, elect their representatives, and formulate their programmes; to join in confederations and affiliate with international organizations; and to be protected against dissolution or suspension by administrative authority. The score a country receives on this variable indicates the extent that worker unions are protected against anti-union discrimination, both in law and in practice. Measure of the extent to which unionization is allowed in practice, which is scored according to the following ordinal scale: 0. Severely restricted. There is no legal protection for workers to form unions. 1. Somewhat restricted. There is some legal protection for workers to form unions. 2. Fully protected. Workers' rights to form unions are fully protected by law.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Mark, Cingranelli and Filippov (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Values for 2021 and following were coded by International IDEA following the original code book by Mark, Cingranelli and Filippov (2022).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties 2.2.C. Freedom of Association and Assembly
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.C. Freedom of Association and Assembly.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Bargaining practices (v_22_27)

Data source	CIRIGHTS
Original variable	barg_p
Name in data set	v_22_27
Definition	The right to collective bargaining includes the right of workers to be represented in negotiating the prevention and settlement of disputes with employers. It also includes the right of workers to strike for at least 90 days without being replaced by their employer. Measure of the extent to which bargaining is allowed in practice, which is scored according to the following ordinal scale: 0. Severely restricted. Workers' rights to bargain collectively and participate in a strike are not protected by law. 1. Somewhat restricted. Workers' rights to bargain collectively and participate in a strike are somewhat protected by law. 2. Fully protected. Workers' rights to bargain collectively and participate in a strike are fully protected by law.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Mark, Cingranelli and Filippov (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Values for 2021 and following were coded by International IDEA following the original code book by Mark, Cingranelli and Filippov (2022).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties 2.2.C. Freedom of Association and Assembly
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.C. Freedom of Association and Assembly.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

E1 Associational and organizational rights (v_22_28)

Data source	FITW
Original variable	E1
Name in data set	v_22_28
Definition	Question: Is there freedom of assembly? Country scores vary between 0 (worst) and 4 (best).
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Freedom House (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties 2.2.C. Freedom of Association and Assembly
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.C. Freedom of Association and Assembly.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

E2 Associational and organizational rights (v_22_29)

Data source	FITW
Original variable	E2
Name in data set	v_22_29
Definition	Question: Is there freedom for non-governmental organizations, particularly those that are engaged in human rights- and governance-related work? Country scores vary between 0 (worst) and 4 (best).
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Freedom House (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	–
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties 2.2.C. Freedom of Association and Assembly
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.C. Freedom of Association and Assembly.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

E3 Associational and organizational rights (v_22_30)

Data source	FITW
Original variable	E3
Name in data set	v_22_30
Definition	Question: Is there freedom for trade unions and similar professional or labour organizations? Country scores vary between 0 (worst) and 4 (best).
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Freedom House (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties 2.2.C. Freedom of Association and Assembly
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.C. Freedom of Association and Assembly.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Association/assembly rights (v_22_31)

Data source	BTI
Original variable	assembly
Name in data set	v_22_31
Definition	Countries scored from 1 to 10, following the statements listed below: 1. Association and assembly rights are denied. Independent civic groups do not exist or are prohibited. 2. 3. 4. Association and assembly rights are often subject to interference or government restrictions. Residents and civic groups that do not support the government often cannot exercise these rights. 5. 6. 7. Association and assembly rights are occasionally subject to interference or government restrictions, but generally there are no outright prohibitions of independent political or civic groups. 8. 9. 10. Association and assembly rights are guaranteed against interference or government restrictions. Residents and civic groups can fully exercise these rights.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Bertelsmann Stiftung (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	–
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties 2.2.C. Freedom of Association and Assembly
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.C. Freedom of Association and Assembly.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Freedom of religion (v_22_32)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2clrelig_ord
Name in data set	v_22_32
Definition	Question: Is there freedom of religion? Responses: 0. Not respected by the public authorities. Hardly any freedom of religion exists. Any kind of religious practice is outlawed or at least controlled by the government to the extent that religious leaders are appointed by and subjected to the public authorities, which control the activities of religious communities in some detail. 1. Weakly respected by the public authorities. Some elements of autonomous organized religious practices exist and are officially recognized but significant religious communities are repressed, prohibited or systematically disabled; voluntary conversions are restricted; and instances of discrimination or intimidation of individuals or groups due to their religion are common. 2. Somewhat respected by the public authorities. Autonomous organized religious practices exist and are officially recognized. Minor religious communities are repressed, prohibited or systematically disabled, however, and/or there are occasional instances of discrimination or intimidation of individuals or groups based on their religion. 3. Mostly respected by the public authorities. There are minor restrictions on the freedom of religion, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases. Minority religions face denial of registration, hindrance of foreign missionaries from entering the country, restrictions on proselytizing or hindrances to accessing the construction of places of worship. 4. Fully respected by the public authorities. The population enjoys the right to practice any religious belief they choose. Religious groups may organize, select and train personnel; solicit and receive contributions; publish; and engage in consultations without undue interference. If religious communities have to register, the public authorities do not abuse the process to discriminate against a religion and do not constrain the right to worship before registration. Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which individuals and groups have the right to choose a religion, change their religion and practice that religion in private or in public as well as to proselytize peacefully without being subject to restrictions by the public authorities.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	–
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties 2.2.D. Freedom of Religion
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.D. Freedom of Religion.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Religious organization repression (v_22_33)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2csrlgrep_ord
Name in data set	v_22_33
Definition	Question: Does the government attempt to repress religious organizations? Responses: 0. Severely. The government violently and actively pursues all real and some imagined members of religious organizations. It seeks not just to deter the activity of such groups but effectively to liquidate them. Examples include Stalinist Russia and Maoist China. 1. Substantially. In addition to the kinds of harassment outlined in 2 and 3 below, the government also arrests, tries and imprisons leaders of and participants in oppositional religious organizations that have not acted unlawfully. Other sanctions include disruption of public gatherings and violent sanctions of activists, such as beatings, threats to families and destruction of valuable property. 2. Moderately. In addition to the material sanctions outlined in 3 below, the government also engages in minor legal harassment such as detentions or short-term incarceration to dissuade religious organizations from acting or their members from expressing themselves. The government may also restrict the scope of their actions through measures that restrict the association of religious CSOs with each other or political parties, bar religious CSOs from taking certain actions or block international contacts. 3. Weakly. The government uses material sanctions such as fines, firings or the denial of social services to deter oppositional religious organizations from acting or their members from expressing themselves. They may also use burdensome registration or incorporation procedures to slow the formation of new religious CSOs and sidetrack them from engagement. The government may also organize parallel religious organizations to crowd out independent religious organizations. 4. No. Religious CSOs are free to organize, associate, strike or express themselves and to criticize the government without fear of government sanctions or harassment.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	–
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties 2.2.D. Freedom of Religion
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.D. Freedom of Religion.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Freedom of thought, conscience and religion (v_22_34)

Data source	CLD
Original variable	frerel
Name in data set	v_22_34
Definition	The extent to which individuals and groups have freedom of thought, conscience and religion, that is, the right of citizens to have a religion or change their religion or belief of their own volition; and alone or in community manifest their religion or belief in practice, through worship, observance and teaching in private or public, as well as to proselytize peacefully without being subject to limitations or restrictions. Component scale: 1. Severely restricted. Hardly any freedom of religion exists. As a rule, any kind of religious practice is controlled by the government and harshly suppressed. 2. Fairly restricted. Some elements of autonomous organized religious practice exist and are officially recognized, but major religious movements are repressed, prohibited or systematically disabled. 3. Modestly restricted. There are minor restraints on the freedom of religion, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases, but as a rule there are no interventions or prohibitions on communities or individual worshippers. 4. Unrestricted. Unhampered freedom of religion exists.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Skaaning (2010)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties 2.2.D. Freedom of Religion
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.D. Freedom of Religion.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Freedom of religion (v_22_35)

Data source	CIRIGHTS
Original variable	rel_free
Name in data set	v_22_35
Definition	This variable indicates the extent to which the freedom of citizens to exercise and practise their religious beliefs is subject to actual government restrictions. Citizens of whatever religious belief should be able to worship free from government interference. Additionally, citizens should be able to hold no religion at all. Citizens should be able to freely practise their religion and proselytize (attempt to convert) other citizens to their religion as long as such attempts are done in a non-coercive, peaceful manner. Members of the clergy should be able to freely advocate partisan political views, oppose government laws, support political candidates, and otherwise freely participate in politics. Some important questions to consider include: Does the government respect rights including the freedom to publish religious documents in foreign languages? Does religious belief affect membership in a ruling party or a career in government? Does the government prohibit promotion of one religion over another and discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief? Does the government restrict the teaching or practice of any faith? Does the government discriminate against minority religious groups? Component scale: Government restrictions on religious practices are: 0. Severe and widespread. 1. Moderate. 2. Practically absent.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Mark, Cingranelli and Filippov (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Values for 2021 and following were coded by International IDEA following the original code book by Mark, Cingranelli and Filippov (2022).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties 2.2.D. Freedom of Religion
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.D. Freedom of Religion.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

D2 Freedom of expression and belief (v_22_36)

