Supporting inclusive transitions: International IDEA and IGAD conclude the 3rd Special Envoys Retreat in Nairobi

The main objective of the retreat was to take stock, reflect and share lessons and strategies on addressing challenges to democratic governance in Africa. The convening brought together Regional Economic Communities (RECs) special envoys and high officials supporting select AU Member States that are undergoing political transitions – Burkina Faso, South Sudan, Sudan, and Somalia. The programme agenda and full list of participants is attached. 

The retreat acknowledged that there was a wave of democratic reversal across the continent manifested by eroding public trust in government by citizens and poor social cohesion. The main challenges and issues that were identified as threats to democratic consolidation include:

a.    A crisis of leadership, and abuse of institutions that safeguard democracy – parliament, judiciary, constitutional commissions, security agencies, etc., are threats to democratic governance. In several instances, state imminent collapse, limited capabilities and inability to deliver for citizens remains a threat to democracy consolidation due to elite and state capture, incapacity and contestations that threaten national cohesion, impunity, corruption and human rights violation by those in leadership with institutions that should safeguard and uphold democracy being weak.

b.    Limited inclusion and participation of citizens in decision making and governance by states. Popular uprisings and agitation especially by young people largely due to disenfranchisement, high levels of corruption, huge debt burden and poor service delivery have widened the gap between citizens trust with state authorities. This has also been buoyed by suppression, repression and violation of human rights and civil liberties including freedom of speech, and association that has led to violent protest, destruction of property, and loss of lives.

c.  Mismanagement of diversity and democratic competition -- the notion that democratic competition only survives if losers are willing to concede defeat the absence of which illegitimises the process. In the absence of concession, securing democracy in competitive electoral outcomes where the loss is negligible has increasingly become contested and led to violence conflict and insecurity.

d. In Member States undergoing political transitions, insecurity, violence, terrorism, displacements and humanitarian crisis challenge democratic governance since states do not have full territorial control or capacity to deliver democratic dividends.  Putting an end to these attacks is challenged by the fact that terrorists are embedded in the general population making it hard to foster cohesion and establish trust between government and citizens. The effects of these attacks further erode any trust in government by the population as they negatively impact service delivery, actual physical harm, displacement of population the effects which are long-term.

e.    Rise in authoritarianism, military coups and unconstitutional changes of government. While citizens perception surveys such as by Afrobarometer suggest that an overwhelming majority of Africans prefer democratic governance to any other form of governance, there is an emerging resurgence in authoritarian and military leadership with a promise to restore security and stability in several AU Member States. The military and authoritarian regimes have since prolonged the political transitions with no sun set clauses to decrees and agreements for the transitions which threats long term stability and opportunity to restore constitutional order.

f.    Poor implementation of norms and standards – while AU Member States have adopted several instruments and policies promoting democratic governance, their weak implementation remains a significant challenge. In addition, several national constitutional frameworks and laws do not reflect the values, aspirations and demands of the citizenry which pits the government against citizens and in turn breeds public mistrust, disconnect with their leaders. The challenges of democracy is not norms and principles but rather how to implement. 

4.    The retreat reflected upon and examined specific experiences towards democratic governance in four AU Member States that are undergoing challenging political transitions: Burkina Faso; South Sudan; Sudan and Somalia. Each of the case studies affirm the identified democratic governance challenges as identified with specific contexts and opportunities on how to address challenges. This section identifies transversal issues and lessons learnt in the four case studies for further deeper refection and opportunities to support inclusive transitions. The issues identified include an acknowledgement that:

a.    Peace, security, stability and restoration of government authority in the territory of country is the utmost priority and thus as a prerequisite to promote and consolidate democratic governance. Without peace, stability and sufficient state authority over its territory credible and legitimate elections are only an illusion. Burkina Faso attested that its priority is to re-establish and reinforce security to ensure territorial integrity. Specifically in the fight against terrorism, the adoption of the National Security Policy to strengthen internal security, a coordination unit and an agency to support victims and survivors of violence is its top priority. With over 2 million people in dire need of humanitarian assistance, the government seeks support to facilitate return for displaced populations and address the humanitarian emergencies as a matter of urgency and priority.

