Combatting Corruption in Political Finance

The funding of political parties and election campaigns, commonly known as political finance, is a key component of democracy, enabling political parties and candidates to engage voters, share policies and participate effectively in elections. However, unchecked political finance can erode trust, distort democratic processes and breed corruption. This report explores the critical balance between funding political activities and safeguarding democratic integrity by addressing vulnerabilities in political finance systems worldwide.

Nearly all 181 countries in the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) Political Finance Database have implemented regulations on funding, spending and oversight. Nonetheless, corruption in political finance remains widespread, often involving high-profile leaders and business figures. Weak enforcement, regulatory gaps and the rapid evolution of technology exacerbate these issues, challenging even robust frameworks.

This report highlights the current state of political finance regulation across different countries, drawing on data from the Political Finance Database (International IDEA n.d.). The analysis focuses on the four primary components of political finance regimes: (a) donations; (b) public funding; (c) expenditure; and (d) reporting, disclosure and oversight mechanisms.

While there is no one-size-fits-all regulatory model, the analysis shows that there are some underregulated areas. For example, more than 25 per cent of the 181 countries in International IDEA’s Political Finance Database still have no regulation on foreign or anonymous donations to political parties. While nearly 70 per cent of the countries have some arrangement to provide direct public funding to political parties, there are variations in eligibility and allocation criteria, with pros and cons in each case.

In addition to political parties and candidates, it is important to note that so-called third parties, or non-contestant campaigners—organizations that are neither political parties nor candidates yet spend resources and engage in electoral campaigns—pose a significant regulatory challenge in many countries. Third-party spending can be a conduit for opaque or foreign money, increasing the risk of corruption or external interference. Existing spending limits on political parties and candidates can be circumvented by channelling funding through third parties. However, only 29 per cent of the countries in the Political Finance Database have adopted a regulation on third-party spending. While at least some form of financial reporting requirements exist in nearly 80 per cent of the countries, donors are not always identified in those reports.

It is also crucial to note that a well-crafted regulatory framework does not automatically guarantee successful implementation or compliance. Gaps between regulations on paper and their practical enforcement are common and can significantly undermine their intended impact. Accordingly, this report also explores the barriers to implementing political finance regulations and compliance issues, including emerging challenges such as digitalization, globalization and illicit funding. For example, global standards in political finance need to be updated and strengthened in order to guide political finance reforms at the national level. When it comes to gaps and loopholes in the existing regulations, the report identifies several areas that are vulnerable to corrupt practices, such as the circumvention of spending limits, the use of cash and in-kind donations, and vague legal definitions of political finance terms. Moreover, the lack of independence, sufficient legal mandates, resources and interagency cooperation mechanisms within enforcement agencies also presents a major challenge in combatting corruption in political finance.

The report also considers the impact of digitalization in political finance. Major challenges in this area include a lack of regulation, the difficulty involved in tracing the money behind online advertisements, public relations firms and influencers, and limited cooperation mechanisms among various oversight entities.

Finally, the impact of illicit funding and organized crime is another challenge in political finance in many parts of the world. High campaign costs, insufficient legitimate funding for political parties, and regional and cultural factors are identified as root causes.

In order to address corruption risks in political finance, good practices from selected countries are also featured in this report. Timely updates to existing political finance laws, the introduction of digital reporting and disclosure platforms, the potential of artificial intelligence (AI) for oversight, and innovative tools developed by oversight agencies and civil society organizations, among other examples, provide valuable insights for advancing political finance reforms.

Designing an effective political finance ecosystem is pivotal for combatting corruption, protecting democratic integrity and fostering sustainable governance. By bridging gaps in data and evidence, this report serves as a critical resource for understanding global trends, identifying challenges and implementing solutions. The comparative analysis and documented good practices found in the report provide valuable insights for stakeholders committed to enhancing political finance transparency and accountability.

Money is essential for the healthy functioning of political parties, elections and democracy. For political parties, funding is crucial for building and maintaining a broad base of operations, recruiting members, formulating policies and effectively communicating with the public. Adequate resources allow parties and candidates to participate in electoral campaigns, enabling them to reach voters through advertising, events and other means.

The problem is that few things have the power to distort democracy—and the values that underpin it, such as equal participation and deliberation—quite like money. The link between political finance and corruption is therefore a critical issue in any democracy. While corruption takes a number of different forms (e.g. bribery, embezzlement, nepotism, extortion, fraud and influence peddling), inadequately controlled political finance is one of the most widely exploited entry points for narrow private interests to exert undue influence over political processes and institutions (Hamada and Agrawal 2020).

Almost all of the 181 countries included in International IDEA’s (n.d.) Political Finance Database have some form of political finance regulation in place regarding private and public income sources, expenditure, and oversight and sanction mechanisms. However, allegations of political finance corruption that implicate national leaders, politicians and business leaders remain prevalent across all regions (Daniels 2023; Sieg 2024; The Korea Times 2024). Regulatory loopholes and shortcomings still exist in many countries, while new technologies and emerging issues present both opportunities and challenges in the implementation of political finance regulations.

Designing an effective political finance ecosystem is a key driver for advancing anti-corruption efforts, safeguarding the integrity of political participation and representation, and promoting sustainable democracy.

Impact of corruption on democracy

Corruption poses a profound threat to democracy, undermining its core principles of fairness, accountability and equal representation. At its heart, democracy is based on the idea that political power should be exercised in the public interest, with leaders chosen through free and fair elections. Corruption distorts this process by allowing money, personal interests or illicit influence, rather than the will of the people, to determine political outcomes.

International IDEA’s Global State of Democracy Indices indicate that the level of perceived corruption around the world has not changed significantly in the last 20 years. According to a special Eurobarometer in 2024, 68 per cent of Europeans still consider corruption to be widespread in their country (European Commission 2024). Similarly, 58 per cent of Africans say corruption increased ‘somewhat’ or ‘a lot’ in their country during the preceding year (Dulani, Boateng and Zindikirani 2023), while the recent Latinobarómetro survey highlights that corruption is the most negative phenomenon in Latin American democracies (Latinobarómetro 2023).

One of the most significant impacts of corruption on democracy is the erosion of public trust in representative institutions. When citizens perceive that their leaders are engaged in corrupt practices, they lose faith in the integrity of political processes and outcomes. This can lead to political disengagement, apathy or even social unrest, as people feel that their votes or voices no longer matter (Drapalova 2019; OECD 2024).

According to recent global surveys, political parties and national parliaments are the least trusted institutions among the public. For example, only 24.2 per cent and 36.5 per cent of the population within Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries trust political parties and national parliaments, respectively (Figure I.1). Similarly, in multiple editions of the World Values Survey, political parties and parliaments appear as the least trusted public institutions (Scarrow 2023).

Corruption risks in political finance

Public distrust of political parties often stems from the perception that they are too closely tied to private interests rather than the public good. One of the key areas fuelling this distrust is the link between political finance and corruption (Box I.1). For example, there are several political finance loopholes that are commonly exploited for corrupt practices, such as the following:

1. Unregulated donations. Contributions from anonymous sources or entities that are not subject to disclosure requirements allow for the concealment of illegal or dirty money.
2. Weak reporting requirements. Loopholes in reporting and disclosure regulations, such as delayed reporting or unreasonably high thresholds that exclude large contributions from oversight, can hide the true scale of financial backing or potential illegal contributions.
3. Foreign influence. Loopholes allow foreign entities to contribute indirectly to campaigns or political parties through intermediaries or digital tools, bypassing rules that prohibit foreign donations.
4. Misuse of loans. Candidates or political parties may misuse loans, either failing to repay them or treating them as donations, avoiding contribution limits.
5. Weak implementation of existing regulations. A lack of independence, resources, political will or capacity on the part of oversight bodies to enforce regulations allows violations to go unchecked, creating a culture of impunity where corrupt practices thrive. Without robust implementation, even the best-designed political finance regulations can become hollow.

The above-mentioned points are just some examples; there are more entry points in political finance that are vulnerable to corruption. Nevertheless, it is clear that corruption in political finance erodes public trust, weakens the integrity of democratic institutions and stifles fair competition (Transparency International 2024). When political power is concentrated in the hands of a few wealthy actors, it marginalizes the voices of average citizens and diminishes electoral integrity. In extreme cases, it can result in a political environment where money determines access to power, creating a cycle of corruption that is difficult to break. 

Political finance reforms as a key anti-corruption driver

Comprehensive regulations that include transparency measures and accountability mechanisms are essential to maintaining a healthy political finance ecosystem in the face of corruption risks. The 2004 United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), the leading global anti-corruption instrument, underscores this necessity by identifying, in article 7.3, transparency in political finance as a key measure to prevent corruption.

Political finance reforms have been on the agendas of many countries worldwide. For example, over 20 countries revised their political finance laws to varying degrees between January 2021 and June 2023 (International IDEA n.d.). The increasing public demand for accountable political finance systems reflects recognition of the fact that unchecked or opaque financial practices threaten both the integrity of democratic processes and the credibility of representative institutions.

Despite many efforts by international organizations, governments and civil society organizations, the path to effective political finance reform remains complex, as countries grapple with balancing the need for legitimate political finance and preventing abuses. This balancing act requires not only domestic legislation but also coordination with a number of political finance stakeholders for the full enforcement of regulations. To further advance such reforms, comparative data and examples of good practices from other countries are essential, as they enable policymakers, regulators and civil society to benchmark their political finance systems against global and regional trends, learn from both successes and challenges in different contexts, and identify areas of relative weaknesses and strengths in combatting corruption. By comparing regulations, enforcement mechanisms and transparency measures, governments can set realistic and attainable standards for reform based on what has proven effective elsewhere.