Data source	FITW
Original variable	D2
Name in data set	v_22_36
Definition	Question: Are individuals free to practise and express their religious faith or nonbelief in public and private? Country scores vary between 0 (worst) and 4 (best).
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Freedom House (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties 2.2.D. Freedom of Religion
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.D. Freedom of Religion.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Freedom of foreign movement (v_22_41)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2clfmove_ord
Name in data set	v_22_41
Definition	Question: Is there freedom of foreign travel and emigration? Responses: 0. Not respected by the public authorities. Citizens are rarely allowed to emigrate or travel out of the country. Transgressors (or their families) are severely punished. People discredited by the public authorities are routinely exiled or prohibited from travelling. 1. Weakly respected by the public authorities. The public authorities systematically restrict the right to travel, especially for political opponents or particular social groups. This can take the form of general restrictions on the duration of stays abroad or delays/ refusals of visas. 2. Somewhat respected by the public authorities. The right to travel for leading political opponents or particular social groups is occasionally restricted but ordinary citizens only face minor restrictions. 3. Mostly respected by the public authorities. Limitations on freedom of movement and residence are not directed at political opponents but minor restrictions exist. For example, exit visas may be required and citizens may be prohibited from travelling outside the country when accompanied by other members of their family. 4. Fully respected by the government. The freedom of citizens to travel from and to the country, and to emigrate and repatriate, is not restricted by the public authorities. Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which citizens are able to travel freely to and from the country and to emigrate without being subject to restrictions by the public authorities.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties 2.2.E. Freedom of Movement
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.E. Freedom of Movement.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Freedom of domestic movement for women (v_22_42)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2cldmovew_ord
Name in data set	v_22_42
Definition	Question: Do women enjoy freedom of movement within the country? Responses: 0. Virtually no women enjoy full freedom of movement (e.g. North Korea or Afghanistan under the Taliban). 1. Some women enjoy full freedom of movement but most do not (e.g. Apartheid South Africa). 2. Most women enjoy some freedom of movement but a sizeable minority does not. Alternatively, all women enjoy partial freedom of movement. 3. Most women enjoy full freedom of movement but a small minority does not. 4. Virtually all women enjoy full freedom of movement. Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which all women are able to move freely, in daytime and at night, in public thoroughfares and across regions within a country, and to establish permanent residence where they wish. Note that restrictions of movement might be imposed by the state and/or by informal norms and practices. Such restrictions sometimes fall on rural residents, on specific social groups or on dissidents. This question does not ask you to assess the relative freedom of men and women. Thus, it is correct to assign the lowest possible score to a country if men and women enjoy equal but extremely low levels of freedom of movement. Do not consider restrictions on movement that are placed on non-political criminals. Do not consider restrictions on movement that result from crime or unrest.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	–
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties 2.2.E. Freedom of Movement
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.E. Freedom of Movement.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Freedom of domestic movement for men (v_22_43)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2cldmovem_ord
Name in data set	v_22_43
Definition	Question: Do men enjoy freedom of movement within the country? Responses: 0. Virtually no men enjoy full freedom of movement (e.g. North Korea). 1. Some men enjoy full freedom of movement but most do not (e.g. Apartheid South Africa). 2. Most men enjoy some freedom of movement but a sizeable minority does not. Alternatively, all men enjoy partial freedom of movement. 3. Most men enjoy full freedom of movement but a small minority does not. 4. Virtually all men enjoy full freedom of movement. Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which all men are able to move freely, in daytime or at night, in public thoroughfares or across regions in a country, and to establish permanent residence where they wish. Note that restrictions in movement might be imposed by the state and/or by informal norms and practices. Such restrictions sometimes fall on rural residents, on specific social groups or on dissidents. This question does not ask you to assess the relative freedom of men and women. Thus, it is correct to assign the lowest possible score to a country if men and women enjoy equal but extremely low levels of freedom of movement. Do not consider restrictions in movement that are placed on non-political criminals. Do not consider restrictions in movement that result from crime or unrest.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties 2.2.E. Freedom of Movement
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.E. Freedom of Movement.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Freedom of movement and residence (v_22_44)

Data source	CLD
Original variable	fremov
Name in data set	v_22_44
Definition	The extent to which individuals and groups have freedom of movement and residence, that is, the right of citizens to settle and travel within their country or to leave and return to their country of their own volition without being subject to limitations or restrictions. Component scale: 1. Severely restricted. Hardly any freedom of movement exists. As a rule, citizens are not allowed to choose their place of residence or to travel around the country or abroad. 2. Fairly restricted. Some elements of foreign travel, choice of residence and/or domestic travel exist but numerous individuals, often belonging to specific groups, are exposed to a variety of prohibitions. 3. Modestly restricted. There are minor restraints on the freedom of travel and/or residence, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases, but as a rule there are no prohibitions. 4. Unrestricted. There is unrestricted freedom of movement and residence.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Skaaning (2010)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties 2.2.E. Freedom of Movement
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.E. Freedom of Movement.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Freedom of foreign movement (v_22_45)

Data source	CIRIGHTS
Original variable	formov
Name in data set	v_22_45
Definition	The freedom to leave and return to one's country is a right. There are countries that do not allow citizens to leave at all. Methods used by governments to restrict freedom of movement include withholding and/or delaying the issuing of passports, 'exit control' lists to prevent emigration, the requirement of an exit visa or special permits to leave the country, revocation of citizenship, and obstacles to the extension of passport's validity. In addition, there are countries where even if one is allowed to leave, there are restrictions on the duration of one's stay abroad. Citizens can lose their property and other assets if they leave for a very long time; some citizens have to get permission to leave. Others, when they leave, are not allowed to return or the government makes return very difficult. Also, some governments place restrictions on certain groups of people such as opposition political leaders, ethnic minorities, religious leaders, women, human rights activists or monitors, and journalists. Rights to emigration and repatriation without prejudice are also included in freedom of foreign movement and travel. Component scale: Foreign movement and travel is: 0. Severely restricted. The government restricts all or nearly all the foreign travel of its citizens. This category includes all countries whose governments have policies making it impossible or very difficult for women to travel abroad alone or without their husband's consent, and countries that limit the travel of sizable minority groups. This includes forcing women to receive permission from a man to leave the country with her own child. 1. Somewhat restricted. The government places modest restrictions on the freedom of foreign movement and travel of its citizens 2. Unrestricted. The government respects the freedom of foreign movement and travel in law and in practice.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Mark, Cingranelli and Filippov (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Values for 2021 and following were coded by International IDEA following the original code book by Mark, Cingranelli and Filippov (2022).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties 2.2.E. Freedom of Movement
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.E. Freedom of Movement.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Freedom of domestic movement (v_22_46)

Data source	CIRIGHTS
Original variable	dommov
Name in data set	v_22_46
Definition	The freedom to travel within one's country is a right. There are governments that do not allow citizens to travel within their own country of birth or that restrict the movement of certain groups for reasons based on political views or activities, religious beliefs, ethnicity, marital status and gender. For example, some countries strictly curtail the freedom of movement of oppositional political leaders, ethnic minorities, religious leaders, human rights activists or monitors, and journalists. This may take many forms, including government-imposed internal exile and/or intentional bureaucratic/administrative delays to freedom of movement after a prison term has ended. Some countries strictly monitor all or nearly all citizens' internal movements, and citizens are required to notify local officials of their whereabouts or must get their permission to move. In some countries, citizens must carry national identity cards, travel or work permits, or internal passports for any movement outside their immediate village, neighbourhood, or province. Some countries use issuance of these cards to restrict movement within the country. Some governments use forced internal resettlement to relocate large numbers of citizens without their consent. Some governments also impose curfew laws and military checkpoints on domestic travel during times of military or civil conflict. Component scale: 0. Severely restricted. The government restricts all or nearly all citizens' freedom of domestic movement, or routinely restricts the movement of a significant number of citizens based on their ethnicity, gender, race, religion, marital status, political convictions, or membership in a group. 1. Somewhat restricted. The government places modest restrictions on freedom of domestic movement. 2. Unrestricted. The government respects the freedom of domestic movement. 'Unrestricted' does not mean the absence of any restrictions and complete freedom of domestic movement at all times and in all places. In many countries, there are minor prohibitions or restrictions imposed on this right.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Mark, Cingranelli and Filippov (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Values for 2021 and following were coded by International IDEA following the original code book by Mark, Cingranelli and Filippov (2022).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties 2.2.E. Freedom of Movement
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.E. Freedom of Movement.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

G1 Personal autonomy and individual rights (v_22_47)

Data source	FITW
Original variable	G1
Name in data set	v_22_47
Definition	Question: Do individuals enjoy freedom of movement, including the ability to change their place of residence, employment or education? Country scores vary between 0 (worst) and 4 (best).
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Freedom House (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.2. Civil Liberties 2.2.E. Freedom of Movement
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.2.E. Freedom of Movement.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Infant mortality rate (v_23_01)

Data source	CME
Original name	Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)
Name in data set	v_23_01
Definition	The probability that a child born in a specific year will die before reaching the age of one, if subject to current age-specific mortality rates. Expressed as a rate per 1,000 live births.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	UN Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation (n.d.)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Missing values have been imputed through Stineman interpolation within countries using the information from the years with valid values. Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles) and then inverted.
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.3. Basic Welfare
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 2.3. Basic Welfare.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Life expectancy at birth (v_23_02)

Data source	WPP
Original name	LE00
Name in data set	v_23_02
Definition	The average number of years a newborn child would live if current mortality patterns were to stay the same.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2022b)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Missing values have been imputed through Stineman interpolation within countries using the information from the years with valid values. Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.3. Basic Welfare
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 2.3. Basic Welfare.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Kilocalories per person per day (v_23_03)

Data source	FAO
Original name	Grand total – kcal/capita/day
Name in data set	v_23_03
Definition	Calorie supply per capita is the amount of food available for consumption, measured in kilocalories per capita per day. This figure is reached by dividing the total available food supply for human consumption by the population. This data set tracks the calorie supply per capita in each country for calories available from crop products. Although these figures can be taken as the average supply available for consumption, actual consumption by individuals can vary greatly.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	UN FAO (2023)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). Values for 2022 and 2023 have been imputed by carrying forward values from 2021.
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.3. Basic Welfare
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 2.3. Basic Welfare.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Literacy (v_23_04)

Data source	UNESCO
Original name	Adult literacy rate, population over 15
Name in data set	v_23_04
Definition	Percentage of the population age 15 and above who can, with understanding, read and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life. This indicator is calculated by dividing the number of literates aged 15 years and over by the corresponding age group population and multiplying the result by 100. Data on literacy is compiled by the UNESCO Institute for Statistics based on national censuses and household surveys or, for countries without recent literacy data, using the Global Age-Specific Literacy Projection Model.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	UNESCO (n.d.)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Missing values have been imputed through Stineman interpolation within countries using the information from the years with valid values. Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.3. Basic Welfare
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 2.3. Basic Welfare.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Mean years of schooling (v_23_05)

Data source	IHME
Original name	SchoolY
Name in data set	v_23_05
Definition	Average years of educational attainment for adults older than 25, age standardized, both sexes. Age-standardized aggregates use model populations to control for differences in age structure across time and geography. The population-weighted aggregates use IHME population estimates to create average values for the groups in question.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	IHME (2020)
Data manipulation for aggregation	The original data were separated by gender. These observations were combined to produce a single measure of the mean years of schooling per country per year, by using the gendered data and correcting for gender ratios in the population. Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.3. Basic Welfare
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 2.3. Basic Welfare.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Educational equality (v_23_06)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2peedueq
Name in data set	v_23_06
Definition	Question: To what extent is high quality basic education guaranteed to all, sufficient to enable them to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens? Responses: 0. Extreme. Provision of high-quality basic education is extremely unequal and at least 75% of children receive education of such low quality that it undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens. 1. Unequal. Provision of high-quality basic education is extremely unequal and at least 25% of children receive education of such low quality that it undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens. 2. Somewhat equal. Basic education is relatively equal in quality but 10–25% of children receive education of such low quality that it undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens. 3. Relatively equal. Basic education overall is equal in quality but 5–10% of children receive education of such low quality that it probably undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens. 4. Equal. Basic education is equal in quality and less than 5% of children receive education of such low quality that it probably undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens. Clarification: Basic education typically refers to schooling between 6 and 16 years of age but this varies slightly among countries.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.3. Basic Welfare
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 2.3. Basic Welfare.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Health equality (v_23_07)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2pehealth
Name in data set	v_23_07
Definition	Question: To what extent is high quality basic healthcare guaranteed to all, sufficient to enable them to exercise their basic political rights as adult citizens? Responses: 0. Extreme. Because of poor quality healthcare, at least 75% of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined. 1. Unequal. Because of poor quality healthcare, at least 25% of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined. 2. Somewhat equal. Because of poor quality healthcare, 10–25% of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined. 3. Relatively equal. Basic healthcare overall is equal in quality but because of poor quality healthcare, 5–10% of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined. 4. Equal. Basic healthcare is equal in quality and less than 5% of citizens cannot exercise their basic political rights as adult citizens. Clarification: Poor quality healthcare can leave citizens unable to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens by failing to adequately treat preventable and treatable illnesses that render them unable to work, participate in social or political organizations, or vote (where voting is allowed).
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.3. Basic Welfare
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 2.3. Basic Welfare.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Healthy life expectancy at 60 – Male (v_23_08)

