Stability or Elections: A look into Qatar's 2024 Constitutional Referendum
On 5 November 2024, as the world focused on the U.S. presidential election, Qatar held a constitutional referendum. One of the key amendments, that to Article (77), ends Qatar's experiment with elections for the Shura Council, the country’s advisory legislative body.
The only election, held in 2021, highlighted the restrictions on political rights for naturalized citizens, including their exclusion from both voting and running for a seat on the Shura Council. The revised constitution now eliminates the requirement for "original" nationality for members of the Shura Council and government ministers, thereby promoting greater political inclusion for naturalized citizens. However, by rescinding voting rights for all citizens, this move towards societal stability comes at the expense of opportunities for democratic participation.
In the referendum, eligible citizens aged 18 and older voted on 19 proposed amendments. The results, announced the following day, revealed a voter turnout of 84 percent. Of the valid votes cast, 90.6 percent approved changes that revised 14 articles, introduced two new ones, and removed three.
Why end elections?
While Qatar has successfully conducted municipal elections since 1999[1], the promise of legislative elections at a national level—initially outlined in the 2003 constitution—was delayed repeatedly until 2021. Now, after just one election cycle, Qatar has reverted to a fully appointed Shura Council. In an address to the Shura Council on 15 October 2024, Emir Sheikh Tamim explained the decision, arguing that electoral competition within the context of family and tribal ties —such as that which occurred during the 2021 Shura Council elections—could lead to future problems, such as intra-tribal rivalries and social fragmentation, that Qatar would rather avoid. Qatar is therefore prioritizing domestic stability over the pursuit of more radical political reform in the form of electoral participation.
Aiming for national unity
Historically, the country has maintained a kinship citizenship system that distinguishes between "original" citizens—individuals whose families settled in Qatar before 1930 and who are recognized as part of the native population due to their continuous ancestral ties to the land— and “naturalized” citizens —individuals whose families obtained citizenship after 1930 through legal processes. Naturalized citizens, including members of nomadic tribes, do not possess the same rights as original citizens and have been denied equal rights and participation in political life due to, principally, their lack of historical continuity in residency and ancestral connection to Qatar.
This type of exclusion is common in Gulf states, where stratified systems reserve political rights for specific groups based on tribal or strategic considerations. In Qatar’s case, many of the naturalized citizens come from tribes historically affiliated with Saudi Arabia, such Al Murrah. During the 2017 Saudi-led blockade of Qatar, this affiliation led to societal tension due to concerns about the loyalty of naturalized citizens. The 2021 electoral law, which limited voting rights to "original" citizens, further exacerbated already existing divisions and sparked considerable protest. After the 2021 election experience, Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani instructed the Qatari government to prepare legal measures for promoting "equal Qatari citizenship". However, until the proposed constitutional amendments this year, there had not been any moves in this regard.
In this context, a key amendment approved by the 2024 referendum is the removal of the requirement of "original" nationality for Shura Council members and government ministers. This change, defined in Articles (80) and (117) of the new constitution, is being touted as a step toward greater unity. By allowing naturalized citizens to be appointed to these roles, the Qatari leadership hopes to heal divisions created by the prior exclusionary laws. In theory, this increases political inclusion among the roughly 13 per cent of Qatar’s population that hold citizenship, including both original citizens and those who have been naturalized.
A vote to end voting
In Qatar’s 2024 constitutional referendum, citizens were asked to vote away their right to elect members of the Shura Council in the name of national unity, rather than extending voting rights to naturalized citizens or allowing them to run for office. As a result, the new constitution strips all citizens of these rights. While this may seem to reduce inequalities by allowing both “original” and naturalized citizens to be appointed to Shura Council and ministerial positions, true equality remains uncertain, as all such appointments still require the Emir’s approval.
Although the constitutional removal of distinctions between “original” and naturalized citizens may suggest a step forward in Qatar's citizenship practices, a critical question remains: will this change extend to other policy areas in the future? For meaningful change, broader reforms are needed —ones that address persistent inequalities in other areas, such as access to employment, social benefits, and public services. Without these deeper policy shifts, the new constitutional provisions risk becoming a symbolic gesture rather than a transformative move towards equal citizenship rights.
In the span of just three weeks from the initial proposal to the referendum[2], Qatar has aligned with a regional trend that prioritizes stability over electoral representation, mirroring Kuwait’s recent suspension of its parliament. In this context, the wide support for the rushed constitutional amendments reflects popular trust in leadership and the shared belief that these changes, amid a sense of a volatile regional landscape, will help ensure domestic stability in Qatar.
Ultimately, the 2024 constitutional referendum marks the end of Qatar’s brief electoral experiment. Yet, within the context of the country’s political system, this change does not represent a significant departure from the status quo. As Emir Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani stated, “the Shura Council is not a representative parliament in a democratic system, and its status and powers will not be affected whether its members are chosen by election or appointment.”
[1] Elections to the Central Municipal Council were not part of the referendum and will continue to take place.
[2] After the Emir's announcement of the proposal on 15 October, the Shura Council’s Constitutional Committee convened the next day for reviewing the amendments and then approving them on 28 October, with unanimous support from all 45 members, including those elected in 2021. On 30 October, an Emiri decree set the referendum for 5 November, alongside the formation of a Referendum Committee to oversee the vote.
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