The use of comparative data and good practices also plays a crucial role in enhancing the legitimacy and credibility of political finance reforms. Evidence-based reforms are more likely to gain the trust and support of stakeholders, including political parties, civil society and the general public. When reforms are transparently grounded in empirical data and proven methodologies, they are perceived as more objective, fair and effective. This, in turn, enhances the likelihood of successful implementation and compliance, thereby strengthening the overall fight against corruption.

Objectives and scope of the report

The main rationale for developing this report was to fill a gap in political finance data and evidence in order to suggest solutions to the challenges of political finance regulation. Implementing effective reforms in this area requires a robust understanding of how different systems operate, the challenges they face and the strategies they employ to mitigate corruption. This is where a report with comparative data and documented good practices can play a crucial role.

The report provides a comprehensive analysis of the global landscape of political finance, the challenges involved in combatting corruption and the innovative solutions that are emerging.

The chapters of the report focus on distinct but interconnected aspects of political finance.

Chapter 1 examines the current state of political finance regulation across different countries, drawing on data from International IDEA’s Political Finance Database. It analyses the four primary components of political finance regimes—donations, public funding, expenditure, and reporting, disclosure and oversight mechanisms. It also highlights global trends and regulatory practices, showcasing examples of strong frameworks and exposing weaknesses in others. The focus is on how well these frameworks align with democratic principles and transparency. Case studies from countries that exemplify both good practices and areas of concern provide insights into the effectiveness of these regulations.

Chapter 2 delves into the barriers that persist in regulating political finance, exploring the lack of robust global standards, typical gaps and loopholes in existing regulations, as well as challenges in enforcing laws consistently. It addresses emerging issues such as the digitalization of political finance, including the rise of social media spending and the difficulties in regulating it. Moreover, it also examines how globalization introduces transnational threats such as foreign influence, and the role of vested interests, lobbying and illicit activities in corrupting political finance. Another focus is the infiltration of organized crime in political finance. The chapter also looks at several good practices for combatting corruption in political finance. Examples of countries that have made improvements in political finance transparency are explored, and innovations in digital reporting, the use of AI for oversight and the critical role of civil society in advocating reform are covered. This chapter also discusses the importance of interagency cooperation and information sharing as key elements in strengthening political finance oversight and transparency.

Finally, Chapter 3 provides actionable recommendations for policymakers, regulatory agencies, private entities, civil society organizations and the international community, offering them a road map for building more transparent and accountable political finance systems.

Comparative data on political finance regulation is crucial for identifying global and regional trends in political finance. By examining how different countries structure their legal frameworks around donations, public funding, expenditure and oversight, policymakers can gain valuable insights into how other countries are closing loopholes and adapting their systems to stay fit for purpose. Countries can also learn from the experiences of others, especially those that have successfully navigated political finance reforms and implemented mechanisms to curb corruption risks. Such analysis of good practices enables policymakers to identify what works, tailor solutions to their unique political contexts and anticipate potential pitfalls. For instance, examining how some countries prohibit certain donation sources, monitor campaign expenditures or promote real-time disclosure of financial transactions can provide valuable insights. At the same time, it is important to recognize that no regulatory model is universally applicable or flawless. Political finance regimes are deeply influenced by national contexts, including political culture, governance structures and the broader socio-economic environment.

This chapter examines the current state of political finance regulations across different countries, drawing on data from International IDEA’s Political Finance Database (see Box 1.1). It analyses four primary components of political finance regimes: (a) private donations; (b) public funding; (c) expenditure; and (d) reporting, disclosure and oversight mechanisms. This comparative analysis focuses on de jure legal and regulatory frameworks. While a de jure analysis does not provide direct insights into the level of enforcement or practical implementation, addressing legislative shortcomings is the first critical step towards mitigating corruption risks in political finance. Without laws in place, there is nothing to enforce, making comprehensive regulation the foundation of any effort to improve accountability. Moreover, regulations must be constantly updated as the political finance landscape evolves. The gap between legislation and implementation, which remains a significant challenge in many parts of the world, will be explored in more detail in Chapter 2.

1.1. Regulations on private donations

Large, unchecked donations from private entities, corporations or wealthy individuals can lead to undue influence over political parties or candidates, compromising their independence and integrity. This sort of influence can be usefully understood as ‘donor-based corruption’, whereby ‘wealth is provided as a funding mechanism in exchange for a political service’ (Power et al. 2024). That is, when donors gain outsized influence through financial contributions, political parties and candidates may shape policies to favour the interests of donors, often at the expense of the public good. This creates a cycle of ‘pay-to-play’ politics, where decisions are made based on the donor’s financial power, undermining democratic principles of fairness and equal representation. Therefore, to combat corruption in political finance, regulations generally place limitations or outright bans on certain types of donations. The logic behind limiting donations is to control the (perceived or actual) power that large donations might have to buy influence.

1.1.1. Banning certain donation sources

Prohibiting certain types of donation sources is important in preventing undue influence and illicit funding, preventing conflicts of interest and creating a more level playing field in political competition (Table 1.1).

According to International IDEA’s Political Finance Database (n.d.), over 70 per cent of the 181 countries included in the database prohibit political parties from receiving donations from anonymous sources and foreign interests (Figure 1.1). Banning foreign and anonymous donations in political finance is crucial for reducing corruption risks. Foreign donations can lead to undue influence from external actors, compromising national sovereignty. Similarly, anonymous donations obscure the true sources of political funding, making it easier for illicit actors, including organized crime or special interest groups, to exert covert control over political processes (Falguera, Jones and Ohman 2014). It is also worth mentioning that some countries, such as Austria, Canada, France, India, Malawi, South Korea, Romania and the United Kingdom, allow small anonymous donations under a certain threshold. This option aims to balance the need for transparency with practical considerations. Setting an appropriate threshold could minimize the possibility that small anonymous donations might have a significant influence on political outcomes or pose corruption risks, while allowing individual citizens to express their support for political parties or candidates without disclosing their identities. This regulatory option could reduce the administrative burden of tracking donations of insignificant amounts, enabling oversight bodies to focus resources on larger, more impactful donations where corruption risks are higher. At the same time, it is important for oversight bodies to be mindful of the risk that donors could divide large donations into smaller amounts in an effort to remain anonymous.

Similarly, the rationale for regulating corporate donations is that, without adequate controls, such donations can lead to policy capture, where political leaders prioritize corporate interests over those of the public. There are varying regulatory approaches to corporate donations to political parties around the world. They are completely banned in 27 per cent of countries worldwide, including Armenia, Brazil (Box 1.2), Canada, Chile, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Peru and Sierra Leone. At the same time, other countries, instead of introducing a blanket ban, have opted to ban specific types of corporate donations that are more prone to corruption risks, such as donations from corporations that are partially state-owned and corporations that hold government contracts. The former are banned in 51 per cent of countries worldwide, while the latter are banned in 38 per cent of countries. Cameroon, Denmark, Sweden and Zambia, among other countries, do not currently prohibit any forms of corporate donations to political parties (International IDEA n.d.).

1.1.2. Capping donations

Setting limits on donations to political parties and candidates (during both election and non-election periods) is another regulatory option to mitigate the risks of undue influence by wealthy donors. A cap on donations can create a more level playing field by providing legal safeguards to prevent a small number of powerful donors from gaining excessive influence over political parties and candidates. Caps can also facilitate increased participation on the part of smaller donors in politics and elections, thereby ensuring that they have an equal influence in the political process. Critics argue, however, that donation caps may restrict the right to political expression, as contributing money can be seen by some as a form of free speech.

According to International IDEA’s Political Finance Database (n.d.), 49 per cent of countries worldwide, including Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Japan, Mexico, Mongolia and South Africa, place some kind of caps on donations to political parties during non-election periods (Figure 1.2). It is important to note that the effectiveness of donation caps hinges on setting a balanced threshold. If the cap is too high, it will fail to prevent substantial financial influence, as wealthy donors can still sway political outcomes. Conversely, if the cap is too low, it will risk deterring genuine political engagement, making it challenging for parties and candidates to fund campaigns effectively, and potentially driving donations underground to avoid restrictive limits. An effective threshold varies across contexts and requires regular assessment to reflect political and economic shifts, ensuring that donation caps remain a functional tool for limiting corruption and maintaining equitable access to political influence (Box 1.3).

1.2. Regulations on public funding

An alternative way to limit the influence of private donations is to offer political parties access to public funds, either through direct financial support or by providing free or subsidized goods and services. When implemented effectively, public funding can positively impact the influence of money in the political process. Public funding for political parties can serve several purposes. First, it can support the sustainability and institutionalization of political parties while reducing their excessive dependence on private sources of funding. By ensuring that all political groups have sufficient resources to reach voters, public funding not only promotes political pluralism but also offers the voters a broader range of choices of politicians. Second, when combined with stringent regulations on private funding and spending regulations, public funding can also level the playing field by reducing the advantages of wealthier competitors by making campaign funds accessible to all. Finally, public funding can serve as a tool for negative reinforcement, encouraging parties to comply with the established rules of political and campaign finance. Such negative reinforcement would entail withholding public funding as a sanction in the event of failure to comply with spending limits or reporting requirements. Such sanctions only work, however, if the funding amount is substantial enough that recipients are motivated to follow the rules to avoid losing it (Falguera, Jones and Ohman 2014).