Data source	WHO
Original variable	WHOSIS_000007
Name in data set	v_23_08
Definition	The average number of years in full health a person (usually at age 60) can expect to live based on current rates of ill-health and mortality. The equivalent lost healthy year fractions required for the HALE calculation are estimated as the all-cause years lost due to disability (YLD) rate per capita, adjusted for independent comorbidity, by age, sex and country. Sullivan's method uses the equivalent lost healthy year fraction (adjusted for comorbidity) at each age in the current population (for a given year) to divide the hypothetical years of life lived by a period life table cohort at different ages into years of equivalent full health and equivalent lost healthy years.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	WHO (n.d.)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.3. Basic Welfare
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 2.3. Basic Welfare.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Healthy life expectancy at 60 – Female (v_23_09)

Data source	WHO
Original variable	WHOSIS_000007
Name in data set	v_23_09
Definition	The average number of years in full health a person (usually at age 60) can expect to live based on current rates of ill-health and mortality. The equivalent lost healthy year fractions required for the HALE calculation are estimated as the all-cause years lost due to disability (YLD) rate per capita, adjusted for independent comorbidity, by age, sex and country. Sullivan's method uses the equivalent lost healthy year fraction (adjusted for comorbidity) at each age in the current population (for a given year) to divide the hypothetical years of life lived by a period life table cohort at different ages into years of equivalent full health and equivalent lost healthy years.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	WHO (n.d.)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.3. Basic Welfare
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 2.3. Basic Welfare.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Social group equality in respect for civil liberties (v_24_01)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2clsocgrp
Name in data set	v_24_01
Definition	Question: Do all social groups, as distinguished by language, ethnicity, religion, race, region or caste, enjoy the same level of civil liberties? Or are some groups generally in a more favourable position? Responses: 0. Members of some social groups enjoy far fewer civil liberties than the general population. 1. Members of some social groups enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than the general population. 2. Members of some social groups enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than the general population. 3. Members of some social groups enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than the general population. 4. Members of all salient social groups enjoy the same level of civil liberties. Clarification: Here, civil liberties are understood as comprising access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement and freedom from forced labour.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.4. Political Equality 2.4.A. Social Group Equality
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.4.A. Social Group Equality.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Power distributed by social group (v_24_02)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2pepwrsoc
Name in data set	v_24_02
Definition	Question: Is political power distributed according to social groups? Responses: 0. Political power is monopolized by one social group comprising a minority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, or not subject to frequent change. 1. Political power is monopolized by several social groups comprising a *minority* of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, or not subject to frequent change. 2. Political power is monopolized by several social groups comprising a *majority* of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, or not subject to frequent change. 3. Either all social groups possess some political power, with some groups having more power than others; or different social groups alternate in power, with one group controlling much of the political power for a period of time followed by another group, but all significant groups have a turn at the seat of power. 4. All social groups have roughly equal political power or there are no strong ethnic, caste, linguistic, racial, religious or regional differences to speak of. Social group characteristics are not relevant to politics. Clarification: A social group is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion or some combination thereof. (It does not include identities grounded in sexual orientation or socio-economic status.) Social group identity is contextually defined and is likely to vary across countries and through time. Social group identities are also likely to cross-cut, so that a given person could be defined in multiple ways and as part of multiple groups. Nonetheless, at any given point in time there are social groups within a society that are understood by those residing in that society to be different, in ways that may be politically relevant.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.4. Political Equality 2.4.A. Social Group Equality
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.4.A. Social Group Equality.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Power distributed by sexual orientation (v_24_03)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2pepwrort
Name in data set	v_24_03
Definition	Question: To what extent is political power distributed according to sexual orientation? Responses: 0. LGBTs are entirely excluded from the public sphere and thus deprived of any real political power (even though they may possess formal powers such as the ballot). 1. LGBTs have much less political power than heterosexuals. LGBTs enjoy formal rights to participate in politics but are subject to informal norms that often serve to exclude them from the halls of power. 2. LGBTs have somewhat less political power than heterosexual citizens. 3. LGBTs have about the same political power as heterosexuals. Each group enjoys a degree of political power that is roughly proportional to their population. 4. LGBTs enjoy somewhat more political power than heterosexuals by virtue of greater wealth, education, and high level of organization and mobilization Clarification: This question contrasts (A) the political power of heterosexuals and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) members of the polity who are not open about their sexuality with (B) the political power of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) members of the polity who are open about their sexuality. (A) will be referred to as 'heterosexual' and (B) as 'LGBT'. Note that in comparing the political power of these two groups we are comparing their power per person. So, when we say that LGBT have less, equal or more power than heterosexuals we mean relative to their share of the population (as near as this can be estimated).
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.4. Political Equality 2.4.A. Social Group Equality
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.4.A. Social Group Equality.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Exclusion by political group (v_24_04)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2xpe_exlpol
Name in data set	v_24_04
Definition	Index of (political) exclusion by political group. Clarification: Exclusion is when individuals are denied access to services or participation in governed spaces (spaces that are part of the public space and the government should regulate, while excluding private spaces and organizations except when exclusion in those private spheres is linked to exclusion in the public sphere) based on their identity or belonging to a particular group. The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators political group equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clpolcl), access to public services by political group (v2peapspol), access to state jobs by political group (v2peasjpol), and access to state business opportunities by political group (v2peasbpol).
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Inverted and recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.4. Political Equality 2.4.A. Social Group Equality
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.4.A. Social Group Equality.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Exclusion by social group (v_24_05)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2xpe_exlsocgr
Name in data set	v_24_05
Definition	Index of (political) exclusion by social group. Clarification: Exclusion is when individuals are denied access to services or participation in governed spaces (spaces that are part of the public space and the government should regulate, while excluding private spaces and organizations except when exclusion in those private spheres is linked to exclusion in the public sphere) based on their identity or belonging to a particular group. The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators power distributed by social group (v2pepwrsoc), social group equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clsocgrp), access to public services by social group (v2peapssoc), access to state jobs by social group (v2peasjsoc), and access to state business opportunities by social group (v2peasbsoc).
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Inverted and recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.4. Political Equality 2.4.A. Social Group Equality
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.4.A. Social Group Equality.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

B4 Political pluralism and participation (v_24_06)

Data source	FITW
Original variable	B4
Name in data set	v_24_06
Definition	Question: Do various segments of the population (including ethnic, racial, religious, gender, LGBT+, and other relevant groups) have full political rights and electoral opportunities? Country scores vary between 0 (worst) and 4 (best).
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Freedom House (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.4. Political Equality 2.4.A. Social Group Equality
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.4.A. Social Group Equality.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

F4 Rule of law (v_24_07)

Data source	FITW
Original variable	F4
Name in data set	v_24_07
Definition	Question: Do laws, policies, and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population? Country scores vary between 0 (worst) and 4 (best).
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Freedom House (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	–
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.4. Political Equality 2.4.A. Social Group Equality
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.4.A. Social Group Equality.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Equal opportunity (v_24_08)

Data source	BTI
Original variable	equal
Name in data set	v_24_08
Definition	Countries scored from 1 to 10, following the statements listed below: 1. Equality of opportunity is not achieved. Women and/or members of ethnic, religious and other groups have only very limited access to education, public office and employment. There are no legal provisions against discrimination. 2. 3. 4. Equality of opportunity is only partially achieved. Women and/or members of ethnic, religious and other groups have limited access to education, public office and employment. There are some legal provisions against discrimination, but their implementation is highly deficient. 5. 6. 7. Equality of opportunity is largely achieved. Women and members of ethnic, religious and other groups have near-equal access to education, public office and employment. There are a number of legal provisions against discrimination, but their implementation is at times insufficient. 8. 9. 10. Equality of opportunity is achieved. Women and members of ethnic, religious and other groups have equal access to education, public office and employment. There is a comprehensive and effective legal and institutional framework for the protection against discrimination.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Bertelsmann Stiftung (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.4. Political Equality 2.4.A. Social Group Equality
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.4.A. Social Group Equality.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Social class equality in respect for civil liberties (v_24_09)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2clacjust
Name in data set	v_24_09
Definition	Question: Do poor people enjoy the same level of civil liberties as rich people do? Responses: 0. Poor people enjoy far fewer civil liberties than rich people. 1. Poor people enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than rich people. 2. Poor people enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than rich people. 3. Poor people enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than rich people. 4. Poor people enjoy the same level of civil liberties as rich people. Clarification: This question specifies the extent to which the level of civil liberties is generally the same across socio-economic groups so that people with a low social status are not treated worse than people with high social status. Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement and freedom from forced labour.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.4. Political Equality 2.4.B. Economic Equality
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.4.B. Economic Equality.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Power distributed by socio-economic position (v_24_10)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2pepwrses
Name in data set	v_24_10
Definition	Question: Is political power distributed according to socio-economic position? Responses: 0. Wealthy people enjoy a virtual monopoly on political power. People of average wealth and poorer people have almost no influence. 1. Wealthy people enjoy a dominant hold on political power. People of average wealth have little say. Poorer people have essentially no influence. 2. Wealthy people have a very strong hold on political power. People of average wealth or poorer people have some degree of influence but only on issues that matter less to wealthy people. 3. Wealthy people have more political power than others but people of average wealth have almost as much influence and poor people have a significant degree of political power. 4. Wealthy people have no more political power than those whose economic status is average or poor. Political power is more or less equally distributed across economic groups. Clarification: All societies are characterized by some degree of economic (wealth and income) inequality. In some societies, income and wealth are distributed in a grossly unequal fashion. In others, the difference between rich and poor is not so great. Here, we are concerned not with the degree of social inequality but rather with the political effects of this inequality. Specifically, we are concerned with the extent to which wealth and income translate into political power.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.4. Political Equality 2.4.B. Economic Equality
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.4.B. Economic Equality.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Exclusion by socio-economic group (v_24_11)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2xpe_exlecon
Name in data set	v_24_11
Definition	Index of (political) exclusion by socio-economic group. Clarification: Exclusion is when individuals are denied access to services or participation in governed spaces (spaces that are part of the public space and the government should regulate, while excluding private spaces and organizations except when exclusion in those private spheres is linked to exclusion in the public sphere) based on their identity or belonging to a particular group. The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators power distributed by socio-economic group (v2pepwrses), socio-economic position equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clacjust), access to public services by socio-economic group (v2peapsecon), access to state jobs by socio-economic group (v2peasjsoecon), and access to state business opportunities by socio-economic group (v2peasbecon). Exclusion is when individuals are denied access to services or participation in governed spaces (spaces that are part of the public space and the government should regulate, while excluding private spaces and organizations except when exclusion in those private spheres is linked to exclusion in the public sphere) based on their identity or belonging to a particular group.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Inverted and recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.4. Political Equality 2.4.B. Economic Equality
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.4.B. Economic Equality.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Exclusion by urban–rural location (v_24_12)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2xpe_exlgeo
Name in data set	v_24_12
Definition	Index of (political) exclusion by urban–rural location. Clarification: Exclusion is when individuals are denied access to services or participation in governed spaces (spaces that are part of the public space and the government should regulate, while excluding private spaces and organizations except when exclusion in those private spheres is linked to exclusion in the public sphere) based on their identity or belonging to a particular group. The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators power distributed by urban–rural location (v2pepwrgeo), urban–rural equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clgeocl), access to public services by urban–rural location (v2peapsgeo), access to state jobs by urban–rural location (v2peasjgeo), and access to state business opportunities by urban–rural location (v2peasbgeo).
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Inverted and recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.4. Political Equality 2.4.B. Economic Equality
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.4.B. Economic Equality.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Socioeconomic barriers (v_24_13)