b.    Relative to democratic governance even before credible elections can be considered it is imperative to ensure institutions that can safeguard the electoral democracy are strengthened and restored and as such the focus remains:

• Judicial and other government sector reforms

• Constitutional review

• Review of the electoral processes and legislation including the enabling legislation to regulate the cost of elections, campaign financing and regulate political party financing by private sector and fight corruption.

c.    Politics of exclusion and limited inclusion of citizens especially youth and women in political transitions and governance are central to the rise in agitation, violence and clamour for self determination and extremism in most of the countries in crisis.  Indeed, the genesis of South Sudanese clamour for independence was noted to have been firmly anchored on the grievance of exclusion and guided by principle of self-determination. Following independence, several civil unrest and wars have erupted raising the need for more efforts to strengthen inclusivity and strengthen cohesion in state formation.

d.    The principle of inclusion demands that it is not incidental nor peripheral, instead, it should be structured, deliberate and planned. Measures to ensure that governance processes are fully and genuinely inclusive must be taken where transitions are designed in a robust way, full participation of citizens or their representatives as well as including sunset clauses in transitional agreements to deter the need for extensions that keep countries in perpetual state of transition. The priorities identified in South Sudan Include: 

• Finding solutions for internally displaced and refugee populations.

• Addressing impunity, accountability and curbing corruption and misuse of public resources through among other investing in sound PFM mechanism.

• Restructuring the judiciary as a fundamental pillar for state building and peace building.

• Strengthen governance through the development of a permanent/federal constitution which recognizes federalism/devolution as a system of choice.

e.    Clarity is needed on whether to pursue a full and complete transition or a new social political order in countries in transition for state building as highlighted in the Sudan case study. Sudan revealed a struggle persists between democracy and pre-existing traditional order. And as such that when transitions and revolutions are not anchored on addressing historical and old legacies of injustice and exclusion, good governance is an impossible dream.

f.    National and local dialogue between and among the various facets of society is a prerequisite for consolidating and restoring democratic governance between various facets of society towards a united state formation. Such dialogue must and should go beyond discussion on democratic governance ideals but other social and societal ills that have become threats to the social fabric, identity and dignity of populations.  The Sudan crisis is extensively exacerbated by the deliberate and concerted use of sexual violence and rape as a tool for war against women and girls, which requires concerted efforts of all, beyond a legalistic approach to ensure accountability and restoration of the rights and dignity of victims and survivors. Traditional and social governance structures including religious authorities should be part and parcel of these conversation and pursuit for sustainable and durable solutions.

g.    Effective coordination, leadership and cooperation among internal actors and external mediators seems elusive in dealing with transitions as exemplified in Sudan.  The Proliferation of mediator and contested spaces recalled a redefinition of role and coordination between special processes and mechanism and special envoys to support transition processes.  In addition, complementarity between the AU and RECs based on the principle of complementarity and subsidiarity is critically important given the differences in approaches including on imposition and lifting of sanctions which have at times made some of the interventions ineffective as highlighted in the Alliance of Sahel States stalemate with ECOWAS and the AU.

h.    It is imperative to shift from a security heavy approach to a political solution in advancing democratic governance as exemplified in the Somalia case study. The significant investment in military approaches and addressing terrorism has not necessary yielded to effective solution to the structural challenges facing the countries in transition. While stability and security remain significant aspects that requires concerted effort, they should be accompanied by other home grown solutions - as emerging in Somalia, even while at face value they may appear imperfect and unfamiliar with conventional democratic processes - such as representation and inclusion through clans in governance.  A focus on constitutional making and restoration and strengthening of institutions that promote and safeguard democracy in the case of Somalia should be the next priority while seeking on the same hand securing territorial integrity.

i.    Enhancing and promoting civil military relations is the key to resolve the Sudan crisis that includes addressing the entitlement of the military and other groups to lead as well as access to resources to ensure national resources are utilised for the benefit of all citizens and harnesses diversity of the people in all regions.