Around the world close to 70 per cent of countries, including Albania, Belgium, Brazil, Cameroon, Colombia, Indonesia, Kenya, Norway and Serbia, have some arrangement to provide direct public funding to political parties, either regularly or in relation to campaigns or both regularly and during campaigns (Figure 1.3). Similarly, 125 countries provide indirect state support, mostly through the provision of free or subsidized media access for political parties, with the aim of levelling the playing field (International IDEA n.d.).

1.2.1. Eligibility criteria for public funding

State resources are often limited; hence, for their optimal use, it is important that clear criteria be laid out to determine which parties are eligible for public funding. In some countries, such as Bhutan, Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico, New Zealand, Panama and Samoa, among others, all registered political parties receive funding regardless of whether they are big or small, established or new. However, the provision of public funding to all parties carries the risk of political fragmentation as well as the creation of political parties just to receive public funding, thus wasting valuable state resources, as was observed in Thailand (Sirivunnabood 2023). Therefore, most countries which have a public funding system in place lay out an eligibility threshold, establishing clear criteria that parties must satisfy in order to receive public funding. Around the world the most frequently used eligibility threshold is to provide funding to those parties that have won more than a certain share of votes (used in 38 per cent of countries, including in Canada, Guatemala, Ireland, Japan, Madagascar, Taiwan and Thailand) (Table 1.2). A low threshold would make the criteria irrelevant, while a high threshold might make it difficult for new political parties to establish themselves.

1.2.2. Allocation criteria for public funding

In addition to setting an eligibility threshold, it is also important that the allocation criteria for the distribution of public funding and the weighting for each of the criteria be appropriate and balanced. While it may seem obvious that all eligible political parties should be provided with the same amount of funding, giving a party with low voter support the same amount of public funding as that of the largest party can be considered a waste of resources or seen as disregarding public will.

The most popular parameter for allocating public funding is to base it on a party’s electoral success, whether proportional to the percentage of votes received or to the number of seats won, or to use a flat rate based on the number of votes received (Table 1.3). The downside of using this parameter is that most of the public funding ends up being allocated to the party in power, which may need less public funding than any other party. To avoid this situation, many countries, such as Albania (see Box 1.4), Austria, Brazil, the Republic of Korea, Moldova, Mozambique, Panama and Zambia, use several criteria—for instance, allocating a certain portion of public funds equally to all eligible parties and the remaining funds based on the party’s performance in the previous election.

1.2.3. Ban on the abuse of state resources

In many parts of the world, the abuse of state resources by incumbents poses significant corruption risks in political finance, undermining fair competition and public trust in elections. This issue often arises in contexts where political incumbents, such as elected politicians or ruling-party members, use their access to state resources—whether material, human, coercive, regulatory, budgetary, media-related or legislative—to support their political campaigns and reduce the opposition’s chances of success. In other words, incumbents who abuse state resources gain an undue advantage over their opponents, skewing the political playing field.

To prevent the abuse of state resources, 69 per cent of countries worldwide ban the use of public resources, including public funds, infrastructure and administrative personnel, in favour of or against a particular political party or candidate, except regulated public funding (Figure 1.4). Provisions may take the form of an overall ban or a prohibition of specific types of abuse, including biased reporting in state-controlled media, public officials campaigning while on duty and the use of government vehicles or buildings for election campaigns (Box 1.5).

1.3. Regulations on spending

Many countries regulate how parties and candidates can spend the money they raise—either in addition to or instead of donation limits. The most straightforward approach is to ban vote buying outright, but many countries also limit the amount that parties and candidates can spend. The underlying purpose is to level the playing field and to inhibit the ability of dominant, well-funded parties to simply flood the electoral marketplace.

Placing spending limits on political parties and candidates is another crucial measure for mitigating corruption risks in political finance. Capping the amount of money that political parties and candidates can spend during campaigns helps reduce the dependency on large donations from wealthy donors, special interest groups and illicit funding sources, who may expect political favours or policy concessions in return. Placing spending limits on political parties and candidates is also essential to level the playing field among political actors. Without such caps, better-funded parties and candidates can vastly outspend their competitors, making elections more about financial power than the merits of ideas or policy platforms. Enforcing spending limits would give parties with fewer resources a fairer chance to compete with better-funded opponents, ensuring that political contests are not disproportionately influenced by money.

1.3.1. Applying spending limits to political parties and candidates

When it comes to expenditures, regulations generally impose caps on how much a political party or candidate can spend on an electoral campaign. In 38 per cent of countries, including Bangladesh, Honduras, North Macedonia, the Philippines, Slovenia, Thailand and the UK, political parties must adhere to a spending limit. Such caps are in place for candidates in 49 per cent of countries, including in Afghanistan, Algeria, Croatia, France, Latvia and the Maldives, among others (International IDEA n.d.) (Figure 1.5).

It is important that laws provide as clear a definition as possible of what constitutes an ‘election expense’ and that they stipulate the duration of an election campaign so that spending can be enforced properly. In Albania, for example, the electoral law stipulates that, as long as expenses were incurred for electoral purposes, regardless of when they were incurred, they should count as electoral expenses and be reported as such.

Countries employ a variety of methods to determine spending caps for election campaigns. Some set the cap based on the average monthly earnings or minimum wage, while others take into account the population of the electoral area or the number of votes when determining the absolute limit (Box 1.6). Whatever strategy is used, the cap must be appropriate. If it is set too high, it will not serve its purpose, and if it is set too low, it can hinder effective electoral campaigning and might even induce parties or candidates to circumvent the rules in place.

1.3.2. Applying spending limits to the third parties

In addition to political parties and candidates, it is important to note that so-called third parties, or non-contestant campaigners—organizations that are neither political parties nor candidates that spend resources and engage in electoral campaigns—pose a significant regulatory challenge in many countries. While the exact definition of such third parties may vary across countries, they typically include political action committees, unions, corporations and special interest groups. They can have a significant influence on elections by supporting or opposing political parties, candidates or specific causes without having direct ties to any political campaign. If left unregulated, these entities could spend unlimited amounts, potentially overshadowing the voices of voters and distorting the political landscape. Such unrestricted spending could result in an uneven playing field where only well-funded interests can exert meaningful influence, undermining democratic principles of equal representation (OSCE/ODIHR 2012). This was observed in the 2006 election in Latvia when the involvement of third parties was significant but problematic considering they were unregulated then. Opposition parties were believed to have mobilized third parties to circumvent spending limits while campaigning on behalf of the parties (GRECO 2010). This led Latvian authorities to pass a legal amendment to bringing third parties within the ambit of the law.

Third-party spending can be a conduit for opaque or foreign money, increasing the risk of corruption or external interference. Existing spending limits on political parties and candidates can be circumvented by channelling funding through third parties. Moreover, we are seeing more of these third parties operate between electoral periods. Regulations on donations and spending tend to be particularly stringent during elections, while enforcement may be less strict between elections. Therefore, the current assumption under electoral law across much of the democratic world is that politics (or at least the kind of politics that requires strict regulation) happens only at election time, although the reality is that political debates can be influenced at any time during an election cycle.

By imposing spending limits, disclosure requirements and transparency measures, regulations on third parties help mitigate these risks and increase accountability. However, regulations on third-party spending are in place in only 29 per cent of countries globally (Figure 1.6), and not many of these countries have embraced strict regulations. However, several countries in Latin America—including Guatemala, Mexico, Panama and Paraguay—have implemented a proxy (complete) ban on third-party spending. There are other countries that have similar legislative arrangements both in Europe and elsewhere, including Canada (Box 1.7), Latvia, Lithuania, Mauritius, Moldova and the Seychelles.

1.4. Reporting, disclosure and oversight mechanisms

Regulations on donations and spending are incredibly important, but transparency is widely regarded as the ‘most important requirement’ for the integrity of a political financing system (Nassmacher 2003). People often commit corrupt acts because they lack sufficient disincentives, and transparency can be a powerful disincentive. When politicians’ actions are subjected to increased scrutiny, they are less likely to act with bad intentions and more circumspect in their dealings with malign actors. Moreover, transparency concerning financial flows helps expose undue influence and conflicts of interest that could distort democratic processes. When political parties and candidates openly report their income and expenditures, it enables meaningful oversight and public scrutiny, limiting the ability of special interest groups to exert hidden control, thereby mitigating corruption risks in political systems.

The enforcement of existing regulations is equally important in ensuring compliance and accountability. Robust, independent regulatory bodies can detect, investigate and penalize financial misconduct in political finance. Consistent oversight discourages illicit activities, such as the abuse of state resources, foreign interference and organized crime, which often exploit regulatory gaps to infiltrate politics. Furthermore, strong oversight boosts public trust in political institutions by demonstrating a commitment to integrity and transparency.

1.4.1. Reporting and disclosure of political finance

A lack of transparency surrounding the financing of political parties and elections is one of the major challenges related to money in politics (Falguera, Jones and Ohman 2014). The open and transparent funding of political parties and candidates is desirable because it helps ensure that everyone is playing by the rules, which in turn strengthens the integrity of and trust in politics. Furthermore, transparency helps expose the risk of undue influence over politicians and helps protect against the infiltration of illicit sources of money, thus contributing to the broader fight against corruption. The need for transparency of political party and campaign finances is enshrined in the UNCAC, which states that countries should ‘consider taking appropriate legislative and administrative measures ... to enhance transparency in the funding of candidates for elected public office, and where applicable, the funding of political parties’ (UNODC 2004: article 7).