Data source	BTI
Original variable	barriers
Name in data set	v_24_13
Definition	Countries scored from 1 to 10, following the statements listed below: 1. Poverty and inequality are extensive and structurally ingrained. 2. 3. 4. Poverty and inequality are pronounced and partly structurally ingrained. 5. 6. 7. Poverty and inequality are limited and barely structurally ingrained. 8. 9. 10. Poverty and inequality are minor and not structurally ingrained.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Bertelsmann Stiftung (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.4. Political Equality 2.4.B. Economic Equality
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.4.B. Economic Equality.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Gini coefficient (v_24_14)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	gini_disp
Name in data set	v_24_14
Definition	Estimate of Gini index of inequality in equivalized (square root scale) household disposable (post-tax, post-transfer) income, using Luxembourg Income Study data as the standard.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Solt (2020)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Inverted and recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles). Most recent values imputed by carrying forward the last valid observation.
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.4. Political Equality 2.4.B. Economic Equality
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.4.B. Economic Equality.
Final scale	Inverted and scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Power distributed by gender (v_24_15)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2pepwrgen
Name in data set	v_24_15
Definition	Question: Is political power distributed according to gender? Responses: 0. Men have a near-monopoly on political power. 1. Men have a dominant hold on political power. Women have only marginal influence. 2. Men have much more political power but women have some areas of influence. 3. Men have somewhat more political power than women. 4. Men and women have roughly equal political power.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.4. Political Equality 2.4.C. Gender Equality
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.4.C. Gender Equality.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

CSO women's participation (v_24_16)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2csgender
Name in data set	v_24_16
Definition	Question: Are women prevented from participating in civil society organizations? Responses: 0. Almost always. 1. Frequently. 2. About half the time. 3. Rarely. 4. Almost never. Clarification: Please pay attention to both: (a) whether women are prevented from participating in CSOs because of their gender; and (b) whether CSOs pursuing women's interests are prevented from taking part in associational life.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.4. Political Equality 2.4.C. Gender Equality
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.4.C. Gender Equality.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Female vs. male mean years of schooling (v_24_17)

Data source	IHME
Original name	FMSchoolY
Name in data set	v_24_17
Definition	Average years of educational attainment for adults older than 25—age standardized; male and female. Age-standardized aggregates use model populations to control for differences in age structure across time and geography. The population-weighted aggregates use IHME population estimates to create average values for the groups in question.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	IHME (2020)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Created a ratio of gender bias in education by dividing the mean for females by the mean for males. Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.4. Political Equality 2.4.C. Gender Equality
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.4.C. Gender Equality.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Lower chamber female legislators (v_24_18)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2lgfemleg
Name in data set	v_24_18
Definition	Question: What percentage of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature is female? Responses: Percentage.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Linear interpolation within countries using the information from the years with valid values. Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.4. Political Equality 2.4.C. Gender Equality
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.4.C. Gender Equality.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Exclusion by gender (v_24_19)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2xpe_exlgender
Name in data set	v_24_19
Definition	Index of (political) exclusion by gender. Clarification: Exclusion is when individuals are denied access to services or participation in governed spaces (spaces that are part of the public space and the government should regulate, while excluding private spaces and organizations except when exclusion in those private spheres is linked to exclusion in the public sphere) based on their identity or belonging to a particular group. The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators power distributed by gender (v2pepwgen), equality in respect for civil liberties by gender (v2clgencl), access to public services by gender (v2peapsgen), access to state jobs by gender (v2peasjgen), and access to state business opportunities by gender (v2peasbgen).
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Inverted and recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.4. Political Equality 2.4.C. Gender Equality
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.4.C. Gender Equality.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Women's political rights (v_24_20)

Data source	CIRIGHTS
Original variable	wopol
Name in data set	v_24_20
Definition	Women's political rights include a number of internationally recognized rights. These rights include: The right to vote; the right to run for political office; the right to hold elected and appointed government positions; the right to join political parties; the right to petition government officials. The indicator measures extensiveness of laws pertaining to women's political rights; and two, government practices towards women or how effectively the government enforces the laws. Component scale: 0. None of women's political rights are guaranteed by law. There are laws that completely restrict the participation of women in the political process. 1. Political equality is guaranteed by law. However, there are significant limitations in practice. Women hold less than 5% of seats in the national legislature and in other high-ranking government positions. 2. Political equality is guaranteed by law. Women hold more than 5% but less 30% of seats in the national legislature and/or in other high-ranking government positions. 3. Political equality is guaranteed by law and in practice. Women hold more than 30% of seats in the national legislature and/or in other high-ranking government positions.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Mark, Cingranelli and Filippov (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Values for 2021 and following were coded by International IDEA following the original code book by Mark, Cingranelli and Filippov (2022).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.4. Political Equality 2.4.C. Gender Equality
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.4.C. Gender Equality.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Women's economic rights (v_24_21)

Data source	CIRIGHTS
Original variable	wecon
Name in data set	v_24_21
Definition	Women's economic rights include a number of internationally recognized rights. These rights include: Equal pay for equal work; Free choice of profession or employment without the need to obtain a husband or male relative's consent; the right to gainful employment without the need to obtain a husband or male relative's consent; equality in hiring and promotion practices; job security (maternity leave, unemployment benefits, no arbitrary firing or layoffs, etc.); non-discrimination by employers; the right to be free from sexual harassment in the workplace; the right to work at night; the right to work in occupations classified as dangerous; the right to work in the military and the police force. Component scale: 0. There are no economic rights for women under law and systematic discrimination based on sex may be built into the law. The government tolerates a high level of discrimination against women. 1. There are some economic rights for women under law. However, in practice, the government DOES NOT enforce the laws effectively or enforcement of laws is weak. The government tolerates a moderate level of discrimination against women. 2. There are some economic rights for women under law. In practice, the government DOES enforce these laws effectively. However, the government still tolerates a low level of discrimination against women. 3. All or nearly all of women's economic rights are guaranteed by law. In practice, the government fully and vigorously enforces these laws. The government tolerates none or almost no discrimination against women.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Mark, Cingranelli and Filippov (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Values for 2021 and following were coded by International IDEA following the original code book by Mark, Cingranelli and Filippov (2022).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.4. Political Equality 2.4.C. Gender Equality
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.4.C. Gender Equality.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Political empowerment (v_24_22)

Data source	GGGR
Original variable	ggr_empower
Name in data set	v_24_22
Definition	This is an estimated index, which considers the gaps between men and women in terms of (1) women in parliament, (2) women in ministerial positions, and (3) years with female/male head of state (last 50).
Original scale	Interval
Citation	World Economic Forum (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.4. Political Equality 2.4.C. Gender Equality
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.4.C. Gender Equality.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Labour force participation rate (women-men) (v_24_23)

Data source	ILOSTAT
Original variable	EAP_DWAP_SEX_AGE_RT
Name in data set	v_24_23
Definition	The labour force participation rate is the number of persons in the labour force as a percentage of the working-age population. The labour force is the sum of the number of persons employed and the number of persons unemployed. Thus, the measurement of the labour force participation rate requires the measurement of both employment and unemployment. Employment comprises all persons of working age who during a specified brief period, such as one week or one day, were in the following categories: (a) paid employment (whether at work or with a job but not at work); or (b) self-employment (whether at work or with an enterprise but not at work). The unemployed comprise all persons of working age who were: (a) without work during the reference period, i.e. were not in paid employment or self-employment; (b) currently available for work, i.e. were available for paid employment or self-employment during the reference period; and (c) seeking work, i.e. had taken specific steps in a specified recent period to seek paid employment or self-employment. The data are published with disaggregation by age (bands) and gender. The age band selected for this purpose is 'Total'.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	ILO (n.d.)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Subtracted values for men from those for women, reporting the difference. Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.4. Political Equality 2.4.C. Gender Equality
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.4.C. Gender Equality.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Proportion of women in managerial positions (v_24_24)

Data source	ILOSTAT
Original variable	SDG_T552_NOC_RT
Name in data set	v_24_24
Definition	This indicator refers to the proportion of females in the total number of persons employed in managerial positions. It is recommended to use two different measures jointly for this indicator: the share of females in (total) management and the share of females in senior and middle management (thus excluding junior management). The joint calculation of these two measures provides information on whether women are more represented in junior management than in senior and middle management, thus pointing to an eventual ceiling for women to access higher-level management positions. In these cases, calculating only the share of women in (total) management would be misleading, in that it would suggest that women hold positions with more decision-making power and responsibilities than they actually do.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	ILO (n.d.)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.4. Political Equality 2.4.C. Gender Equality
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.4.C. Gender Equality.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Account ownership at a financial institution or with a mobile-money-service provider (v_24_25)

Data source	World Bank
Original variable	FX.OWN.TOTL.FE.ZS
Name in data set	v_24_25
Definition	Account denotes the percentage of respondents who report having an account (by themselves or together with someone else) at a bank or another type of financial institution or report personally using a mobile money service in the past 12 months (% age 15+). Data are provided disaggregated by gender.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	World Bank (n.d.)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Values for 2023 were carried forward from 2022. Values for men were subtracted from those for women and the difference is used at the indicator value. Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	2. Rights 2.4. Political Equality 2.4.C. Gender Equality
Aggregation	IRT to construct subcomponent 2.4.C. Gender Equality.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Chapter 3

RULE OF LAW

Rule of Law is the third of the four attributes of democracy developed by International IDEA's Global State of Democracy Indices. This section of the Codebook provides details about the subattributes and indicators that comprise the index of Rule of Law.