Lesson Learned and Key Messages

5.    The retreat acknowledged that in advancing democratic governance in countries in transition requires modesty in how we approach and seek to provide answers and solutions to crisis. Inevitably that entails:

a.    Effective coordination and cooperation among the affected state parties with regional mechanism and regional institutions. The primary responsibility of restoration of democracy order and constitutionalism is the preserve of the state party concerned. Accordingly support for state undergoing transition should be based on effective coordination and dialogue with the State party concerned and citizens and importantly acknowledging their contexts and challenges without imposition of solutions that are not informed and based on their lived reality as exemplified in the Burkina Faso case study. Granted states should no hide behind the principle of sovereignty when sovereignty truly lies with the people in engaging and finding solutions to governance challenges. Regarding the Alliance of Sahel States, RECs and the AU should consider lifting sanctions and measures  aimed at frustrating the Sahel Alliance –noting that it not only aligns with other regional Mechanisms to resolve and address peculiar challenges confronting them but it’s a product of the frustration and failure by the regional mechanism to attend to some of the concerns and issues raised by its Members.

b.    The role of external factors should be further interrogated and interrogated. This examination should not only be limited to regional actors but other international foreign actors whose interests are vested and not necessary aligned with voices and aspiration of citizens of the countries in transition. Support should not be limited to countries that have embraced democracy but importantly those countries that have fallen out of the remits of democracy without attracting other actors taking advantage of their exclusion to facilitate them to participate in democratic processes including reconsider sanctions as the solution or the incentive to return them to the fold.

c.    Democracy governance goes beyond electoral processes and thus an acknowledgement that elections are not the only barometer of democratic progress and governance – but rather stability, peace, security and economic governance should be priority focus in efforts to restore democratic governance. It was acknowledged and affirmed that exclusive focus on civilian rule through elections is not a guarantee of good governance, and that stability or a viable social contract between the people and state are as important. In the case of Somalia, the role of clans and religions (Islam) are key to any efforts to democracy consolidation and this important to ensure context specific solutions mirror and reflect a country context.

d.    Managing democratic competition is central to restoration of democratic governance in countries in transition through efforts such as consensus democracy and governance built upon and based not only losers willing to concede they have lost elections but ensuring the interest of the minority or those considered to have lost equally being part and benefiting from share of national resources and opportunities. Elections are linked to share of resources which should not be the main driver but rather harnessing good and accountable governance for all. That includes establishing and developing mechanisms and incentives to enable the enfranchisements of the minority who may not feel part of the system.

e.    Investing in devolution of power and resources to the local people is an imperative so that people can govern themselves. That is hinged upon an appreciation that democracy means more than fundamental political freedoms and should go hand in hand with socio economic delivery and facilitating citizens to only have a voice but also take charge of how their local context and issues are handled and inform national policy making including the role of traditional authorities and community leaders. At the heart of democratic process is transformation which is hinged upon delivery to citizens – governing by the people for the people and holding the state accountable.

f.    Enhancing linkages and synergy between humanitarian assistance and development to address significant humanitarian crisis including Internally displaced people, refugees and erosion of state capacity to deliver should be accompanied by efforts to provide the means for citizens to find durable solutions.  

g.    Public and civic education is critical to safeguarding and building a democratic state. Engaging citizens in a language their understand, connect with and understand is critically important as demonstrated in the resurging the Gen Z movements on the continent. Technology and information and new data tools and process can promote and enhance public education while remain conscious of threats and some of the emerging dangers associated with new media and technology including invasion of privacy, abuse and misuse of information, which are also threats to democratisation.

h.    Investing in quality of leadership and strong institutions matters which requires conscious and deliberate effort to identify, capacitate and develop a new generation of leaders and public officials whose interests is to deliver for the people rather that self-aggrandisement. The need to develop to train and produces quality and ethical minds that are also capable into Africa’s space for democracy requires investing in leadership – by among others designing platforms and spaces for politics governance and leadership – in all spheres. Leadership should not be the work of solitary workers but part of the collective which entail a new political class that have the character, capacity and competence.

i.    Strengthening political parties as the vehicles and institutions to guarantee credible and issues-based governance is important. Acknowledging that most of the current political parties are special purpose vehicles primary for elite access to power and resources of the state, it was noted that sustaining democratic governance will require capable independent and issues based political parties.

j.    Accountability and addressing impunity should accompany political transition processes and democratisation – through sequencing transitional justice processes that are not only focused on criminal accountability but rather the entire scope of justice including transformative and rehabilitative justice reforms.