Such transparency can be attained by requiring that political actors submit reports detailing how they raise and spend money. At least some form of reporting requirements exist—typically for both political parties and candidates—in nearly 80 per cent of countries (International IDEA n.d.) (Figure 1.7). An important consideration when designing reporting requirements is the frequency and timing of reporting. Many countries require that parties submit financial reports both on a regular basis and specifically for election campaigns. In countries where political parties are active between elections, it is important that they report on their financial operations. Mandating financial reports only during election periods enables parties to circumvent rules by raising and spending money earlier in the process. On the other hand, when parties are required to report only on an annual basis, details on campaign expenditures might not become available until long after the campaign. Requiring reports during campaigns could provide voters with important insights, but this may not be practical in countries with limited staffing.

However, transparency in and of itself is not enough; beyond the headline figures, countries approach transparency in different ways. For example, there is considerable variance in how much information political parties and candidates are required to include in their financial reports. This can be broken down further into three levels of spending itemization: high, medium and low. High-level itemization is evident in countries such as Canada, the UK and the United States.

Another frequent point of debate is whether reports should disclose donor identities; doing so is required in more than half of the countries with reporting obligations (Figure 1.8). In some of these countries, such as Austria, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Finland, Germany and Japan, the identity of donors is required only for contributions exceeding a certain threshold (International IDEA n.d.). These regulations aim to balance transparency with privacy for smaller donors, while also reducing the reporting burden.

In South Korea, under article 42 of the 2005 Political Funds Act (Republic of Korea 2023), contributions below specific thresholds made to associations of political supporters are exempt from public disclosure. For presidential candidates or candidates in intraparty competitions for presidential elections, the threshold is raised to KRW 5 million annually (approximately USD 3,500). Similarly, in Romania, under article 11(2) of the 2006 Law on Financing the Activity of Political Parties and Electoral Campaigns (Republic of Romania 2006), a donor may request that their identity be undisclosed, provided their donation is within the limit of the annual amount of 10 minimum gross national salaries. This ensures that smaller donors can contribute to political campaigns without their personal details or donation amounts being publicly disclosed.

Countries also differ in terms of whether these reports must be accessible to the public. Approximately 20 per cent of countries do not require public access to financial reports, which goes against the intent of the UNCAC provision mentioned earlier (Figure 1.9). In other cases reports are available but are difficult to access or interpret. Ideally, reports should be posted online in an easy-to-read, searchable format, which should be the norm worldwide.

Spending details are provided relatively frequently through interactive online databases. Such databases should be considered a best practice that countries around the world should consider adopting.

1.4.2. Types of political finance oversight bodies

Even the strongest formal regulations are ineffective without proper enforcement. Therefore, any rules governing how political parties and candidates can raise and use funds must be paired with measures to ensure compliance. Political actors’ compliance with finance regulations can be overseen by a variety of bodies, including electoral management bodies (EMBs), auditing agencies, courts, state comptrollers, anti-corruption agencies, parliamentary committees and state tax offices. The mandates of oversight agencies vary across countries; some nations consolidate multiple responsibilities within a single entity that collects financial reports, verifies disclosures, audits, investigates, and enforces sanctions—while others delegate these functions among multiple agencies based on their resources, capacity and specialized expertise (Duri and Resimić 2022).

EMBs are most commonly given the legal mandate not only to receive political finance reports but also to examine them and investigate violations of political finance regulations. Similarly, auditing agencies, ministries and specialized agencies are also used. (See Figure 1.10 and Figure 1.11 for a detailed breakdown of the institutions responsible for receiving and examining reports.)

Although the models and mandates of oversight institutions differ from one country to another (see Box 1.8), there is consensus that effective implementation of political finance regulations requires an oversight body with a clear mandate and sufficient resources to carry out its duties. Oversight authorities should meet the same requirements as those institutions that manage elections, which include:

• a clear, sufficient mandate that does not overlap with that of other institutions; 
• an inclusive and transparent leadership appointment process to ensure independence from political pressures and maintain public trust;
• secure tenure for leaders and staff to guard against undue influence; and
• sufficient funding and budgetary oversight for the institution and a commitment within the institution to operate impartially and transparently, engaging constructively with those it regulates to promote compliance and prevent violations wherever possible.

1.4.3. Sanctions for political finance violations

Sanctions for violations are another crucial aspect of effective enforcement of political finance regulations. Such sanctions could range from financial (fines, loss and/or suspension of public funding) to administrative (loss of elected office, loss of political rights) to criminal (imprisonment). Globally, fines are the most common measure used to punish political finance violations (Figure 1.12).

The range of sanctions varies across countries (Figure 1.12), depending on the type of violations. As such, it is important that sanctions be enforceable, dissuasive and proportionate to the nature of the violation. For example, a warning or a small fine could suffice for relatively minor infractions, such as failing to submit reports on time, or public funding could be withheld in case of a continuous refusal to submit reports in spite of reminders. In any case, party bans or dissolutions should be reserved for exceptionally serious violations. It is important to remember that, without proper enforcement, sanctions lack the capacity to realize any positive change, undermining the entire political finance regulatory system.

1.5. Designing comprehensive political finance regulations

This chapter has provided an overview of political finance regulations, highlighting global trends in regulating private donations, public funding, expenditures, reporting, disclosure and oversight mechanisms. While these measures are essential to ensuring transparency and accountability in political finance, no single regulatory model fits all contexts. Each country must carefully evaluate its unique political, social and economic environment to design a tailored regulatory framework. To succeed, they must balance the strengths and weaknesses of various regulatory options to address specific challenges effectively.

It is also crucial to note that a well-crafted regulatory framework does not automatically guarantee successful implementation or compliance. Gaps between regulations on paper and their enforcement in practice are common and can lessen their intended impact considerably. The effectiveness of political finance regulations often depends on the strength of enforcement mechanisms, political will and public oversight.

The next chapter delves into these challenges, exploring the barriers to implementing political finance regulations as well as compliance issues. It also examines emerging challenges such as digitalization, globalization and illicit funding, while proposing innovative solutions and best practices to strengthen the integrity of political finance systems globally.

This chapter delves into the multifaceted challenges that undermine transparency and accountability in political finance and explores effective measures to address them. For example, a lack of strong global standards remains a critical obstacle. Existing regulations often contain gaps and loopholes, enabling covert funding and the circumvention of oversight mechanisms. Even where laws are robust, enforcement challenges arise due to their inconsistent application, insufficient capacity or a lack of political will. Moreover, the rise of online spending has introduced new complexities in monitoring political advertising and campaign finance, compounded by opaque algorithms and cross-border operations. Globalization adds to the challenges, as foreign entities increasingly influence domestic politics, often through undisclosed channels. The role of vested interests, particularly in lobbying, public procurement and concealed beneficial ownership structures, further entrenches corrupt practices. Additionally, illicit funding and organized crime find their way into political systems, threatening democratic processes and governance.

This chapter also highlights mitigating measures that have shown promise in responding to the challenges. Countries that have successfully updated their political finance regimes provide valuable lessons in improving transparency. Digital reporting and disclosure mechanisms, coupled with the use of AI for oversight, enhance real-time monitoring and analysis of political funding. The involvement of civil society fosters accountability, while interagency cooperation and information sharing ensure a coordinated response to transnational and emerging issues. Collectively, these strategies offer a pathway to strengthening political finance systems globally.

2.1. Weak global political finance standards

The absence of a universally recognized global standard to guide the design of political finance regimes poses a significant challenge in combatting corruption in this area. Transparent and accountable political finance systems are essential for safeguarding democracy, ensuring fair competition and preventing undue influence by vested interests. While nearly every country in the world has systems in place to regulate political finance, these systems often lack consistency.

Currently, the 2004 UN Convention against Corruption is the only global instrument that addresses political finance transparency (Box 2.1).

However, UNCAC article 7.3 lacks detailed provisions or guidelines on how to address the complex challenges relating to political finance in a comprehensive manner. The self-assessment checklist outlined in Box 2.1 provides some additional detail on the types of legislative and administrative measures that countries can take; however, they are framed only as illustrative examples to aid peer reviewers, rather than as normative guidelines on what constitutes a robust framework for political finance integrity. While the UNGASS political declaration raises the ambition to some extent, by committing member states to maintaining, developing and strengthening transparency measures, there are no further details on the modalities for bookkeeping, reporting, disclosure of political finance information or on accountability mechanisms. This lack of detail has resulted in fragmented efforts, with countries interpreting and implementing political finance rules in vastly different ways.

At the regional level, promising initiatives have emerged to fill this gap. Regional organizations, such as the Organization of American States (OAS), the Council of Europe and the African Union, have developed principles and guidelines tailored to their specific contexts (Box 2.2).

The regional frameworks described in Box 2.2 highlight critical elements such as transparency, accountability and oversight. However, without a cohesive global principle to unify these efforts, achieving a level playing field in regulating political finance remains an uphill battle. A comprehensive global standard is urgently needed to address this challenge.

To respond to existing challenges, a group of international and civil society organizations, including International IDEA, Transparency International, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, the UNCAC Coalition Secretariat and the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, has been urging UNCAC signatories to enhance political finance transparency. For example, the group drafted a joint statement ahead of the 10th session of the UNCAC Conference of States Parties in 2023. The statement, which was signed by over 100 organizations, makes a compelling case for including the following actions in a new UNCAC resolution dedicated to strengthening article 7.3 of the UNCAC (Transparency International 2023): (a) closing loopholes for illicit funds in politics, including foreign and anonymous donations; (b) introducing digital reporting and disclosure systems; (c) improving oversight and accountability of political finance regimes; (d) promoting knowledge, civic engagement and public participation; and (e) strengthening international cooperation to stem the flow of transnational illicit funds in politics.