1 attribute

- Rule of Law

4 subattributes

- Judicial Independence
- Absence of Corruption
- Predictable Enforcement
- Personal Integrity and Security

32 indicators

ATTRIBUTE

Rule of Law (rule_law_est)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in data set	rule_law_est
Definition	Beyond regular elections, the exercise of political power needs to be subject to defined limits and continuous scrutiny and people should be able to live a secure life without the risk of political violence. If there is not integrity in the public administration and judiciary is not independent, executive power is more prone to be abused for private gain and to bias in political decision making and implementation. The four subattributes were aggregated into the Rule of Law index using BFA.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning and Hudson (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	—
Indicator of	—
Aggregation	—
Indicators included	jud_ind_est, abs_corrupt_est, predict_enf_est, pers_integ_sec_est
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	rule_law_l = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval rule_law_u = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval

SUBATTRIBUTES

Judicial Independence (jud_ind_est)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in data set	jud_ind_est
Definition	The Judicial Independence subattribute denotes the extent to which the courts are not subject to undue influence from the other branches of government, especially the executive. Since our framework places judicial independence under the attribute concerning the Rule of Law, it is important to supplement the four Judicial Independence indicators with two indicators on government compliance with the courts. The eight indicators were aggregated into the Judicial Independence subattribute using IRT.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning and Hudson (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	3. Rule of Law
Aggregation	BFA of 3.1. Judicial Independence, 3.2. Absence of Corruption, 3.3. Predictable Enforcement, and 3.4. Personal Integrity and Security to create 3. Rule of Law.
Indicators included	v_31_01, v_31_02, v_31_03, v_31_04, v_31_05, v_31_06, v_31_07, v_31_08
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	jud_ind_l = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval jud_ind_u = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval

Absence of Corruption (abs_corrupt_est)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in data set	abs_corrupt_est
Definition	The Absence of Corruption subattribute denotes the extent to which the executive and the public administration, more broadly, do not abuse their office for personal gain. Four V-Dem indicators explicitly refer to corruption in the government broadly understood, i.e. the executive and public administration more generally (but excluding courts and parliaments). These are used along with another expert-coded but broader indicator of government corruption from ICRG, and in-house coded measures from BTI and Freedom House. The seven indicators have been aggregated into the Absence of Corruption subattribute using IRT.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning and Hudson (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	3. Rule of Law
Aggregation	BFA of 3.1. Judicial Independence, 3.2. Absence of Corruption, 3.3. Predictable Enforcement, and 3.4. Personal Integrity and Security to create 3. Rule of Law.
Indicators included	v_32_01, v_32_02, v_32_03, v_32_04, v_32_05, v_32_06, v_32_07
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	abs_corrupt_l = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval abs_corrupt_u = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval

Predictable Enforcement (predict_enf_est)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in data set	predict_enf_est
Definition	The Predictable Enforcement subattribute denotes the extent to which the executive and public officials enforce laws in a predictable manner. To measure the related feature of Predictable Enforcement, five expert-coded V-Dem indicators on the executive's respect for constitutional provisions, the presence of transparent laws with predictable enforcement, and rule-abiding in the public sector, and the practices of appointment in the state administration and armed forces are used. These are complemented by an indicator from ICRG that assesses the strength and expertise of the bureaucracy and an indicator from Freedom House that measures the openness and transparency in government. To round out the measurement of the extent to which the government enforces laws in consistent ways, we added a measure of law and order from ICRG, and measures of administrative capacity and the monopoly on the use of force from BTI. The 10 indicators were aggregated into the Predictable Enforcement subattribute using IRT.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning and Hudson (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	—
Indicator of	3. Rule of Law
Aggregation	BFA of 3.1. Judicial Independence, 3.2. Absence of Corruption, 3.3. Predictable Enforcement, and 3.4. Personal Integrity and Security to create 3. Rule of Law.
Indicators included	v_33_01, v_33_02, v_33_03, v_33_04, v_33_05, v_33_06, v_33_07, v_33_08, v_33_09, v_33_10
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	predict_enf_l = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval predict_enf_u = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval

Personal Integrity and Security (pers_integ_sec_est)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in data set	pers_integ_sec_est
Definition	Personal Integrity and Security denotes the extent to which bodily integrity is respected and people are free from state and non-state political violence. To operationalize personal integrity and security, three indicators were used to capture different types of violations, such as torture and political and extrajudicial disappearances and killings. These indicators come from V-Dem and PTS. The CIRIGHTS Physical Integrity Rights Index was included as a summary measure of the above-mentioned types of human rights violations. The seven indicators were aggregated into the Predictable Enforcement subattribute using IRT.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning and Hudson (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	3. Rule of Law
Aggregation	BFA of 3.1. Judicial Independence, 3.2. Absence of Corruption, 3.3. Predictable Enforcement, and 3.4. Personal Integrity and Security to create 3. Rule of Law.
Indicators included	v_34_01, v_34_02, v_34_03, v_34_04, v_34_05, v_34_06, v_34_07
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	pers_integ_sec_l = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval pers_integ_sec_u = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval

INDICATORS

High Court independence (v_31_01)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2juhcind
Name in data set	v_31_01
Definition	Question: When the High Court in the judicial system rules in cases that are salient to the government, how often would you say that it makes decisions that merely reflect the government's wishes regardless of its sincere view of the legal record? Responses: 0. Always. 1. Usually. 2. About half of the time. 3. Seldom. 4. Never. Clarification: We are seeking to identify autonomous judicial decision making and its absence. Decisions certainly can reflect government wishes without 'merely reflecting' those wishes, in that a court can be autonomous when its decisions support the government's position because a court can be fairly persuaded that the government's position is meritorious. 'Merely reflect the wishes of the government' means that the court's own sincere evaluation of the record is irrelevant to the outcome. The court simply adopts the government's position regardless of its sincere view.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	3. Rule of Law 3.1. Judicial Independence
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.1. Judicial Independence.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Lower court independence (v_31_02)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2juncind
Name in data set	v_31_02
Definition	Question: When judges not in the High Court are ruling in cases that are salient to the government, how often would you say that their decisions merely reflect government's wishes regardless of their sincere view of the legal record? Responses: 0. Always. 1. Usually. 2. About half of the time. 3. Seldom. 4. Never.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	3. Rule of Law 3.1. Judicial Independence
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.1. Judicial Independence.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Compliance with High Court (v_31_03)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2juhccomp
Name in data set	v_31_03
Definition	Question: How often would you say the government complies with important decisions of the High Court with which it disagrees? Responses: 0. Never. 1. Seldom. 2. About half of the time. 3. Usually. 4. Always.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	3. Rule of Law 3.1. Judicial Independence
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.1. Judicial Independence.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Compliance with judiciary (v_31_04)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2jucomp
Name in data set	v_31_04
Definition	Question: How often would you say the government complies with important decisions by other courts with which it disagrees? Responses: 0. Never. 1. Seldom. 2. About half of the time. 3. Usually. 4. Always. Clarification: We are looking for a judgment on the entire judiciary excluding the High Court. Consider judges in both the ordinary courts and the specialized courts.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	3. Rule of Law 3.1. Judicial Independence
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.1. Judicial Independence.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Independent judiciary (v_31_05)

Data source	CIRIGHTS
Original variable	injud
Name in data set	v_31_05
Definition	This variable indicates the extent to which the judiciary is independent of control from other sources, such as another branch of the government or the military. Important questions to consider include: Are judges safe from removal by other government officials? Can actions of other government branches be challenged in the courts? Are court hearings public? Are judicial officials generally free from corruption and intimidation? Are case outcomes protected from governmental interference? Component scale: As an institution, the judiciary is: 0. Not independent. Active and widespread constraints on the judiciary, including active government interference in the decision of cases or widespread corruption and judicial intimidation from either inside or outside government. 1. Partially independent. Structural limitations of judicial independence without active government interference or occasional or limited corruption and judicial intimidation from non-governmental actors. 2. Generally independent. The judiciary has the right to rule on the constitutionality of legislative acts and executive decrees; judges at the highest level of courts have a minimum of a seven-year tenure; the president or minister of justice cannot directly appoint or remove judges. The removal of judges is restricted (e.g. allowed for criminal misconduct); actions of the executive and legislative branch can be challenged in the courts; all court hearings are public; judgeships are held by professionals.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Mark, Cingranelli and Filippov (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Values for 2021 and following were coded by International IDEA following the original code book by Mark, Cingranelli and Filippov (2022).
Indicator of	3. Rule of Law 3.1. Judicial Independence
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.1. Judicial Independence.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

F1 Rule of law (v_31_06)

Data source	FITW
Original variable	F1
Name in data set	v_31_06
Definition	Question: Is there an independent judiciary? Country scores vary between 0 (worst) and 4 (best).
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Freedom House (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	—
Indicator of	3. Rule of Law 3.1. Judicial Independence
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.1. Judicial Independence.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Separation of power (v_31_07)

Data source	BTI
Original variable	separation
Name in data set	v_31_07
Definition	Countries scored from 1 to 10, following the statements listed below: 1. There is no separation of powers, neither de jure nor de facto. 2. 3. 4. The separation of powers is formally established but weak in practice. One branch, generally the executive, has largely undermined checks and balances. 5. 6. 7. The separation of powers is in place and functioning. Checks and balances are occasionally subject to interference, but a restoration of balance is sought. 8. 9. 10. There is a clear separation of powers with mutual checks and balances.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Bertelsmann Stiftung (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	—
Indicator of	3. Rule of Law 3.1. Judicial Independence
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.1. Judicial Independence.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Independent judiciary (v_31_08)

Data source	BTI
Original variable	judiciary
Name in data set	v_31_08
Definition	Countries scored from 1 to 10, following the statements listed below: 1. The judiciary is not independent and not institutionally differentiated. 2. 3. 4. The independence of the judiciary is heavily impaired by political authorities and high levels of corruption. It is to some extent institutionally differentiated, but severely restricted by functional deficits, insufficient territorial operability and scarce resources. 5. 6. 7. The judiciary is largely independent, even though occasionally its decisions are subordinated to political authorities or influenced by corruption. It is institutionally differentiated, but partially restricted by insufficient territorial or functional operability. 8. 9. 10. The judiciary is independent and free both from unconstitutional intervention by other institutions and from corruption. It is institutionally differentiated, and there are mechanisms for judicial review of legislative or executive acts.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Bertelsmann Stiftung (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	3. Rule of Law 3.1. Judicial Independence
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.1. Judicial Independence.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Public sector corrupt exchanges (v_32_01)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2excrptps
Name in data set	v_32_01
Definition	Question: How routinely do public sector employees grant favours in exchange for bribes or other material inducements? Responses: 0. Extremely common. Most public sector employees are systematically involved in petty but corrupt exchanges almost all the time. 1. Common. Such petty but corrupt exchanges occur regularly involving a majority of public employees. 2. Sometimes. About half or less than half of public sector employees engage in such exchanges for petty gains at times. 3. Scattered. A small minority of public sector employees engage in petty corruption from time to time. 4. No. Never, or hardly ever. Clarification: When responding to this question, think about a typical person employed in the public sector, excluding the military. If there are large discrepancies between branches of the public sector, between the national/federal and subnational/state level, or between the core bureaucracy and employees working in public service delivery, try to average them out before stating your response.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	3. Rule of Law 3.2. Absence of Corruption
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.2. Absence of Corruption.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Public sector theft (v_32_02)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2exthftps
Name in data set	v_32_02
Definition	Question: How often do public sector employees steal, embezzle or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use? Responses: 0. Constantly. Public sector employees act as though all public resources were their personal or family property. 1. Often. Public sector employees are responsible stewards of selected public resources but treat the rest as personal property. 2. About half the time. Public sector employees are about as likely to be responsible stewards of selected public resources as they are to treat them as personal property. 3. Occasionally. Public sector employees are responsible stewards of most public resources but treat selected others as personal property. 4. Never, or hardly ever. Public sector employees are almost always responsible stewards of public resources and keep them separate from personal or family property. Clarification: When responding to this question, think about a typical person employed by the public sector, excluding the military. If there are large discrepancies between branches of the public sector, between the national/federal and subnational/state level, or between the core bureaucracy and employees working in public service delivery, try to average them out before stating your response.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	3. Rule of Law 3.2. Absence of Corruption
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.2. Absence of Corruption.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Executive embezzlement and theft (v_32_03)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2exembez
Name in data set	v_32_03
Definition	Question: How often do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government and cabinet ministers), or their agents, steal, embezzle or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use? Responses: 0. Constantly. Members of the executive act as though all public resources were their personal or family property. 1. Often. Members of the executive are responsible stewards of selected public resources but treat the rest as personal property. 2. About half the time. Members of the executive are about as likely to be responsible stewards of selected public resources as they are to treat them as personal property. 3. Occasionally. Members of the executive are responsible stewards of most public resources but treat selected others as personal property. 4. Never, or hardly ever. Members of the executive are almost always responsible stewards of public resources and keep them separate from personal or family property.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	3. Rule of Law 3.2. Absence of Corruption
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.2. Absence of Corruption.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Executive bribery and corrupt exchanges (v_32_04)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2exbribe
Name in data set	v_32_04
Definition	Question: How routinely do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government and cabinet ministers) or their agents grant favours in exchange for bribes or other material inducements? Responses: 0. It is routine and expected. 1. It happens more often than not in dealings with the executive. 2. It happens but is unpredictable; those dealing with the executive find it hard to predict when an inducement will be required. 3. It happens occasionally but is not expected. 4. It never, or hardly ever, happens.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	3. Rule of Law 3.2. Absence of Corruption
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.2. Absence of Corruption.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Corruption (v_32_05)

Data source	ICRG
Original variable	Corruption (F)
Name in data set	v_32_05
Definition	This is an assessment of corruption within the political system. The most common form of corruption met directly by business is financial corruption in the form of demands for special payments and bribes connected with import and export licences, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection or loans. Although this measure takes such corruption into account, it is more concerned with actual or potential corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, 'favour-for-favours', secret party funding and suspiciously close ties between politics and business.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Howell (2011)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	3. Rule of Law 3.2. Absence of Corruption
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.2. Absence of Corruption.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

C2 Functioning of government (v_32_06)

Data source	FITW
Original variable	C2
Name in data set	v_32_06
Definition	Question: Are safeguards against official corruption strong and effective? Country scores vary between 0 (worst) and 4 (best).
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Freedom House (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	3. Rule of Law 3.2. Absence of Corruption
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.2. Absence of Corruption.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Prosecution of office abuse (v_32_07)

Data source	BTI
Original variable	prosecution
Name in data set	v_32_07
Definition	Countries scored from 1 to 10, following the statements listed below: 1. Officeholders who break the law and engage in corruption can do so without fear of legal consequences or adverse publicity. 2. 3. 4. Officeholders who break the law and engage in corruption are not adequately prosecuted, but occasionally attract adverse publicity. 5. 6. 7. Officeholders who break the law and engage in corruption generally are prosecuted under established laws and often attract adverse publicity, but occasionally slip through political, legal or procedural loopholes. 8. 9. 10. Officeholders who break the law and engage in corruption are prosecuted rigorously under established laws and always attract adverse publicity.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Bertelsmann Stiftung (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	—
Indicator of	3. Rule of Law 3.2. Absence of Corruption
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.2. Absence of Corruption.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Executive respects constitution (v_33_01)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2exrescon
Name in data set	v_33_01
Definition	Question: Do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government and cabinet ministers) respect the constitution? Responses: 0. Members of the executive violate the constitution whenever they want to without legal consequences. 1. Members of the executive violate most provisions of the constitution without legal consequences, but must respect certain provisions. 2. Somewhere between 1 and 3. Members of the executive would face legal consequences for violating most provisions of the constitution but can disregard some provisions without any legal consequences. 3. Members of the executive rarely violate the constitution and when it happens they face legal charges. 4. Members of the executive never violate the constitution.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	3. Rule of Law 3.3. Predictable Enforcement
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.3. Predictable Enforcement.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Transparent laws with predictable enforcement (v_33_02)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2cltrnslw
Name in data set	v_33_02
Definition	Question: Are the laws of the land clear, well publicized, coherent (consistent with each other), relatively stable from year to year and enforced in a predictable manner? Responses: 0. Transparency and predictability are almost non-existent. The laws of the land are created and/or enforced in completely arbitrary fashion. 1. Transparency and predictability are severely limited. The laws of the land are more often than not created and/or enforced in arbitrary fashion. 2. Transparency and predictability are somewhat limited. The laws of the land are mostly created in a non-arbitrary fashion but enforcement is rather arbitrary in some parts of the country. 3. Transparency and predictability are fairly strong. The laws of the land are usually created and enforced in a non-arbitrary fashion. 4. Transparency and predictability are very strong. The laws of the land are created and enforced in a non-arbitrary fashion. Clarification: This question focuses on the transparency and predictability of the laws of the land.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	3. Rule of Law 3.3. Predictable Enforcement
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.3. Predictable Enforcement.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Rigorous and impartial public administration (v_33_03)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2clrspct
Name in data set	v_33_03
Definition	Question: Are public officials rigorous and impartial in the performance of their duties? Responses: 0. The law is not respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is rampant. 1. The law is weakly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is widespread. 2. The law is modestly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is moderate. 3. The law is mostly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is limited. 4. The law is generally fully respected by the public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is rare. Clarification: This question focuses on the extent to which public officials generally abide by the law and treat like cases alike; or, conversely, the extent to which public administration is characterized by arbitrariness and bias (i.e. nepotism, cronyism or discrimination). The question covers the public officials who handle the cases of ordinary people. If no functioning public administration exists, the lowest score (0) applies.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	3. Rule of Law 3.3. Predictable Enforcement
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.3. Predictable Enforcement.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Criteria for appointment decisions in the state administration (v_33_04)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2stcritrecadm
Name in data set	v_33_04
Definition	Question: To what extent are appointment decisions in the state administration based on personal and political connections, as opposed to skills and merit? Responses: 0. All appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. None are based on skills and merit. 1. Most appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. Only a few are based on skills and merit. 2. Approximately half of the appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. Approximately half are based on skills and merit. 3. Only few of the appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. Most appointment decisions are based on skills and merit. 4. None of the appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. All are based on skills and merit. Clarification: Appointment decisions include hiring, firing and promotion in the state administration. Note that the question refers to the typical de facto (rather than de jure) situation obtaining in the state administration, excluding the armed forces. If there are large differences between different branches of the state administration or between top and lower level state administrators please try to consider the average when answering the question.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	3. Rule of Law 3.3. Predictable Enforcement
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.3. Predictable Enforcement.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Criteria for appointment decisions in the armed forces (v_33_05)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2stcritapparm
Name in data set	v_33_05
Definition	Question: To what extent are appointment decisions in the armed forces based on personal or political connections or alternatively based on skills and merit? Responses: 0. All appointment decisions in the armed forces are based on personal or political connections. None are based on skills and merit. 1. Most appointment decisions in the armed forces are based on personal or political connections. Only a few are based on skills and merit. 2. Approximately half of the appointment decisions in the armed forces are based on personal or political connections. Approximately half are based on skills and merit. 3. Only few of the appointment decisions in the armed forces are based on personal or political connections. Most are based on skills and merit. 4. None of the appointment decisions in the armed forces are based on personal or political connections. All are based on skills and merit. Clarification: Appointment decisions include hiring, firing and promotions in the armed forces. Note that the question refers to the typical de facto (rather than de jure) situation obtaining in the armed forces. If there are large differences between different branches of the armed forces or between top and lower level ranks please try to consider the average when answering the question.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	3. Rule of Law 3.3. Predictable Enforcement
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.3. Predictable Enforcement.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Bureaucratic quality (v_33_06)

Data source	ICRG
Original variable	Bureaucratic quality (L)
Name in data set	v_33_06
Definition	The institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy is another shock absorber that tends to minimize revisions of policy when governments change. Therefore, high points are given to countries where the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services. In these low-risk countries, the bureaucracy tends to be somewhat autonomous from political pressure and to have an established mechanism for recruitment and training. Countries that lack the cushioning effect of a strong bureaucracy receive low points because a change in government tends to be traumatic in terms of policy formulation and day-to-day administrative functions.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Howell (2011)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	3. Rule of Law 3.3. Predictable Enforcement
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.3. Predictable Enforcement.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Law and order (v_33_07)