In 2024 Transparency International published a position paper titled Standards for Integrity in Political Finance; the paper presents a holistic set of measures that outline the efforts needed to mitigate corruption risks and promote integrity in the financing of national-level political parties and election campaigns (Transparency International 2024). These standards, which are meant to be a blueprint for reform, were informed by a series of regional and global consultations with Transparency International’s national chapters, as well as experts from governments, international organizations, election observation groups, civil society, media and think tanks. The standards cover issues ranging from transparency, organized crime and dirty money to gender, abuse of state resources and accountability. Both the statement as well as the standards have informed some of the recommendations provided at the end of the report.

Such advocacy efforts continue to highlight the critical need for more comprehensive global standards on political finance to counter the pervasive risks of corruption, foreign influence and opaque financial practices in politics. International organizations and civil society organizations play a vital role in maintaining momentum on this issue, ensuring that political finance reforms remain a priority on global anti-corruption and governance agendas. Sustained and coordinated advocacy is essential for closing regulatory gaps, harmonizing international norms, and fostering a culture of transparency and accountability across jurisdictions. By amplifying calls for such actions, the international community can better equip countries to safeguard the integrity of their political systems.

2.2. Gaps and loopholes in existing regulations

Although most countries around the world regulate campaign finance, the legal frameworks in many of them contain numerous loopholes. Whether the issue is definitions, the circumvention of restrictions or the publication of data, no country has a perfect system.

2.2.1. Unclear definition of terms

To ensure that no loopholes are created, definitions of terms such as ‘donation’, ‘income’, ‘revenue’, ‘donor’, ‘expenditure’ and so on are critically important. A guide from the Commonwealth highlights the example of the UK, where the 2002 political finance law excluded loans on ‘commercial terms’ from donation regulations, allowing parties to bypass restrictions on foreign donors and disclosure requirements. Consequently, parties increasingly relied on large, undisclosed loans until 2006, when the law was amended to mandate disclosure of all loans (Commonwealth Secretariat 2020).

2.2.2. Lack of beneficial ownership transparency and anonymous donations

Over a quarter of the 181 countries included in International IDEA’s Political Finance Database (n.d.) have no restrictions on anonymous donations. Furthermore, 128 countries allow corporate donations to candidates, and 130 countries permit such donations to political parties, while only 90 countries around the world have provisions in place for beneficial ownership registers (Open Ownership n.d.). This means that, in many countries, anonymous donations can still be made through corporate donors that do not declare their true owners.

2.2.3. Third-party donations

As mentioned in the previous chapter, third-party campaigning poses significant corruption risks, as political parties can bypass spending limits by using proxy groups that claim to be independent. This loophole allows vested domestic and foreign interests to create false grassroots support. Despite these concerns, at least 107 of the 181 countries assessed (nearly 60 per cent) have no reporting obligations in place for third parties (International IDEA n.d.). For example, all seven countries analysed in a recent regional study of the Western Balkans and Türkiye fail to require that third parties report on their campaign activities and spending (Vrushi and Buchner 2023). Furthermore, 97 countries impose no limits on the amounts that third parties can spend on election campaign activities (International IDEA n.d.).

2.2.4. Risks of foreign donations and influence

While over 70 per cent of countries ban foreign donations in their legislation (International IDEA n.d.), foreign interests often cloak their financial support to political parties, candidates, campaigns and other politically influential groups through non-transparent or corrupt structures. Among the loopholes exploited to that end are in-kind financial support (e.g. loans or expensive gifts, tailor-made social media manipulation, advisory services), straw donors, foreign-controlled corporate vehicles and other third-party organizations (Valladares and Sample 2022).

For example, in the Western Balkans, where foreign influence on politics has been documented, legal frameworks often leave loopholes which can be exploited. In Albania, for example, the ban on foreign donations does not apply to gifts or assistance from foreign political parties, international unions of parties or foreign political foundations and organizations. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, only foreign political parties and foreign legal entities are banned from making donations, but donations from foreign individuals are permitted, and the law makes an additional exception for educational programmes aimed at the development and promotion of democratic principles (Vrushi and Buchner 2023).

2.2.5. Circumventing donation limits

Donation caps in political finance are designed to curb undue influence by limiting the amount individuals or entities can contribute to political parties or candidates. However, these caps can be exploited, posing significant corruption risks. A common tactic is splitting donations, where a large sum is divided among multiple individuals or entities to appear as separate smaller contributions, thereby circumventing the cap. This practice can obscure the true source of funding and enable donors to exert disproportionate influence while evading regulatory scrutiny. Another method involves using proxy donors such as employees or family members to make contributions on behalf of a single donor.

An investigation by The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ) showed that five of the UK’s six main political parties had accepted illegal donations made on behalf of TBIJ, exposing how easy it is to bypass laws meant to limit improper influence by foreign donors. TBIJ arranged a series of small payments to each of the six major parties. The payments were individually less than GBP 500 (approximately USD 625)—the lower limit for a legal political donation—but surpassed that threshold once added together. Only one party correctly identified and blocked the money. The other five failed to refuse or return the payments (Rose, Lock and Nash 2024).

2.2.6. Cash and in-kind donations

Nearly half of the 181 countries covered in International IDEA’s Political Finance Database do not require donations to be processed through banking systems, making cash transactions susceptible to abuse because they are opaque and difficult to trace (International IDEA n.d.). Additionally, in-kind contributions remain unregulated in more than half of the world’s countries, presenting significant risks, as such donations can be easily concealed (International IDEA n.d.). In North Macedonia, for example, the Special Prosecution Office launched an investigation into a former prime minister and ruling party for accepting EUR 4.9 million (approximately USD 5.1 million). According to the Special Prosecution Office, there was reasonable suspicion that the money originated from a crime committed by a group of people who enabled money laundering through the ruling party’s local organizations by depositing cash in the party’s account in the form of personal payments (Samardžiski 2021).

2.2.7. Limited or inaccessible disclosure

When it comes to the publication of political finance data, as the UNCAC implementation review mechanism highlights, challenges persist around disclosure obligations (United Nations Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption 2024). Even when reported to a relevant authority, financial information, in many cases, is not made available to the public or is made available only in formats that are not easily accessible and reusable. The 2021 Global Data Barometer (n.d.) survey of 109 countries found that only 20 provide financial data in machine-readable formats, with just 10 allowing bulk downloads. Most political finance reports lack critical details: 72 do not disclose in-kind or non-financial donations, 58 omit expenditure data, and 55 exclude information on public funding or membership dues.

2.3. Enforcement challenges

Although most countries have some sort of political finance regulations in place, many of them continue to face major challenges when it comes to enforcing those regulations, undermining efforts to ensure meaningful transparency and accountability in politics. A key issue is the lack of a mandate, resources, capacity and independence on the part of oversight bodies. Cooperation across different regulatory bodies is often insufficient as well. The increasingly transnational nature of political finance requires cross-border and interagency collaboration, which is often hindered by differing legal standards and weak mechanisms for information sharing.

2.3.1. Lack of mandate

Having a clear mandate and explicit roles and responsibilities for oversight bodies in charge of controlling and monitoring political finance is crucial. Twenty countries globally have no institution mandated to scrutinize political finance reports or investigate infractions and reported offences (International IDEA n.d.). Furthermore, only 55 out of 109 countries surveyed by the Global Data Barometer (n.d.) have rules which empower an agency or official to ensure the accurate and timely collection and publication of political finance data.

Oversight of political finance is further hindered by unclear mandates; ambiguous thresholds for administrative, civil or criminal investigations; and weak coordination among enforcement bodies. Fragmented responsibilities can reduce the efficiency of investigations, resulting in wasted resources due to overlapping investigations, delays in information sharing and inadequate evidence (McDevitt n.d.). In the UK, for example, there is currently no single law enforcement body with overall responsibility for criminal enforcement of electoral finance laws or laws to prevent foreign interference (Spotlight on Corruption 2023). In some cases the mandate is too limited or too specific. In Germany, for example, state prosecutors possess investigative authority, but this power is constrained to a specific range of criminal offences related to political finance. This limitation narrows the scope of their investigations, preventing them from examining other potentially associated infractions that fall outside this defined category (Transparency International in Bosnia and Hercegovina 2024).

2.3.2. Lack of resources or capacity

Oversight agencies need the commensurate resources to conduct verifications and investigations. The lack of a dedicated budget and the human and technological resources necessary for oversight functions can severely restrict the ability of these agencies to conduct thorough audits and investigations. The workload associated with political finance tends to follow a cyclical pattern, with increased demands leading up to elections, during the submission of financial reports and while those reports are being reviewed (Ohman 2022).

A study conducted by chapters of Transparency International in the Western Balkans and Türkiye found that, across the region, resources are often insufficient for political finance oversight bodies to fulfil their mandate (Box 2.3) (Vrushi and Buchner 2023).

2.3.3. Lack of independence or autonomy

Given the key role that oversight bodies play in regulating political parties, elections and campaigns, they often face political pressure, ranging from improper influence to intimidation or in some cases co-optation. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, political interference in the work of the EMB has escalated to dangerous levels and takes different forms, ranging from obstruction of funding to threats, insults and attacks on its members. As a consequence of EMB decisions related to election irregularities, one employee needed police protection (Blagovčanin et al. 2023). A lack of judicial independence also has a profound impact. Case law across the Western Balkans, for example, shows that parties that no longer hold power usually face harsher punishment for violations (Ugi Zvekić, Roksandić and Dobovšek 2023).