Data source	ICRG
Original variable	Law and order (I)
Name in data set	v_33_07
Definition	To what extent is the legal system strong and impartial and to what degree is there popular observance of the law?
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Howell (2011)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	3. Rule of Law 3.3. Predictable Enforcement
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.3. Predictable Enforcement.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

C3 Functioning of government (v_33_08)

Data source	FITW
Original variable	C3
Name in data set	v_33_08
Definition	Question: Does the government operate with openness and transparency? Country scores vary between 0 (worst) and 4 (best).
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Freedom House (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	3. Rule of Law 3.3. Predictable Enforcement
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.3. Predictable Enforcement.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Monopoly on the use of force (v_33_09)

Data source	BTI
Original variable	monopoly
Name in data set	v_33_09
Definition	Countries scored from 1 to 10, following the statements listed below: 1. There is no state monopoly on the use of force. 2. 3. 4. The state's monopoly on the use of force is established only in key parts of the country. Large areas of the country are controlled by guerrillas, paramilitaries or clans. 5. 6. 7. The state's monopoly on the use of force is established nationwide in principle, but it is challenged by guerrillas, mafias or clans in territorial enclaves. 8. 9. 10. There is no competition with the state's monopoly on the use of force throughout the entire territory.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Bertelsmann Stiftung (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	3. Rule of Law 3.3. Predictable Enforcement
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.3. Predictable Enforcement.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Basic administration (v_33_10)

Data source	BTI
Original variable	admin
Name in data set	v_33_10
Definition	Countries scored from 1 to 10, following the statements listed below: 1. The administrative structures of the state are limited to keeping the peace and maintaining law and order. Their territorial scope is very limited, and broad segments of the population are not covered. 2. 3. 4. The administrative structures of the state are extending beyond maintaining law and order, but their territorial scope and effectivity are limited. 5. 6. 7. The administrative structures of the state provide most basic public services throughout the country, but their operation is to some extent deficient (lack of resources, corruption, inefficiency). 8. 9. 10. The state has a differentiated administrative structure throughout the country which provides all basic public services.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Bertelsmann Stiftung (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	3. Rule of Law 3.3. Predictable Enforcement
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.3. Predictable Enforcement.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Freedom from torture (v_34_01)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2cltort
Name in data set	v_34_01
Definition	Question: Is there freedom from torture? Responses: 0. Not respected by the public authorities. Torture is practised systematically and is incited and approved by the leaders of the government. 1. Weakly respected by the public authorities. Torture is practised frequently but is often not incited or approved by senior leaders in the government. At the same time, government leaders are not actively working to prevent it. 2. Somewhat. Torture is practised occasionally but is typically not approved by senior leaders in the government. 3. Mostly respected by the public authorities. Torture is practised in a few isolated cases but is not incited or approved by senior government leaders. 4. Fully respected by the public authorities. Torture is non-existent. Clarification: Torture refers to the deliberate inflicting of extreme pain, whether mental or physical, with the aim of extracting information or intimidating victims, who are in a state of incarceration. Here, we are concerned with torture practised by state officials or other agents of the state (the police, security forces, prison guards and paramilitary groups).
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	3. Rule of Law 3.4. Personal Integrity and Security
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.4. Personal Integrity and Security.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Freedom from political killings (v_34_02)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2clkill
Name in data set	v_34_02
Definition	Question: Is there freedom from political killings? Responses: 0. Not respected by the public authorities. Political killings are practised systematically and they are typically incited and approved by the senior leaders of the government. 1. Weakly respected by the public authorities. Political killings are practised frequently and senior government leaders are not actively working to prevent them. 2. Somewhat respected by the public authorities. Political killings are practised occasionally but they are typically not incited and approved by senior government leaders. 3. Mostly respected by the public authorities. Political killings are practised in a few isolated cases but they are not incited or approved by senior government leaders. 4. Fully respected by the public authorities. Political killings do not take place. Clarification: Political killings are killings by the state or its agents without due process of law for the purpose of eliminating political opponents. These killings are the result of the deliberate use of lethal force by the police, security forces, prison officials or other agents of the state, including paramilitary groups.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	3. Rule of Law 3.4. Personal Integrity and Security
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.4. Personal Integrity and Security.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Political terror scale (v_34_03)

Data source	Political Terror Scale
Original variable	PTS_S
Name in data set	v_34_03
Definition	What is the level of political violence and terror? PTS scores based on information contained in the annual human rights reports produced by the US State Department. Reports are scored on a 5-point scale. Higher scores indicate higher levels of abuse, political terror or physical integrity rights violations than lower scores.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Gibney et al. (2023)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Inverted so that higher scores represent better performance. Values for 2023 were coded by International IDEA following the original code book by Gibney et al. (2023).
Indicator of	3. Rule of Law 3.4. Personal Integrity and Security
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.4. Personal Integrity and Security.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Internal conflict (v_34_04)

Data source	ICRG
Original variable	Internal conflict (D)
Name in data set	v_34_04
Definition	An assessment of political violence in the country and its actual or potential impact on governance. The highest rating is given to those countries where there is no armed or civil opposition to the government and the government does not indulge in arbitrary violence, direct or indirect, against its own people. The lowest rating is given to a country embroiled in an ongoing civil war. The risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents (Civil War/ Coup Threat, Terrorism/Political Violence, Civil Disorder), each with a maximum score of 4 points and a minimum score of 0 points. A score of 4 points equates to very low risk and a score of 0 points to very high risk.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Howell (2011)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	3. Rule of Law 3.4. Personal Integrity and Security
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.4. Personal Integrity and Security.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Physical integrity rights sum (v_34_05)

Data source	CIRIGHTS
Original variable	Physint_sum
Name in data set	v_34_05
Definition	Index reflecting the extent to which government respects the prohibition of torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment and disappearance. Component scale: Ranges from 0 (no government respect for these four rights) to 8 (full government respect for these four rights).
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Mark, Cingranelli and Filippov (2022)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Values for 2021 and following were coded by International IDEA following the original code book by Mark, Cingranelli and Filippov (2022).
Indicator of	3. Rule of Law 3.4. Personal Integrity and Security
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.4. Personal Integrity and Security.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

G4 Personal autonomy and individual rights (v_34_06)

Data source	FITW
Original variable	G4
Name in data set	v_34_06
Definition	Question: Do individuals enjoy equality of opportunity and freedom from economic exploitation? Country scores vary between 0 (worst) and 4 (best).
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Freedom House (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	3. Rule of Law 3.4. Personal Integrity and Security
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.4. Personal Integrity and Security.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

F3 Rule of law (v_34_07)

Data source	FITW
Original variable	F3
Name in data set	v_34_07
Definition	Question: Is there protection from the illegitimate use of physical force and freedom from war and insurgencies? Country scores vary between 0 (worst) and 4 (best).
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Freedom House (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	3. Rule of Law 3.4. Personal Integrity and Security
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 3.4. Personal Integrity and Security.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Chapter 4

PARTICIPATION

Participation represents the fourth of the four attributes of democracy developed by International IDEA's Global State of Democracy Indices.

This section of the Codebook offers details about the subattributes and indicators that comprise this attribute.

1 attribute

- **Participation**

3 subattributes

- Civil Society
- Civic Engagement
- Electoral Participation

12 indicators

ATTRIBUTE

Participation (participation_est)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in data set	participation_est
Definition	Democratic institutions tend to be hollow if not filled by active citizens in connection with and between different kinds of elections. In other words, politically involved citizens are considered an important part of democracy. The more citizens are allowed to participate at all levels of government and make actual use of these opportunities, through participation in dynamic civil society organizations and elections, the more popular control and responsiveness can be achieved. The three subattributes were aggregated into the Participation index through an IRT model.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning and Hudson (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	—
Indicator of	—
Aggregation	—
Indicators included	civil_soc_est, civic_engage_est, elect_part_est
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	participation_l = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval participation_u = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval

SUBATTRIBUTES

Civil Society (civil_soc_est)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in data set	civil_soc_est
Definition	The measurement of Civil Society relies on six indicators. Three of these are V-Dem indicators based on expert surveys that consider the extent to which the legal and political context supports civil society organizations and activities. To these we have added measures of the strength of interest groups and social capital from BTI, and the infrastructurally focused E-Participation Index from the UN.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning and Hudson (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	—
Indicator of	—
Aggregation	—
Indicators included	v_41_01, v_41_02, v_41_03, v_41_04, v_41_05, v_41_06
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	civil_soc_l = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval civil_soc_u = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval

Civic Engagement (civic_engage_est)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in data set	civic_engage_est
Definition	The measure of Civic Engagement is constructed from three expert survey indicators of the extent to which people engage in political and non-political associations, and trade unions from V-Dem. We also include an indicator of civil society traditions from BTI. The indicators are aggregated into the Civic Engagement index through IRT.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning and Hudson (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	—
Indicator of	—
Aggregation	—
Indicators included	v_42_01, v_42_02, v_42_03, v_42_04
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	civic_engage_l = lower bound for the 68% confidence interval civic_engage_u = upper bound for the 68% confidence interval

Electoral Participation (elect_part_est)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in data set	elect_part_est
Definition	The level of electoral participation for the adult voting age population (VAP) in the last national election.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning and Hudson (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	The index is coded as having a value of zero in cases where the electoral regime has been interrupted, as indicated by the value of the V-Dem electoral regime indicator (v2x_elecreg).
Indicator of	—
Aggregation	—
Indicators included	v_43_01
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	—

INDICATORS

CSO participatory environment (v_41_01)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2csprtcpt
Name in data set	v_41_01
Definition	Question: Which of these best describes the involvement of people in civil society organizations (CSOs)? Responses: 0. Most associations are state-sponsored and although a large number of people may be active in them, their participation is not purely voluntary. 1. Voluntary CSOs exist but few people are active in them. 2. There are many diverse CSOs, but popular involvement is minimal. 3. There are many diverse CSOs and it is considered normal for people to be at least occasionally active in at least one of them.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	4. Participation 4.1. Civil Society
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 4.1. Civil Society.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Engaged society (v_41_02)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2dlengage
Name in data set	v_41_02
Definition	Question: When important policy changes are being considered, how wide and how independent are public deliberations? Responses: 0. Public deliberation is never, or almost never, allowed. 1. Some limited public deliberations are allowed but the public below the elite level is almost always either unaware of major policy debates or unable to take part in them. 2. Public deliberation is not repressed but infrequent; and non-elite actors are typically controlled and/or constrained by the elites. 3. Public deliberation is actively encouraged and some autonomous non-elite groups participate, but it is confined to a small slice of specialized groups that tend to be the same across issue areas. 4. Public deliberation is actively encouraged and a relatively broad segment of non-elite groups often participate; these vary with different issue areas. 5. Large numbers of non-elite groups as well as ordinary people tend to discuss major policies among themselves, in the media, in associations or neighbourhoods and in the streets. Grassroots deliberation is common and unconstrained. Clarification: This question refers to deliberation as manifest in discussion, debate and other public forums such as popular media.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	4. Participation 4.1. Civil Society
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 4.1. Civil Society.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