2.3.4. Lack of interagency cooperation mechanisms

Interagency cooperation is essential for effectively enforcing political finance regulations due to the complexity and cross-sectoral nature of financial misconduct, enabling regulatory bodies, tax authorities, anti-corruption agencies and law enforcement to share expertise, resources and data. This collaboration helps identify and address the influence of illicit funding, foreign interference and organized crime on political processes. Nevertheless, such cooperation mechanisms are still not the norm in most countries and regions.

For example, the FORT database, compiled by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, shows that 8 of the 12 countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia have some form of memorandums of understanding in place with other institutions, including, in many cases, with the prosecution. However, the numbers of cases referred to the prosecution are mostly in the single digits. Furthermore, only 6 of the 12 countries have any informal cooperation mechanisms in place (IFES  n.d.a).

Cross-border cooperation mechanisms are even weaker. Countries often rely on mutual legal assistance, which is triggered only for criminal cases. A lack of cooperation between oversight bodies at the administrative level, concerning data sharing, memorandums of understanding, joint investigations, and so on, greatly hinders the detection of transnational breaches of political finance regulations.

2.4. Impact of digitalization and globalization on political finance

Politics is transforming into an increasingly digital affair: many aspects of political organization and electoral campaigns are shifting online, with political parties and candidates spending more financial resources online. This shift is the result of the ongoing digitalization of society as a whole. In every country around the world, Internet use is continuously on the rise. As of 2024 global Internet penetration was around 66 per cent, meaning that two thirds of the global population have access to the Internet. In Western countries Internet penetration is even higher, at more than 90 per cent (Kemp 2024). Moreover, online advertising is considerably cheaper than traditional advertising, such as billboards, leaflets and television.

Therefore, it is not surprising that there has been remarkable growth in the use of digital tools and social media platforms for political and electoral campaigning, not least for the reasons highlighted above but also for the opportunities online spaces provide for sophisticated microtargeting of the electorate. Many authors have even argued that we have entered a new era—or ‘fourth phase’—of data-driven political campaigning, focused on the collection and analysis of large amounts of individual-level data with the purpose of microtargeting groups of voters (Magin et al. 2016; Roemmele and Gibson 2020). This means that, in this new campaign environment, data—as much as spending—is the driving force. Vast quantities of personal data can be bought leading up to an election, analysed by consultants in the pre-election period and used to develop a strategy that is then enacted during the election itself.

2.4.1. Regulatory gaps for the digital age

While digital campaigning creates new opportunities for political participation and reaching voters, regulators are confronted with new challenges when it comes to tackling this phenomenon. The primary factor to consider—when thinking about the opportunities, challenges and risks posed by new technology and digitalization in political finance—is that money in politics is ‘hydraulic’ (Issacharoff and Karlan 1999). It is like water; it finds the gaps and loopholes in a legislative regime and flows directly into them. It is a reasonable diagnosis that, even though some countries (e.g. Canada, Ireland) and blocs (e.g. the European Union) have passed robust legislation, existing regulatory gaps and loopholes can be found online. These gaps and loopholes are so extensive that the online space, as it relates to political finance, can still reasonably be called a ‘Wild West’ (Palese and Mortimer 2019). This means existing regulatory frameworks are often insufficient to cope with the digitalization of campaign finance and need to be adapted. However, many questions remain concerning how the rules should be changed and which regulatory approach should be followed, while striking a balance between ensuring fair political competition and electoral integrity, on the one hand, and respecting fundamental rights such as freedom of expression, on the other (Wolfs forthcoming 2025).

2.4.2. Third-party campaigning and foreign interference online

Third-party campaigning has long been a sensitive issue for regulators, but the new forms of digital communication have only exacerbated the challenges. The online space presents considerably more opportunities for third parties, including foreign third parties with malign intentions, to seep into a country’s political system or campaign space and potentially circumvent traditional bans and limits on donations and spending. For instance, there are strong indications that foreign actors attempted to manipulate democratic elections in the EU by deepening polarization and eroding trust in the elections (Albrycht et al. 2021; Dunčikaitė, Žemgulytė and Valladares 2021). A report conducted on behalf of the European Parliament outlined two ways in which foreign powers can (often illegally) finance politics (European Parliament and Jones 2023):

1. Foreign third-party campaigning. Malign foreign actors undertake campaigns themselves (e.g. via social media) for or against political parties or candidates.
2. Foreign-funded third-party campaigning. Malign foreign actors fund other entities that engage in political campaigning (e.g. donating to an anti-immigration organization which might support a specific political party or candidate).

A recent example of an approach taken to regulate the influence of foreign money on third-party campaigns can be seen in the UK. The Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014 (United Kingdom 2014) limits third-party campaign spending to UK-based entities (and eligible overseas voters) and requires that all third parties that spend over GBP 10,000 (approximately USD 12,500) in England or GBP 20,000 (approximately USD 25,000) in Northern Ireland, Scotland or Wales during an election register with the Electoral Commission. In Sweden, on the other hand, rules in place since 1962 (pursuant to the Swedish Penal Code) ban any individual from accepting money from a foreign power that is aimed at influencing public opinion concerning the country’s form of government or matters of significance to national security.

2.4.3. Influencers and digital marketing firms

Political parties and candidates are increasingly turning to influencers, external experts and digital marketing agencies, referred to collectively as the ‘influence industry’, to shape or enhance their electoral campaigns. Social media has become a vital source of information and news for citizens, particularly younger audiences (Wolfs forthcoming 2025). For instance, a 2022 survey conducted in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico revealed that social media was the primary channel for political information among 16–24-year-olds (Luminate 2022). Social media influencers can be hired either to endorse or campaign on behalf of specific candidates or political parties or to conduct negative campaigns focused on portraying political opponents in a bad light (Grassi 2024; Adetula 2024). Similarly, the use of external experts and professional data and media companies to develop and carry out campaigns is also on the rise. This influence industry dominates political debates, which has serious consequences for our political experience, and our social and economic life (Tactical Tech n.d.). Moreover, one of the main concerns regarding the mobilization of industry players for campaigning is the lack of transparency in the financial transactions between political actors and these entities. Online platforms are unable to control or monitor any deals that are made off-platform, and appropriate reporting and transparency protocols are often lacking (Venslauskas 2024).

2.4.4. Synergy between multiple agencies and actors

Because of the technical and legal complexities of online campaign activities, multiple oversight agencies often need to share responsibility for monitoring them. Effective oversight requires a clear division of responsibilities and established collaborative procedures. However, regulatory frameworks often lack such clarity, leaving oversight of online political advertising at the intersection of various agency mandates. This situation can lead to overlaps in responsibilities, causing competition between agencies or, conversely, leading to gaps where certain tasks are neglected. Stronger coordination among all monitoring bodies is essential for effective oversight.

In Mexico electoral oversight involves at least three institutions—the National Electoral Institute (specifically its Technical Audit Unit, which monitors online activities), the Federal Electoral Tribunal and the Specialized Prosecutor for Electoral Crimes. The complexity of online political campaigns, particularly the use of influencers, highlights the need for these institutions to collaborate closely. However, unclear rules and responsibilities often hinder effective oversight. Addressing the potential misuse of influencers in political campaigns requires significant interagency coordination, which can be difficult to achieve in practice (Agrawal, Hamada and Fernández Gibaja 2021).

2.5. Illicit funding and organized crime

Organized crime poses a growing threat to peace and prosperity worldwide. Transnational illicit networks have spread, strengthening their ability not only to carry out their activities across borders and evade capture but also to exert control over territories and populations in every region of the world.

Organized criminal groups interfere with political and electoral processes through four main types of activities: (a) electoral fraud; (b) state-led electoral manipulation; (c) election-related violence; and (d) illicit campaign funding (Briscoe and Goff 2016). This section focuses on the last form of interference, illicit campaign funding, which takes place mainly during the campaign period. Around the world, evidence shows that political finance is a common channel for organized criminal groups to launder their cash and buy political leverage. By pumping illicit funds into political parties and election campaigns, they aim to influence elected officials in order to weaken law enforcement efforts, enable themselves to operate with impunity and gain support for their illegal enterprises.

The type of concession expected from elected officials in return for illicit funds provided during campaigns varies in accordance with their institutional roles and powers. In Guatemala, for example, local mayors can issue identity papers, so the provision of these documents to organized criminal organizations may be a point of particular interest, motivating them to support candidates for local office (Krujit 2011). In Brazil, where municipalities are in charge of zoning laws and construction permits, organized criminal groups have targeted local elected officials for several reasons, but especially because building houses in the neighbourhoods they control is one of their main sources of income (Veloso Hirata et al. 2021).

While this phenomenon is most pervasive in Latin American countries, studies have shown that it is also present in Africa, Asia and the Western Balkans (Box 2.4).

2.5.1. High campaign costs and insufficient legitimate funding

In many countries the high cost of entering into politics and running political campaigns makes candidates vulnerable to the influence of organized crime. Limited access to legitimate public and private funding exacerbates the problem, and criminal organizations exploit this gap by offering financial support in exchange for future favours—if and when the candidates they support are elected—such as shelving or preventing judicial investigations or legal proceedings against gang members and organized criminals, weakening legal and institutional mechanisms to combat them, and implicitly ceding territorial control by national and local governments (Lara Otaola and Rosales 2022). In Nigeria, for example, the ruling political party, the All Progressive Congress (APC) require candidates to pay NGN 100 million (approximately USD 66,600) for nomination forms to be a presidential candidate , forcing them to rely on ‘loans’ from donors which would eventually be paid back through inflated public contracts and other abuses of public resources (Itodo 2022; Chayes 2015). Political parties also benefit from links to organized crime, as they need to mobilize support and money to fund electoral campaigns and party-building activities. Criminal organizations not only may have money to invest (and launder) in these activities, but they also frequently have access to and control over cheap or forced labour that can be put to work to the benefit of their preferred candidates.

2.5.2. Weak regulation and oversight

Since drug trafficking (and other illicit businesses that fuel illicit networks) is a transnational business, international cooperation is essential for tracking and stopping the flow of dirty money into politics. The 2019 Oslo Statement on Corruption Involving Vast Quantities of Assets includes a specific recommendation reflecting this understanding: ‘Addressing state capture, foreign funding in politics and the penetration of political parties by organized crime groups should be prioritized by national and international stakeholders’ (UNODC 2019: 9).

It should be noted, however, that international legal regimes, such as the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) or the UNCAC, have been slow to provide more detailed provisions on how political finance integrity is connected with corruption and organized crime. For example, the 10th UNCAC Conference of States Parties failed to adopt a resolution on the topic despite significant pressure from civil society (Transparency International 2023). The Legislative Guide for the Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime does not mention political finance issues (UNODC 2017), nor does the Model Legislative Provisions against Organized Crime, published by the UNODC (2022). The legislative guidelines for the UNCAC also fail to go beyond copying and pasting article 7.3 of the Convention.

Moreover, a lack of effective political finance regulation at the national level is a critical vulnerability that enables and incentivizes criminal groups to use illicit campaign funding to influence political decisions. For instance, foreign donations or contributions from unregistered sources, such as diaspora communities, are often poorly controlled, providing an avenue for organized crime to finance candidates. This type of illicit funding has been observed in countries such as El Salvador and Ghana, where diaspora groups affiliated with political parties are increasingly providing both monetary and in-kind support for electoral campaigns. A lack of oversight of and accountability for these funding efforts is considered a vulnerability not only for money laundering and bribery but also for state capture by foreign entities disguised as diaspora groups (Nyarko 2021). In some cases, even state-level monitoring mechanisms fail to trace the origin and destination of such funds, leaving political systems open to exploitation.

2.5.3. Institutional weaknesses

Many countries struggle to enforce criminal laws due to systemic corruption and limited institutional capacity. Judicial systems are often compromised, with politicians and officials shielding criminal groups from prosecution. In some cases organized crime actively influences legislative and judicial decisions, weakening existing frameworks meant to counter illicit funding and infiltration. The inability of institutions to hold offenders accountable further emboldens criminal organizations, making it difficult to break the cycle of corruption and crime.

Another challenge is the level of independence of police and security forces in relation to elected officials. Where these officials are formally or informally empowered to appoint law enforcement, illicit networks might find it enticing to gain control of or influence over them before or during campaigns in order to extract benefits later. If the police and security forces have greater independence, as in Bolivia, direct bribery of law enforcement officials and security forces might be a more efficient path to ensuring impunity (Krujit 2011: 47). Thus, independence does not correlate with an absence of corruption, but it might impact how it manifests.

2.5.4. Geographic and regional factors

Organized crime often exploits institutional vulnerabilities at the local level as a way of infiltrating political systems. In rural or remote areas the lack of an effective state presence allows criminal networks to co-opt local politics, often through intimidation or financial support. The power of local elected officials over the appointment (and removal) of municipal and state police officers and their ability to direct public contracts make these officials the main targets of organized criminal groups (Briscoe and Goff 2016: 45). Temporary political organizations and smaller municipal structures, as well as regions of strategic importance, such as border areas and drug trafficking corridors, are especially susceptible to such influence, due to weak governance and their limited capacity to enforce regulations and resist external influences.

In Brazil, for instance, there is a growing concern about the infiltration of organized crime into local politics. By supporting candidates for mayor and city council through illicit funding and other means, major organized criminal groups such as the Comando Vermelho and Primeiro Comando da Capital drug-trafficking factions have sought to obtain influence over local governments to secure contracts, especially for garbage collection and public transportation (Godoy and Mazzoco 2024), in order to launder the proceeds of their criminal enterprises. Organized crime is also frequently interested in and benefits from changes to local zoning laws, which could lead to environmental degradation. As these major criminal organizations—originally from São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, respectively—gain footholds in other regions of the country, including in the Amazon, drug trafficking is becoming increasingly associated with illegal mining, further fuelling a vicious cycle of destruction of the rainforest (Gonçalves and Mariz 2024).

2.5.5. Cultural and structural issues

Cultural practices such as clientelism, vote buying and patronage create an environment conducive to the influence of organized crime. Politicians may seek out or be vulnerable to criminal organizations whenever they need to improve their political or personal positions. In many cases political systems prioritize personal enrichment over public service, leading candidates to accept bribes or misuse campaign funds for personal gain. These structural vulnerabilities make it easier for criminal organizations to infiltrate political systems, as politicians prioritize their self-interest over accountability or ethical governance.

Honduras is the country with the highest rate of vote buying in Central America. The predominance of clientelist structures and patronage networks leads to an increased reliance on the use of state resources to win elections, either through direct payments or through social programmes (Lara Otaola and Rosales 2022: 13). Insufficient transparency and the difficulty of auditing in-kind donations in small municipalities make it even more difficult to enforce legislation aimed at keeping dirty money from organized crime out of politics.

2.6. Good practices and practical examples from selected countries

This section describes good practices from selected countries that demonstrate a range of effective and innovative solutions to address corruption risks in political finance. Highlighted examples include the timely updating of existing political finance laws to reflect evolving challenges, the introduction of digital reporting and disclosure platforms to enhance transparency, and the use of AI to improve oversight capabilities and active engagement with civil society. These examples provide practical and actionable strategies to address issues such as campaign finance transparency, third-party spending, real-time monitoring and public accountability, offering valuable insights for tailoring approaches to different political and cultural contexts.

2.6.1. Legal and regulatory reforms

Placing limits on online campaign expenditure

Most countries have been slow to institute any meaningful legislative reform when it comes to advertising online or on social media platforms, often creating a loophole for the movement of money and making limits or bans on traditional advertising increasingly ineffective. In a handful of countries that have regulations in place, the nature of the regulations varies widely, including a requirement to register online advertising profiles (e.g. Argentina and Indonesia); outright bans (e.g. Comoros); targeted bans, such as on election day and the eve of polling (e.g. Armenia and Malaysia); bans on payments to influencers (e.g. Brazil); and regulations on specific content appearing in online advertisements (e.g. Iraq, Paraguay, the Philippines) (Power et al 2024). Several countries that demonstrate best practice in specific areas are highlighted in Box 2.5.

Curbing organized crime in politics through legislative measures

The UNTOC provides an overarching framework for legislative measures designed to address organized crime (UNODC 2022). As these measures address illicit funding in politics, it is important to consider how law enforcement measures are applicable to electoral courts or electoral prosecution systems, since it is the responsibility of these institutions to prevent organized crime from interfering in elections.

Specific restrictions on political funding might also help combat illicit funding from organized crime. Such measures might include bans on anonymous donations, enforcement against the use of proxy donors, limits on private donations, measures to restrict in-kind donations and to ensure that such donations can be audited, and sanctions for receiving funding from illicit sources. Several countries, such as Guatemala, Mexico, Nigeria and Peru, have already adopted measures to address these challenges (Box 2.6).

2.6.2. Digital solutions

Digital reporting and disclosure

In recent years a growing number of countries have adopted online reporting and disclosure systems to meet the broader demand for political finance transparency. These systems enable political parties and candidates to submit financial information through digital platforms, via either a dedicated website or specialized software. The information submitted is stored in a centralized database managed by the responsible monitoring agency, thus enabling comprehensive monitoring, categorization, analysis and verification. The information is then made available online, either as downloadable data files or through searchable databases (Jones 2017).

Online reporting and disclosure systems play a vital role in enhancing political integrity by fostering transparency and supporting anti-corruption efforts. These systems integrate with other mechanisms, leveraging shared data to identify patterns and expose potential corruption (Santiso and Roseth 2017). By making political finance data more publicly accessible in user-friendly formats, these systems empower voters to hold parties and candidates accountable. Although not a definitive solution to political finance reporting issues, such systems have the potential to improve the verification process and increase oversight by media and civil society, making a significant contribution to broader transparency initiatives.

Artificial intelligence for political finance oversight

While AI-related challenges—concerns about deepfakes, AI-powered misinformation and numerous other potential problems—have been thoroughly covered in recent literature and the popular press, the many potential benefits of AI have received much less coverage. International IDEA’s report Artificial Intelligence for Electoral Management highlights the ways in which AI can be harnessed at three stages of the electoral process—before, during and after elections (Juneja 2024).

AI can be used in many ways in the post-electoral period, such as consolidating political finance documents (Box 2.8), accelerating manual practices considerably and reducing the potential for electoral fraud. Electoral oversight bodies across the world are often constrained by resources and time. This makes their job of investigating wrongdoing, including political finance violations, incredibly challenging. This means investigations conclude long after elections have taken place, and often too late to enable voters to make informed decisions. Future adoption of technologies like AI can address this challenge by using cutting-edge technology to improve oversight bodies’ capacity to detect non-compliance in real time.

However, these solutions pose certain risks. The biggest challenge in utilizing AI-powered tools is adopting these new technologies without causing public concern. Human beings often do not trust innovations because of the difficulty involved in understanding them. In terms of its use for political finance oversight, the primary challenge is ensuring that AI-powered tools are not used to take oversight (and potential sanctioning) out of the hands of commissioners themselves. To mitigate public concerns, it is essential that AI-powered tools be used only to assist with electoral oversight—never to replace it. Keeping oversight in human hands is not just a guiding principle; it is an absolute necessity.