CSO consultation (v_41_03)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2cscnsult
Name in data set	v_41_03
Definition	Question: Are major civil society organizations (CSOs) routinely consulted by policymakers on policies relevant to their members? Responses: 0. No. There is a high degree of insulation of the government from CSO input. The government may sometimes enlist or mobilize CSOs after policies are adopted to sell them to the public at large. But it does not often consult with them in formulating policies. 1. To some degree. CSOs are but one set of voices that policymakers sometimes take into account. 2. Yes. Important CSOs are recognized as stakeholders in important policy areas and given voice on such issues. This can be accomplished through formal corporatist arrangements or through less formal arrangements.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Recoded into 20 categories, each containing five percentiles, ranging from 1 (the lowest five percentiles) to 20 (the highest five percentiles).
Indicator of	4. Participation 4.1. Civil Society
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 4.1. Civil Society.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

E-Participation index (v_41_04)

Data source	UNEGS
Original variable	epart_idx
Name in data set	v_41_04
Definition	The E-Participation index is a multifaceted framework, composed of three core components, i.e. e-information, e-consultation and e-decision-making.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2022a)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	4. Participation 4.1. Civil Society
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 4.1. Civil Society.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Interest groups (v_41_05)

Data source	BTI
Original variable	int_group
Name in data set	v_41_05
Definition	Countries scored from 1 to 10, following the statements listed below: 1. Interest groups are present only in isolated social segments, are on the whole poorly balanced and cooperate little. A large number of social interests remain unrepresented. 2. 3. 4. There is a narrow range of interest groups, in which important social interests are underrepresented. Only a few players dominate, and there is a risk of polarization. 5. 6. 7. There is an average range of interest groups, which reflect most social interests. However, a few strong interests dominate, producing a latent risk of pooling conflicts. 8. 9. 10. There is a broad range of interest groups that reflect competing social interests, tend to balance one another and are cooperative.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Bertelsmann Stiftung (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	4. Participation 4.1. Civil Society
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 4.1. Civil Society.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Social capital (v_41_06)

Data source	BTI
Original variable	soc_cap
Name in data set	v_41_06
Definition	Countries scored from 1 to 10, following the statements listed below: 1. There is a very low level of trust among the population, and civic self-organization is rudimentary. 2. 3. 4. There is a fairly low level of trust among the population. The small number of autonomous, self-organized groups, associations and organizations is unevenly distributed or spontaneous and temporary. 5. 6. 7. There is a fairly high level of trust among the population and a substantial number of autonomous, self-organized groups, associations and organizations. 8. 9. 10. There is a very high level of trust among the population and a large number of autonomous, self-organized groups, associations and organizations.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Bertelsmann Stiftung (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	4. Participation 4.1. Civil Society
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 4.1. Civil Society.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Engagement in independent non-political associations (v_42_01)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2canonpol
Name in data set	v_42_01
Definition	Question: What share of the population is regularly active in independent non-political associations, such as sports clubs, literary societies, charities, fraternal groups or support groups? Responses: 0. Virtually no one. 1. A small share of the population (less than 5%). 2. A moderate share of the population (about 5 to 15%). 3. A large share of the population (about 16% to 25%). 4. A very large share of the population (about 26% or more). Clarification: Non-political associations include all associations whose main purpose is not the change of policy or practice at the state or societal level. It does NOT include political parties, or trade unions. An organization is independent if it is not controlled by the state or the ruling party and membership is voluntary. We consider an individual as active if they attend a meeting activity or event at least twice a year.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	4. Participation 4.2. Civic Engagement
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 4.2. Civic Engagement.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Engagement in independent political associations (v_42_02)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2capolit
Name in data set	v_42_02
Definition	Question: What share of the population is regularly active in independent political interest associations, such as environmental associations, animal rights groups, or LGBT rights groups? Responses: 0. Virtually no one. 1. A small share of the population (less than 5%). 2. A moderate share of the population (about 5% to 15%). 3. A large share of the population (about 16% to 25%). 4. A very large share of the population (about 26% or more). Clarification: Political associations include all associations whose main purpose is the change of policy or practice at the state or societal level. It does NOT include political parties or trade unions. An organization is independent if it is not controlled by the state or the ruling party and membership is voluntary. We consider an individual as active if they attend a meeting, activity or event at least twice a year.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	—
Indicator of	4. Participation 4.2. Civic Engagement
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 4.2. Civic Engagement.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Engagement in independent trade unions (v_42_03)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2catrauni
Name in data set	v_42_03
Definition	Question: What share of the population is regularly active in independent trade unions? Responses: 0. Virtually no one. 1. A small share of the population (less than 5%). 2. A moderate share of the population (about 5% to 15%). 3. A large share of the population (about 16% to 25%). 4. A very large share of the population (about 26% or more). Clarification: An organization is independent if it is not controlled by the state or the ruling party and membership is voluntary. We consider an individual as active if they attend a meeting, activity or event at least twice a year.
Original scale	Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Citation	Pemstein et al. (2020) Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	4. Participation 4.2. Civic Engagement
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 4.2. Civic Engagement.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Civil society traditions (v_42_04)

Data source	BTI
Original variable	civil_trad
Name in data set	v_42_04
Definition	Countries scored from 1 to 10, following the statements listed below: 1. Traditions of civil society are very strong. 2. 3. 4. Traditions of civil society are fairly strong. 5. 6. 7. Traditions of civil society are fairly weak. 8. 9. 10. Traditions of civil society are very weak.
Original scale	Ordinal
Citation	Bertelsmann Stiftung (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	4. Participation 4.2. Civic Engagement
Aggregation	IRT to construct subattribute 4.2. Civic Engagement.
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Voter turnout (as percentage of voting age population) (v_43_01)

Data source	VTD
Original variable	VAP turnout
Name in data set	v_43_01
Definition	Question: According to official results, what percentage (%) of the adult voting age population (VAP) cast a vote in this national election? Responses: Percentage. Clarification: The VAP can reflect irregularities such as problems with the voters' register or registration system. VAP numbers are estimates since they do not take into account legal or systemic barriers to the exercise of the franchise or account for non-eligible members of the population. Thus, VAP values can surpass 100, which is not an error but reflects such conditions.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	International IDEA (n.d.)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Repeated within elections: values for non-election years are copied from the previous election year. Coded as 0 if the electoral regime (v2x_elecreg from V-Dem) is coded as 0, indicating the absence of regularly scheduled elections, as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent. A small number of cases had values higher than 100. For each of these cases the International IDEA Voter Turnout Database was checked and these were coded as either 100 (if voter turnout in the surrounding elections was close to 100%), or, missing (if voter turnout in the surrounding elections was not close to 100%), or where the turnout data are reliable but the census data are not, turnout as a share of registered voters was used.
Indicator of	—
Aggregation	—
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

Electoral regime index (v_43_02)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2x_elecreg
Name in data set	v_43_02
Definition	Question: At this time, are regularly scheduled national elections on course, as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent? Reponses: 0. No. 1. Yes. Clarification: Coded 0 until an executive or legislative election is held, defined by v2xel_elecpres and v2xel_elecparl, then set to 1 until any of the following two events occur (if they occur): (a) that the election was 'aborted', meaning that those elected did not resume power, as defined by v2x_hosabort and v2x_legabort; or (b) an 'electoral interruption', meaning that either the legislature was shut down, as defined by v2xlg_leginter, or there was an executive coup, as defined by v2x_hosinter; in the case of (a) or (b), v2x_elecreg is set to 0 until there is another election.
Original scale	Dichotomous
Citation	Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	—
Indicator of	4.3. Electoral Participation
Aggregation	—
Final scale	—

ADDITIONAL INDEX

Direct Democracy (direct_dem_est)

Data source	GSoD Indices
Original variable	Constructed variable
Name in data set	direct_dem_est
Definition	V-Dem offers the only comprehensive data set in the form of the direct democracy index developed by David Altman (2016). It is based on observable variables on the formal opportunities for and actual use of different instruments of direct democracy at the national level. However, it seems pertinent to take into account whether mechanisms of direct democracy are available and used in a context where elections are generally respected as the main source of political power. To do so, the Credible Elections subattribute is also used here. The measure of direct democracy and the Credible Elections subattribute are multiplied to estimate the Direct Democracy subattribute score.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Skaaning and Hudson (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	_
Indicator of	—
Aggregation	—
Indicators included	v_00_01, cred_elect_est
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).
Auxiliary variables	_

Indicators

Direct democracy (v_00_01)

Data source	V-Dem
Original variable	v2xdd_dd
Name in data set	v_00_01
Definition	Question: To what extent are direct popular votes utilized? Clarification: Direct popular votes are institutionalized processes by which citizens of a region or country register their choice or opinion on specific issues through a ballot. The term is intended to embrace initiatives, referendums and plebiscites, as they are usually understood. It captures some aspects of the more general concept of direct democracy. The term does not encompass recall elections, deliberative assemblies or settings in which the vote is not secret or the purview is restricted. Similarly, it does not apply to elections for representatives.
Original scale	Interval
Citation	Coppedge et al. (2024)
Data manipulation for aggregation	Coded as zero if there are no elections or if the electoral process has been suspended or nullified (e.g. through dismissal or dissolution of the relevant elected bodies or offices), as indicated by values of zero for both Executive_elections and Legislative_ elections from the LIED data set.
Indicator of	0.0. Direct Democracy
Aggregation	Multiplication with cred_elect_est
Final scale	Scaled to range from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score).

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The Global State of Democracy is a report that aims to provide policymakers with an evidence-based analysis of the state of global democracy, supported by the Global State of Democracy (GSoD) Indices, in order to inform policy interventions and identify problem-solving approaches to trends affecting the quality of democracy around the world.

This document presents revised and updated information about all the variables included in the GSoD Indices data set that enabled the construction of Version 8 of the GSoD Indices, which depicts democratic trends at the country, regional and global levels across a broad range of different attributes of democracy in the period 1975–2023.

The data underlying the GSoD Indices is based on a total of 165 indicators developed by various scholars and organizations using different types of sources, including expert surveys, standards-based coding by research groups and analysts, observational data and composite measures.

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