2.6.3. Civil society involvement

Civil society organizations and actors can play a crucial role in political finance monitoring and oversight by highlighting flaws in the regulatory process, identifying gaps in implementation, and proposing workable remedies and solutions (Box 2.9). They do so by:

• analysing political finance reports from political parties and candidates, investigating their accuracy and sharing the data provided in those reports with the electorate (in countries where official political finance data is scarce, civil society organizations collect this data themselves);
• conducting voter education activities, whereby voters are alerted to the long-term costs of vote buying and other political finance issues that are harmful to the political process; and
• advocating reform in collaboration with political parties, donors and government agencies.

2.6.4. Institutional approaches to strengthening oversight

By implementing robust legal frameworks, empowering independent oversight bodies and enhancing monitoring mechanisms, governments can establish a fair and transparent political finance landscape. Additionally, leveraging technology, engaging civil society and adopting international best practices can strengthen enforcement and promote a culture of accountability. These measures collectively ensure that political financing aligns with democratic principles and the public interest.

2.6.5. Interagency cooperation

Given the variety of challenges—both existing and emerging—related to political finance, several bodies and institutions are responsible for monitoring and oversight. To address these challenges, enhanced, interconnected information systems are needed to enable the adequate (and expedited) assessment of issues such as the integrity of donation sources, the legality of donated funds, and the veracity of reports presented by individuals and political parties (Lara Otaola and Rosales 2022: 18). By fostering collaboration and sharing resources, expertise and real-time information, different agencies can create a robust framework for detecting fraud, enforcing political finance laws, and ensuring transparency and accountability.

3.1. Policymakers and oversight agencies

3.1.1. Regulation on private contributions

1. In order to prevent the undue influence of one donor or a small group of donors, establish a reasonable limit on donations from a single source, whether an individual or a legal entity. Also apply this limit to donations from candidates and political parties to their own campaigns.
2. Prohibit donations from corporations that are fully or partially state-owned, participate in public procurement tenders, or receive state subsidies, permits or concessions.
3. Ban anonymous donations; where a ban is not feasible, impose appropriate limits on anonymous donations.
4. Prohibit donations to political parties and candidates from foreign sources, including foreign governments, citizens and legal entities, and establish clear definitions of what constitutes a foreign legal entity.
5. Establish criminal liability for individuals who knowingly solicit or accept political funding from illicit sources.

3.1.2. Provision of public funding

1. Consider direct public funding for political parties on an annual basis; ensure that the eligibility threshold and allocation criteria are objective and non-discriminatory, while allowing for political pluralism and safeguarding against abuse.
2. Provide subsidized access to public media outlets for political parties and candidates, especially during campaign periods, based on reasonable allocation criteria.
3. Develop clear guidelines on the permissible and prohibited use of state resources, including human, financial, material and other resources, by political parties and candidates during elections.

3.1.3. Spending regulations

1. Place limits on expenditures by political parties and candidates to reflect local realities; these limits should be determined through a consultation process based on objective data.
2. Review regulations on third parties and ensure that they are brought in line with regulations on political parties and candidates.
3. Review the regulated campaign periods and explore the feasibility of regulating parties, candidates and third parties in election and non-election years to the same (or a similar) degree.
4. Explore the feasibility of bringing online advertising regulations in line with restrictions on traditional media advertising. Require that publishers of advertisements, including social media platforms, maintain a register of all political advertisements, detailing the ad’s owner, sponsor and authorizing body; the amount spent; the number of impressions; the reach and duration of the ad; the targeting criteria; etc.
5. Require online platforms to implement measures preventing third parties from misusing paid online communications to evade political finance regulations. These measures could include relevant disclosure requirements, identity verification, and reporting systems for detecting non-compliant or suspicious advertisements.
6. Pass a law requiring that spending above a certain threshold be accompanied by an invoice in a machine-readable format.

3.1.4. Reporting and disclosure requirements

1. Require that political parties, candidates and third parties maintain detailed financial records in compliance with international accounting standards, including details on their income and expenditures, and the identity of donors and vendors, as well as assets and liabilities.
2. Mandate that political parties, candidates and third parties process all transactions through dedicated bank accounts for political and campaign purposes, which should be transparent and open to public scrutiny.
3. Require that political parties, candidates and third parties report on itemized income (cash and in-kind contributions) and expenditures, including details on transaction values and dates and the identity of donors and vendors. Adopt a regulation requiring that reports allow for the categorization of different expenses, including for preparing and placing online ads, whether directly or through intermediaries.
4. Adopt requirements on reporting deadlines to allow for verification, auditing and accountability, requiring annual and election-specific reports from political parties and campaign reports from candidates and third parties, including interim reports prior to election day.
5. Standardize reporting formats, introduce digital solutions and other systems to ensure seamless reporting, and provide political actors with appropriate training on their use.
6. Require that the oversight agency responsible for receiving political and campaign finance reports publish them in as close to real time as possible, through a centralized and user-friendly platform that provides searchable and accessible information in open-data formats.
7. Disclose certain data points, such as itemized income and expenditures, the identity of donors and vendors, etc.
8. Where there are privacy and security concerns associated with revealing the identify of small donors, place reasonable limits on the aggregate permissible amount of donations to a political party, candidate or campaign whose source is not publicly identified.

3.1.5. Oversight mechanisms

1. Empower an independent oversight body with the necessary mandate and sufficient resources to effectively monitor and enforce compliance with political finance regulations.
2. Provide training and resources for staff responsible for oversight of political and campaign finance.
3. Introduce effective, dissuasive and proportional civil, administrative, disciplinary and criminal sanctions for political finance violations. Provide the responsible agencies with a sufficient mandate and human and financial resources to investigate and prosecute violators. A repository of all the sanctions imposed should be available for public scrutiny.
4. Work with researchers and computer scientists to test the use of AI-powered tools in electoral oversight activities before, during and after an election, while adhering to the central tenet of human-in-the-loop oversight.

3.1.6. Interagency cooperation

1. Ensure proactive collaboration between political finance oversight agencies and other relevant institutions—such as tax and audit authorities, anti-corruption and financial intelligence units, law enforcement and judiciary—to track and investigate potential political finance violations and prevent the flow of illicit money into politics.
2. Enhance cooperation with private entities, including social media platforms, to ensure that their policies on political advertising are in line with national laws on political and campaign finance.
3. Collaborate with civil society and other watchdog groups to deploy monitors to investigate political finance violations.

3.2. Political parties

3.2.1. Internal policies and practices

1. Include political finance policy in party manifestos, which will make parties more accountable to citizens and demonstrate a commitment to levelling the playing field and tackling illicit funding.
2. Conduct an independent external audit of financial reports and make them available to the public in a user-friendly format.

3.2.2. Compliance with laws

1. Ensure that the sources and amounts of donations received are in line with existing regulations.
2. Cooperate with oversight bodies and submit required reports and documentation without delay.

3.2.3. Foster transparency

1. Introduce self-regulatory mechanisms even where formal regulations may not exist or are not comprehensive. Make intraparty procedures transparent, demonstrating to the public how they are preventing illicit funding.
2. Publish detailed and timely financial reports, including itemized income sources, expenditures, assets and liabilities, through accessible, public-facing financial dashboards.

3.2.4. Foster a culture of integrity

1. Train party members and candidates on ethical fundraising, spending and compliance with regulations.
2. Cultivate an internal party culture that prioritizes transparency and rejects corrupt practices.

3.3. Private entities

3.3.1. Corporations

1. Establish clear internal policies and guidelines governing political donations, including contribution limits, restrictions and approval processes.
2. Set up board committees to monitor and approve political donations and ensure alignment not only with corporate values but also with broader societal goals, avoiding funding that promotes narrow corporate interests at the expense of public welfare.
3. Publish on websites and in annual reports detailed reports on all political donations, including the amounts, recipients and purpose of contributions.
4. Collaborate with industry peers to develop and adhere to voluntary standards for political finance transparency.

3.3.2. Social media platforms

1. Ensure compliance with political finance laws wherever they operate.
2. Ensure that all political advertisements are labelled and include information on who paid for them, who authorized them, the targeting criteria used and the amount spent.
3. Maintain publicly accessible, searchable libraries of all political advertisements, including the information outlined above.
4. Implement safeguards to prevent foreign entities from funding or running political ads during elections in another territory.
5. Allow regulatory bodies and the public to monitor campaign spending in real time by offering application programming interfaces or dashboards with detailed data on political advertising expenditures.

3.4. Civil society organizations and media

1. Serve as an effective watchdog when it comes to compliance with political finance regulations by systematically documenting and analysing political parties’ and candidates’ finances, and make the information publicly accessible in a way that is easy to understand.
2. Work closely with oversight agencies and political parties to provide feedback on measures to promote political finance transparency.
3. Carry out awareness-raising activities to educate the public on the role of money in politics and the negative repercussions of violations of political finance regulations, including vote-buying and vote-selling practices.

3.5. International actors (international organizations, donor agencies, etc.)

1. Prioritize the issue of political finance as part of larger efforts to curb corruption, focusing on building the capacity of oversight agencies to carry out their role in monitoring and enforcing compliance with political finance regulations.
2. Provide support to strengthen internal party controls and to build the capacity of political party leaders and officials.
3. Document and share best practices from different countries and make them available for collective learning. Create spaces for dialogue and to exchange best practices.
4. Upon request from national stakeholders, provide technical support for drafting or updating political finance laws and regulations, drawing on global best practices.
5. Together with civil society organizations and national governments, continue calling for better global norms and standards for political finance transparency.